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Abstract of the Dissertation
Empire of Energy:
Environment, Geopolitics, and American Technology before the Age of Oil
by
Peter Adam Shulman,
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The History and Social Study of Science and Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2007
This dissertation asks how the United States physically built its global empire. Between
1840 and 1930, empire building involved the establishment of a network of naval bases
and coaling stations. By focusing on energy, I reconceptualize the American overseas
empire as neither inevitable nor geographically predetermined. I trace how coal shaped
U.S. expansion, how this expansion influenced ideas about national security, and how
these security concerns affected the global environment. Coal reveals continuities in
American foreign relations that link overseas expansion to responses to the introduction
of steam power into ocean travel. As the Navy sought coal, it progressively assembled
the familiar contours of America's global reach.
The dissertation addresses both global and local history. It shows how policy makers
before the Civil War demonstrated tremendous creativity in initiating geological
investigations, diplomatic arrangements, and commercial agreements in foreign
territories. Between the Civil War and 1898, these approaches gradually gave way to a
more singular effort by the Navy to control strategic ports around the world. Soon, coal
was so central to the Navy that coaling strategy and technology formed a foundation for
the education of elite officers at the Naval War College, where its study shaped the
planning for future wars. Attention to Americans in Borneo, Japan, the Isthmus of

Chiriqui, Haiti, and Alaska shows how coal reoriented the American geographic
perspectives.
Three themes structure this work. First, the peculiar geography of the U.S. overseas
empire of coaling stations was never predetermined, for the perceived needs of expansion
changed with evolving diplomatic and technological circumstances. Paying close
attention to scientists and engineers, I show how the fundamental obstacles presented by
coal were addressed not only by diplomacy but also new inventions and geological
expeditions. Second, that the American pursuit of steamship lines, coal, and territory
abroad took place amid the global context of other maritime nations. Finally, the ultimate
shape of American global expansion often depended on the particular histories of specific
places and local events. I thus show how coal linked mine labor, professional geologists,
naval officers, and global expansion to the construction of a recognizably modern United
States.
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Introduction: Discovering American Power
Matthew Perry was by nature a cautious man. When selected in 1852 to command an
American expedition to Japan, he spent months preparing his ships and crew. He
interviewed whaling captains in New Bedford who knew the Pacific's waters better than
any sailor in America or Europe. He also composed meticulous plans for coaling his
steamers. Steam was, in fact, essential to his mission. His ships, the Mississippi, the
Susquehanna, and the Powhatan, were selected to impress upon the Japanese the
technological might of the United States. For Perry, the steamers offered him more
control to maneuver in different seasons and weather. Steam was also a motive behind
the mission itself, for steam power required coal. In the vast Pacific Ocean, Americans
lacked no resource more than coal. As one of his most pressing objectives in Japan,
Perry determined to secure supplies of coal for future American steamship lines from
California to China.1
Perry did not restrict his hunt for coal to Japan alone. He brought what stocks he
could with him, arranged for additional supplies to be deposited in advance of his arrival
in certain ports, and hoarded any quantity he could obtain wherever he dropped anchor.
He sent geological expeditions to search for coal in Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands. He
even purchased a strip of land from an American settler in the Bonin Islands where he
anticipated establishing an American coaling station. The desire for coal in the far east
convinced Perry, however, that perhaps more drastic measures were necessary, that
perhaps a more political and geographic solution to the coal problem was required.
' On the Perry mission in general, see Peter Booth Wiley and Ichiro Korogi, Yankees in the Land of the
Gods: Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan (New York: Viking, 1990).
Writing in 1844 to James Dobbin, then Secretary of the Navy, Perry suggested
formally annexing Great Lew Chew Island, the largest of the Ryukyu group and home of
Okinawa for coal and a coaling station. Perry's suggestion horrified his superiors in
Washington. Dobbin called Perry's suggestion to take the island "embarrassing."
President Millard Fillmore, briefed on the proposal, acknowledged Perry's "patriotic
motive" but was "disinclined, without the authority of Congress, to take and retain
possession of an island in that distant country, particularly unless more urgent and potent
reasons demanded it than now exist." Why? Dobbin did not refer to theories of
representative government or racial superiority, but rather the stark language of great
power politics and naval strategy. Dobbin explained that "it would also be rather
mortifying to surrender the island, if once seized, and rather inconvenient and expensive
to maintain a force there to retain it."2
How different the world looked in 1899. When Royal B. Bradford, Chief of the
Navy's Bureau of Equipment, wrote that year that "it is necessary to have stations where
provisions, ammunition, and coal may be obtained," more Americans were inclined to
listen. That year, the United States assumed control of the Samoan harbor of Pago Pago.
Only the year before, the United States had annexed Hawaii. Guam and the Philippines
came under formal U.S. sovereignty in 1899. The Navy intended on building or
enlarging naval stations on each of these islands. In the Caribbean, the Navy
appropriated the Cuban harbor at Guantinamo, and began planning for a naval station in
eastern Puerto Rico as well.
2 J.C. Dobbin to Matthew Perry 5/30/1854, A Report of the Secretary of the Navy, in Compliance with a
Resolution of the Senate ofDecember 6, 1854, Calling for Correspondence, &C., Relative to the Naval
Expedition to Japan, Senate Ex. Doc. 34, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess. (1855).
Only a few more years and fueling the American empire was a well
institutionalized activity. "The efficiency of a battleship depends upon its coal almost as
much as upon its guns," explained Franklin Roosevelt to Congress in 1915. Roosevelt,
then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was describing his department's obsession with
purchasing the finest coal available. "Had it been necessary," he observed, "as
fortunately it has not been, to submit to what we consider monopolistic and extortionate
prices, or to take coal of an inferior character, we would unhesitatingly have submitted to
such extortion rather than impair the efficiency of our ships."3 Alfred Thayer Mahan, the
dean of American naval historians and strategists, went even further than Roosevelt in
characterizing the nation's dependence on coal. "Fuel stands first in importance of the
resources necessary to a fleet," he noted in 1911. "Without ammunition, a ship may run
away, hoping to fight another day, but without fuel she can neither run, nor reach her
station, nor remain on it, if remote, nor fight. '" Without fuel, the American empire would
not run.
How does a nation build an empire? What are its sinews and where are its synapses?
How is foreign policy and naval strategy tied to the geography of natural resources, and
in particular to the resources of energy? How do strategic concerns affect the
environment? In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the United States
expanded its commercial and military reach into the Caribbean and Pacific, a central
rationale for territorial acquisition was the establishment of coaling stations to help
3 Committee on Naval Affairs. House, Statement of Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, 63rd. Cong., 3rd. sess., 1915, 957.
4 A. T. Mahan to G. von L. Meyer, April 21, 1911, Box 41, File "414-2 1900-1915," General Board
Subject File, 1900-1947, RG 80, National Archives I.
enlarge foreign markets and to provide national security. But why did the association of
coal with empire and control of distant territories seem to matter more in 1899 or 1915
than 1854?
This dissertation is about the United States' first energy policy and how it shaped
the global expansion of the nation. According to the cultural historian of technology,
David Nye, "energy systems" structure the social world, from work and leisure to the
organization of cities and the human interaction with nature.5 Energy systems also
fundamentally shape a nation's foreign affairs and patterns of geographic expansion in
ways that demand careful historical analysis. As Nye emphasizes, energy systems-and
the technologies that implement them--do not themselves determine the choices people
make about how much energy to use, in what forms to consume it, or what policies a
state should adopt. These choices are made by individuals, and after the emergence of
industrial power sources, increasingly by governments and corporations. As those
choices are made, energy systems shape "assumptions about what is normal and
possible."6 What energy made normal and possible in the mid-19 th century looked very
different in the early 20&, and in part, these changed stimulated and facilitated the growth
of the American global empire.
Empire is a tricky word for the historian, especially in the context of the United
States. Empire is sometimes celebrated and often criticized. Its connotations range from
continental expansion to economic exploitation to cultural hegemony. It is always
political. It is also more than markets and ideas. It requires a material underpinning, and
that underpinning changed with industrialization in the 19h century. In the 1840s,
s David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History ofAmerican Energies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1998), 8.
6 Ibid., 7.
American policy-makers began thinking very consciously about what they wanted for the
future of their country, and what sorts of resources and technologies would facilitate that
vision. Projecting American influence overseas-building an empire-began in part with
the incorporation of industrial technology into the realm of American foreign relations.
In the modem world, the most fundamental of these industrial technologies involve
energy.7
This dissertation is about power. It is about political power operating in the halls
of Washington. It is about the geopolitical power of an expanding nation, butting against
other nations and peoples. It is about an economic power brought about by
industrialization. These narratives will be familiar to many readers. But power has other
valences as well. I argue that American power, as measured by its economic output, the
size of its armed forces, or its ability to influence the affairs of other nations, was directly
related to the harnessing of material power-the power found in coal-that the nation
possessed in abundance at home but struggled for nearly a century to make serve foreign
policy. French Chadwick, President of the Naval War College, captured the significance
of this power in 1901. Speaking proudly of his nation, he declared that "on coal depends
this civilization as truly as does life upon air." Upon coal he anticipated building the 20th
century, for "the future is ours," he exclaimed, "because the coal is ours."8
' For important recent works touching on the emergence of the American empire, see Niall Ferguson,
Colossus: The Price ofAmerica's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Eric Tyrone Lowery Love, Race over
Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
2004), Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006), Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude
to Globalization, California Studies in Critical Human Geography 9 (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2003).
8 Captain French E. Chadwick, "Coal; Lecture Delivered 1901," Folder 1, Box 2, RG 14, Naval War
College, Newport, RI.
This history also has an environmental context. Steam power might seem a
peculiar subject for environmental history, but environmental historians are no strangers
to empire. Charting the ecological aspects of empire has, in fact, been an important topic
for historians of European imperialism for some time.9 Some works have examined
ecological exchange, like the flow of plants, animals, and disease organisms between
previously isolated ecological regimes.10 Describing the exchange of specific food and
cash crops, other historians have traced the impacts of European colonial agriculture and
the social consequences of the introduction of new foods and products like sugar, coffee,
and tobacco."1 Still other works have examined the ways imperialism provided a context
for science and the development of scientific ideas, as well as they ways in which science
was used to project or buttress imperial power. From the development of
"environmentalist" thought to the collection of medicinal plants, historians have shown
that empires depend on scientific networks and technological systems as much as on
political control. 12
9 For one American environmental historian's foray into the historiographic differences between U.S. and
non-U.S. environmental history, especially the latter's emphasis on imperialism, see Paul Sutter,
"Reflections: What Can U.S. Environmental Historians Learn from Non-U.S. Environmental
Historiography?," Environmental History 8, no. 1 (2003).
o1 Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492, 30th
anniversary ed. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The
Biological Expansion ofEurope, 900-1900, 2nd ed., Studies in Environment and History (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), William Hardy McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor
Books, 1989), Elinor G. K. Melville, A Plague ofSheep: Environmental Consequences of the Conquest of
Mexico, Studies in Environment and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
" For a classic study of sugar in the Caribbean and Europe, see Sidney Wilfred Mintz, Sweetness and
Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin Books, 1986). For two works that
consider the European reception of crops including tea, coffee, tobacco, chocolate, the potato, quinine, and
cotton, see James Walvin, Fruits ofEmpire: Exotic Produce and British Taste, 1660-1800 (New York:
New York University Press, 1997), Henry Hobhouse, Seeds of Change: Six Plants That Transformed
Mankind, New ed. (London: Papermac, 1999).
12 Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of
Environmentalism, 1600-1860, Studies in Environment and History (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1995). For two excellent recent studies on scientific networks, see Richard Harry Drayton, Nature's
Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2000), Londa L. Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World
American historians have been encouraged recently to draw upon this Europe-
centered scholarship and help recast U.S. history in global, environmental terms. In a
provocative essay in Diplomatic History, Mark H. Lytle has spoken of a "silence" among
historians of American foreign relations on environmental topics.1 3 The silence is
gradually being filled. Kurk Dorsey has pioneered this field by showing how
international cooperation between the United States and Canada over fisheries, fur seals,
and migratory birds placed the natural world front and center among diplomats.14
Richard Tucker has argued that American demand for natural goods like sugar, rubber,
and timber have led to a global environmental decline. 15
Only recently, however, have historians begun considering the relationship
between war, militaries, and environmental change. 16 The mutual dependence of war and
the environment evokes an array of iconic images: in recent history one thinks
immediately of the napalm devastated forests of Vietnam or Kuwait's smoldering oil fires
from the First Gulf War. Surprisingly, however, historians now studying the
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). On the emergence of ecological thought, see Greg
Barton, Empire Forestry and the Origins ofEnvironmentalism, Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography
; 34 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order
in the British Empire, 1895-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).
13 Mark Lytle, "An Environmental Approach to American Diplomatic History," Diplomatic History 20, no.
2 (1996): 280.
14 Kurkpatrick Dorsey, The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties
in the Progressive Era, Weyerhaeuser Environmental Books (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1998).
15 Richard P. Tucker, Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the
Tropical World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
16 To be sure, historians have long noted the effects of military campaigns on agriculture and landscapes,
though these observations have typically been ancillary to other aspects of their narratives. The lack of
historical evidence also makes the evaluation of some of these claims difficult. For example, the fifth
century, B.C. historian Thucydides describes the torching of Athenian crops and forests, though the
classicist Victor Davis Hanson demonstrated in the 1980s that this strategy caused little long-term damage
to Athens and did not, as had long been assumed, contribute to the polis's fourth century decline. On the
Peloponnesians torching of Athenian crops, see Thucydides, Walter Blanco, and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts,
The Peloponnesian War: A New Translation, Backgrounds, Interpretations, 1st ed., Norton Critical Edition
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998), 67, 79. For Hanson's now classic analysis, see Victor Davis
Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, Rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1998).
environmental impacts of war have observed that the violence of combat actually
produces little lasting ecological damage. The same cannot be said for preparations for
war and economic mobilization. What J. R. McNeill has recently written about forests
and warfare holds true for the environment in general. McNeill notes that in all
likelihood, preparing for war has affected forests far more than warfare itself "because
societies more often have prepared for war than gone to war, and because preparation
often lasted longer, remained more constant, and thus had more ongoing effects."' 7
Although war plays pivotal roles in this history, most of the story takes place in long
years in between when thinking about the next war consumed naval and diplomatic
thought about the natural world and its useful resources.
My thinking about flows of commodities in the construction of bounded political
spaces draws on William Cronon's magisterial Nature's Metropolis, with two important
differences. Cronon explores how urban Chicago emerged simultaneously with its grain,
timber, and meat producing hinterland. Railroads connected country and city, and city to
the growing nation. Where Cronon describes city and hinterland, I am interested in
nation and its global companions in trade and war. In a sense, I am interested in inverting
Cronon's analysis: instead of looking at how a city shaped a nation from within, I am
7 J.R. McNeill, "Woods and Warfare in World History," Environmental History 9, no. 3 (2004): 403. For
other recent examples of the far environmental reach of military mobilization, see A. Joshua West, "Forests
and National Security: British and American Forestry Policy in the Wake of World War I," Environmental
History 8, no. 2 (2003), Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals
from World War I to Silent Spring, Studies in Environment and History (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001). Rauno Lahtinen and Timo Vuorisalo, "'It's War and Everyone Can Do As They Please!' An
Environmental History of a Finnish City in Wartime," Environmental History 9 (October, 2004), Peter A.
Shulman, "'Science Can Never Demobilize': The United States Navy and Petroleum Geology, 1898-1924,"
History and Technology 19 (2003), William M. Tsutsui, "Landscapes in the Dark Valley: Toward an
Environmental History of Wartime Japan," Environmental History 8 (April, 2003), Richard P. Tucker and
Edmund Russell, Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an Environmental History of Warfare, 1 st ed.
(Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2004). For an expos6 of the environmental risks posed by the
U.S. military in the late twentieth century, see Seth Shulman, The Threat at Home: Confronting the Toxic
Legacy of the U.S. Military (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992).
interested in how the U.S. empire shaped the nation from without. The second difference
is more subtle. Nineteenth century Chicago was built amid the hustle and bustle of
commerce and competition. The construction of the American empire-the formal parts
of it, at least-involved more overtly political decisions. Serendipitous at times but never
random, it was a process we can, and must, associate with individual choices. I am
interested in connecting the structural features of empire with the human and institutional
choices that helped bring it about.' 8
Exploring the American empire from an ecological, scientific, and, technological
perspective requires departing from familiar periodizations. By focusing on the
development of coal and coaling systems, technological innovations, geological
discoveries, and the invention of robust logistical networks matter at least as much as the
usual temporal boundaries of presidential administrations, decades, and wars. The
historian Charles Maier has described historical periodization as an interpretive tool, a
decision less about an inherent logic of history and more "to assign a meaning to
historical phenomena.""19 Part of my goal for this work is assign a new meaning to the
American empire by connecting its emergence and geographical structure to the
technological changes that propelled and shaped it.
In the chapters that follow, I make three interlocking arguments. First, the United
States, working mostly through the Departments of State and Navy, developed its first
national energy policies, and in particular, its first foreign energy policies, as the Navy
'
8 William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis : Chicago and the Great West, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton,
1991). On the global flow of cotton and its shaping of the United States in the 19"t century, see Sven
Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age
of the American Civil War," American Historical Review 109, no. 5 (2004), Sven Beckert, "From Tuskegee
to Togo: The Problem of Freedom in the Empire of Cotton," Journal ofAmerican History 92, no. 2 (2005).
9 Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern
Era," American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 809.
increasingly made use of steam power. This energy policy was explicitly linked to
questions of national security and commercial expansion from the beginning. Second,
American architects of empire thought about nature and resources, and this thought
framed the development of foreign policy. Nature for naval officers may have been less
elegant than nature for Emerson or Muir, but it shaped their thinking and actions in no
less significant ways. Finally, I argue that American power in the twentieth century, so
identified with petroleum, was built upon decades of empire building based around coal.
The federal government's support of American oil companies in their actions overseas
merely continued a policy long pursued by international-looking government officials,
especially in the Navy, to ensure that Americans had fuel for commerce and defense.
This policy began with coal.
The five chapters of this dissertation examine the evolution of U.S. naval and foreign
policies related to coal from the 1840s through the 1920s. I emphasize three central
themes: that the peculiar geography of the U.S. empire was never predetermined, as
solutions to the coaling problem constantly evolved; that U.S. efforts to supply coal took
place in a global context of other competing nations; and that this global network was
built in particular places and influenced by local events.
In chapter one, "Embarking," I ask how Americans fueled steam navigation. I
link the development of a global steam network to transport mail, news, and business
information with a similarly global search for the coal resources to support it. I focus on
American naval expeditions for coal in Borneo in the 1840s and in Japan with Matthew
Perry in the 1850s. In these expeditions, American policy-makers employed tremendous
creativity addressing the coaling problem, engaging in diplomatic agreements,
commercial arrangements, geological exploration, and ultimately military coercion. At
the end of the 1850s, no one policy appeared more promising than any other.
In chapter two, "Race, Technology, and the Politics of Mineral Wealth on the
American Isthmus," I describe how the demand for coal in the U.S. Navy and merchant
fleet that began earlier in the century prompted entrepreneurs to join in the search for coal
in strategic locations. I focus on an account of the failed attempt of American
entrepreneur Ambrose W. Thompson to establish a major coal mine for the Navy in New
Granada's province of Chiriqui in the 1850s and 1860s. There, the technological changes
brought about by industrialization intersected with the social and political conflicts of
race. As part of his isthmian project, Thompson interested the Lincoln administration in
developing a colony of emancipated slaves in Chiriqui in to mine coal for the Navy in the
Caribbean and Pacific. This project suggests that even 19th century social and political
issues like race were understood and addressed in the context of technological change
and the aspirations of American leaders for geopolitical influence.
In chapter three, "The Geography of Power," I show how Union and Confederate
difficulties in obtaining coal for their vessels during the Civil War inspired decades of
attempts to acquire coaling stations-from ports to harbors to whole islands-to support
the growth of American hegemony in the Caribbean. Focusing especially on negotiations
for coaling stations on St. Thomas and in Haiti, this chapter traces how naval strategy
shifted from antebellum creativity to the acquisition of coaling stations in the late 19th
and early 20 th centuries, bringing into sharper focus how strategy, resources, and politics
interacted to produce the geography of the United States' geographic reach in the early
20 h century. I also show how the pursuit of coaling stations was not the only avenue
policy-makers of the late 19h century had for addressing the coaling problem. They also
supported scientific and engineering projects to reduce the Navy's dependence on coal
and increase the efficiency of steam engines. Through chemical analyses, engineering
experiments, and geological expeditions, the federal government complemented its
simultaneous interest in acquiring new territory.
Chapter four, "Inventing Logistics," shifts the coaling narrative from conducting
war to planning for it, examining how ideas about industrial warfare crystallized in the
education of elite officers at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. In the
early 20th century, officers there evaluated naval strategy and tactics, systematizing war
preparation and execution. Coal formed a central element of this education. In this
chapter I argue that coal provided the model for war planning that the College later
generalized as "logistics"-the provision of all resources for war and the strategy for
ensuring their availability. I look closely at lectures, exams, student essays, and
instructor evaluations to trace the emergence of a comprehensive idea of logistics among
the elite officer class.
The U.S. global coaling network was shaped not only by economic, strategic, and
material constraints, but by how naval policy elites imagined the relationships between
places. This is the subject for chapter five, "Alaska: Infinite Coal Mine of the Imperial
Imagination." After prospectors discovered massive coal deposits in Alaska in the late
19th century, the U.S. Navy began investigating Alaska as both a coaling station and as a
source for inexpensive coal. In the 1920s, the Navy operated its own experimental coal
mine near Anchorage. I show in this chapter how Alaska became an increasingly
important part of naval planning from strategic and environmental perspectives. Drawing
on documents from both Alaska and Washington, D.C., I link naval planners' ideas about
grand strategy in the Pacific to local obstacles in exploration, labor, and mining. By
moving from a global narrative to a local one, I weave together environmental change,
geology, labor, naval strategy, economic development, and evolving steam technology.
By retracing this coaling story from the perspective of Alaska, we gain a clearer idea of
how American foreign and naval policy were tightly bound to U.S. industrialization as
well as how flows of important resources link otherwise unconnected lands.
$**
Like many of his contemporaries, Perry wrote enthusiastically about America's future in
world affairs in the Pacific and beyond. "It may be looked upon as mere speculation in
me," he apologized to his audience in New York, "but I have been long a believer in the
doctrine of the 'manifest destiny' of this great nation, still in its youth." His youthful
nation, no less than for a youthful person was "destined at some indefinite time to attain a
full and vigorous manhood." But Perry's history was cyclical in nature, and like a man
the United States would inevitably weaken with age. Like empires past, economic might
would rise and fall. Glory was transient, he concluded, and it was also destiny for the
United States, "like all earthly governments, to fall into decadence, to decline in power,
and at last, to fall asunder, by the consequences of its own vices and misdoings; thus
making room for some new empire now scarcely in embryo." But in 1856, the potential
for decline seemed a long way off, and Americans hungered for coal.20
20 M.C. Perry, A Paper by Commodore M. C. Perry, U.S.N., Read before the American Geographical and
Statistical Society, at a Meeting Held March 6th, 1856 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1856), 12.
Chapter 1: Embarking
The 19th century United States was built upon the visible and the invisible. The visible
included the most recognizable artifacts of industrialization: railroads, steamships, and
the bridges, and factories, associated with the "technological sublime"--the peculiarly
American enthusiasm for machines that transformed human creations into transcendent
experiences.' The visible could be seen, of course, but also touched, smelled, and heard.
The visible was experienced through its material form-the arc of the bridge or the
design of the skyscraper. The visible was composed of iron, or steel, or wood, and it
reminded Americans at every moment of the stuff of which their worlds were composed.
"On the contrary," to this visible world, wrote Walter R. Johnson in 1850, "the
material which furnishes motive power, is either wholly overlooked, or soon forgotten."
For Johnson, a chemist and the founding General Secretary of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, it was too easy to praise the locomotive and neglect its
fuel or marvel over Manchester's fabrics instead of the coal that helped steam them
across the Atlantic. "The evanescent movement of machinery, which transports materials
from place to place, or transforms them from one shape to another, leaves nothing visible
or tangible on which our senses can dwell," Johnson remarked.2 This evanescent
' On the technological sublime in America, see David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994). As Nye notes, the term originates in Perry Miller's The Life of the
Mind in America and was developed subsequently by both John Kasson and Leo Marx. See Perry Miller
and American Council of Learned Societies., The Life of the Mind in America: From the Revolution to the
Civil War, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1965), John F. Kasson, Civilizing the Machine:
Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900, 1st Hill and Wang ed. (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1999), Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America
(London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
2 Walter R. Johnson, The Coal Trade of British America, with Researches on the Characters and Practical
Values ofAmerican and Foreign Coals (Washington, D.C.: Taylor & Maury; [etc. etc.], 1850), 6.
movement, he insisted, was the product of coal, a material itself, but one consumed in the
very activity that made it useful and leaving little trace of its importance.
Johnson knew some Americans paid more attention to coal than others. He had
been employed several years earlier, in fact, by the U.S. Navy to investigate different
coals from around the country to determine which provided better fuels for naval steam
engines.3 The Navy was not alone in its interest in coal, however. Any entrepreneur or
politician interested in establishing a new steamship line had to pay close attention to it.
Those who did not quickly failed. This chapter describes the earliest ways Americans
faced the physical constraints brought about by steam power in ocean transportation
during the inaugural years of regular trans-oceanic steamship service between 1840 and
1860. Instead of examining the technological or social aspects of steam, I want to
refocus attention on the environmental context with which builders and operators of
steamships themselves had to contend. Building an industrial ecology, they discovered
and directed flows of resources into new paths that would make modem civilization
possible.
This industrial ecology began in the broad economic context of ocean steam
travel, where information, not the transportation of material goods, first concerned steam
line pioneers. The transmission of this information preoccupied American merchants
abroad and led some to pursue the creation of steamship lines to transport mail. As these
lines grew, the American government began taking an interest in facilitating foreign trade
by securing coal concessions overseas, first in Borneo in the 1840s and then in Japan,
Formosa, and the Lew Chew islands in the 1850s. Throughout these episodes, Americans
3 Walter R. Johnson and United States. Navy Dept., A Report to the Navy Department of the United States,
on American Coals Applicable to Steam Navigation, and to Other Purposes, Senate Doc. No. 386, 28th
Cong., 1st sess. (1844).
operated in a global context of competing economic and political interests, especially
with English traders and the Royal Navy. By placing coal front and center, I argue that
the materiel of energy-the invisible foundation of nineteenth century power-both
motivated and constrained the activities of American merchants and especially
government representatives abroad.
The Information Economy
"The mail is in; here is the 'Straits' Times!"' came the call in Canton.4 The year was
1853. Pressed upon "a half sheet of foolscap" in Singapore, the 'Straits' Times' was a
digest of newspapers freshly delivered from Europe and the United States. The western
papers arrived in southeast Asia by steamer via the overland route connecting the
Mediterranean with the Red Sea. These steamers, which delivered mail as well as news,
reached Canton from Boston in only sixty-five days. "Such speed is almost incredible
even now," exclaimed an American expatriate living in the bustling Chinese port. Only
twenty years earlier, the fastest American and British clippers might have taken twice that
time and the future promised even greater speeds. "Boston and Canton will be still more
closely approximated in point of time," continued the expatriate in Canton, "when a
railroad connects the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States and a system of
steam navigation is established across the Pacific, between California and China."s The
pursuit of this system, which would complete a vast chain of western commerce and
4 "Notes and Commentaries, on a Voyage to China: Chapter XXI," Southern Literary Messenger 19, no. 8
(1853): 474. Punctuation emended to correct an error in the original publication.
5 Ibid.: 476.
communication around the globe, would bring the United States into the overseas empire
business for the first time.
The United States was a commercial nation in 1853, and commerce depended on
information. Information-in the form of newspapers, business instructions, and
personal correspondence-provided the tenuous umbilical that connected capital to its
investments, merchants to their homes, and traders to the producers and consumers of
their goods. Steam allowed that information to travel more rapidly than ever before. It is
no accident that one encounters the phrase "steam communication" far more often in
historical documents than "steam transportation"--the ability to transmit information
regularly and rapidly was probably the most appealing feature of steamships in the 1840s
and 1850s.6 Nowhere were American merchants more dependent on this information in
the 1850s than in China. There, over 6,000 miles and an ocean away from North
America, American trading houses competed with other westerners, mainly from Britain,
to exchange opium, bullion, and cotton goods for teas and silk.7 "Early information as to
the changing condition of the markets in Europe and America is very important to
merchants in China," related the expatriate. Control over this flow of information, he
continued, meant "to a considerable extent, the advantages of a limited monopoly of the
trade"-the difference between profit and bankruptcy.
6 The first ten years of the New York Times, for example, searchable online at Proquest Historical
Newspapers, reveal only four instances of "steam transportation" as opposed to 122 for "steam
communication."
7 Mira Wilkins, "Impacts of American Multinational Enterprise on American-Chinese Economic Relations,
1786-1949," in America's China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance,
ed. Ernest R. May and John K. Fairbank, Harvard Studies in American-East Asian Relations (Cambridge:
Committee on American-East Asian Relations of the Dept. of History in collaboration with the Council on
East Asian Studies Harvard University: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1986), 259-62.
8 "Notes and Commentaries, on a Voyage to China: Chapter XXI." Historians have recently begun to
explore how information and the construction of a state apparatus to deliver it have shaped political and
social development. Reflecting on the U.S. postal service's success in connecting the early republic's
Competition to control commercial information in the early nineteenth century
had begun in the Atlantic. In the two decades after the end of the Napoleonic Wars,
American packet boats took the lead. On January 1, 1818, New York merchants
launched the first regular shipping line to bring mail, passengers, and cargo across the
ocean. This line, which would become known as "the Black Ball" for the distinctive
circle adorning the ships' fore topsails, sailed between New York and Liverpool on a
predetermined monthly schedule. Other lines followed, and by 1840 there were forty-
eight packets crossing the ocean. American sailing vessels, in the words of maritime
historian Robert Albion, "were the ships of the North Atlantic."9
During precisely this same period, American and British shipping firms and
engineers began experimenting with using steam to cross the Atlantic. In 1819 the
American steamship Savannah crossed from the eponymous city in Georgia to Liverpool
in twenty-seven days, though most of the journey was, in fact, powered by sail. Only in
1833 did the Royal William, a Canadian ship from Quebec, complete the Atlantic voyage
entirely by steam. Five more years and the British Sirius began carrying mail across the
ocean, followed only days later by the Great Western. Nevertheless, American packet
boats continued to grow in number speed to compete with steam for carrying the mail.
For the sender and receiver of mail, increasingly frequent sailings made the transit of
scattered cities, towns, and settlements, the historian Richard John has labeled the postal service acted "a
powerful agent of change." See Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from
Franklin to Morse, 1 st paperback ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Examining
information as a form of political capital, C.A. Bayly has shown both how British control and failure in
India depended on collecting information. See C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence
Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870, Cambridge Studies in Indian History and
Society 1 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
9 Robert Greenhalgh Albion, Square-Riggers on Schedule: The New York Sailing Packets to England,
France, and the Cotton Ports (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press; H. Milford Oxford
University Press, 1938), 35, see also vii, 20-1. See also George E. Hargest, History ofLetter Post
Communication between the United States and Europe, 1845-1875, 2d ed. (Lawrence, Mass.: Quarterman
Publications, 1975), Frank Staff, The Transatlantic Mail (New York: J. DeGraff, 1956), 62.
information across the Atlantic faster and more predictable than ever before. In 1838, the
British Government began accepting proposals for a formal steam mail route, and the
following year, a contract was forged with Samuel Cunard of Halifax, Nova Scotia for a
seven year service between Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston. Over the following years,
the British government began subsidizing additional mail steam services along other
routes of commercial interest, from the Mediterranean to India, China, and the South
American Pacific Coast. As the cost of sending mail decreased and its delivery became
more regular, more and more American mail began traveling in foreign ships The
greatest strength of the British mail network, however, was its near simultaneous
emergence. Each separate line formed the connective tissue that linked the British
empire together.10
The carriage of American mail by British vessels troubled many Americans.
When America and Britain stumbled to the brink of war over Oregon in 1846, the
ramifications of Britain transporting American mail-including diplomatic
correspondence-became clear. "What an idea," wrote the American charge in Lima in
1846,
that the American squadron in the Pacific should be dependent upon
English steamers of war for their letters and dispatches from the
government of the United States, when each is looking the other in the
face upon the Oregon question. Our navy dependent upon the British fleet
to give them notice when it is time to fight! To fight whom? Why, those
giving them the information; and our whalemen dependent upon the same
source for information, when it is time for them to run to avoid the same
English fleet."
10 Staff, The Transatlantic Mail, 62-3, John A. Butler, Atlantic Kingdom: America's Contest with Cunard in
the Age ofSail and Steam, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2001), 83. See also J. C. Arnell, Steam and
the North Atlantic Mails: The Impact of the Cunard Line and Subsequent Steamship Companies on the
Carriage of Transatlantic Mails (Toronto, Ont.: Unitrade Press, 1986).
" Albert Gallatin Jewett, 4/13/1846, quoted in Thomas Butler King, Ocean Steamers, H. Rep. Doc. 685,
29th Cong., 1st sess. (1846).
Britain's commercial steamers were even commanded by Royal Navy officers, who could
collect another kind of information: a sailor's intimacy with the American coast.
Knowledge of its harbors and shoals, its winds and currents, offered the British a
maritime familiarity that might be utilized in a future war. As the size of the British fleet
grew with subsidies from the Crown, Americans felt increasingly threatened. "In
carrying out this system, the steam-marine of England has been extended to a limit that
startles belief," explained Texas Senator Thomas J. Rusk in 1852, "and suggests to every
reflecting mind the propriety, on the part of other and rival nations, of taking steps to
guard themselves from the attacks of so overwhelming a force, in the event of a collision
with that great power."12 Like Rusk, many Americans in the 1850s vividly recalled the
British invasion in 1814 and the war scare over Oregon remained very real.
As Cunard and the other lines grew, Americans began planning for steam lines of
their own. Under an act passed in 1845, Congress directed the Postmaster General to
contract with private investors to create two steam mail lines, one of them to Europe.
According to Alabama Representative Henry Hilliard in 1846, "[t]he time has arrived for
increasing our means of communication with Europe." 13 A year later, the postal contract
took effect when Edward Mills began a modest mail steamer service between New York
and Bremen. His ship, the first American mail steamer, The Washington, left New York
that winter.14 It joined the Cunard line (Liverpool to Halifax and Boston) and a French
12 Reports of the Secretary of the Navy and the Postmaster General, Communicating, in Compliance with a
Resolution of the Senate, Information in Relation to the Contracts for the Transportation of the Mails, by
Steamships, between New York and California, (Washington, D.C.: A. Boyd Hamilton, 1852), 20.
13 Henry Hilliard, Atlantic Mail Steamers, H. Rep. Report 476, 29th Cong., 1st sess. (1846).
14 "American Mail Steamers," Niles'National Register 21, no. 23 (1847).
line (Havre or Cherbourg and New York) that were already in service across the
Atlantic. 1"
Bremen appealed to Congress as a terminus for a mail line for several reasons.
First, throughout the early nineteenth century, American trade with German states
traveled through Britain, which imposed heavy taxes upon it. The British government
similarly taxed American mail. A direct line connecting New York to Bremen thus
bypassed British taxation. Second, for years the British post detained American mail in
its offices until it thoroughly distributed British letters, giving British companies and
investors advance notice of world events, commercial transactions, and investment
opportunities. According to one Senator, "every English merchant got his letters, and if
there was anything interesting to be done on the Continent, they had the benefit of it,
instead of our own citizens." The practice outraged Americans, and the British
government eventually ceased the practice and tendered an apology.1 6
Steam mail service offered apparently boundless opportunities for trade. "The
rapid and certain transmission of intelligence is of the highest importance to a
commercial people," declared Representative Hilliard, "and instead of relying upon the
steamships of Great Britain for the transportation of our mails, we should enter at once
upon an enterprise to which we are invited by the most powerful considerations
connected with our relations to the world, and which can no longer be neglected if we
'~ Hilliard, Atlantic Mail Steamers. "Trial Trip of the U.S. Mail Steamer Washington," New York Evangelist
18, no. 21 (1847): 1. "Steam and Sailing Lines," Scientific American 2, no. 43 (1847). Mills boasted that his
first ship, The Washington, would reach Southampton from New York in a dramatic eight or nine days, but
unexpected mechanical trouble delayed the voyage to just under two weeks. Though still a respectable
time, the ship's passengers nevertheless complained. "Arrival of the Washington Steamer in England,"
Scientific American 2, no. 43 (1847).
16 Cong. Globe Appendix 31st Cong., 1st Session (1850): 1325.
would keep pace with the movements of an enlightened age." 17 This enlightened age
brought a second round of mail steamships in 1847 when Congress instructed the
Secretary of the Navy to contract for three additional lines. Georgia Representative
Thomas Butler King's Committee on Naval Affairs had developed the plan in 1846 in
order to enlarge the U.S. Navy by subsidizing a steam powered merchant marine. The
idea was "to render the transmission of the mail, passengers, and freight subservient to
the extension of her naval establishment," much as Britain had similarly done. 18 King
had originally sought a more general enlargement of the Navy, but could only receive
support by proposing mail steamers to operate in peacetime that would be convertible
into warships in the event of a national emergency. Even so, many Americans already
blurred the distinctions between a merchant and a naval steam marine and considered
Britain's success at sea at least as much a product of its mail subsidies as its already
substantial Navy. 19
The new steamship lines concentrated on important trade routes. One line would
connect New York to Liverpool, a second would link New York to Havana and on to the
Caribbean coast of Panama, and a third the Pacific side of Panama up to San Francisco
and the Oregon Territory.20 Congress began funding steam mail lines to Europe "upon
considerations of the highest State and commercial policy," according to one Senator.21
At all times, government policy required that these ships be captained by naval officers
7 Hilliard, Atlantic Mail Steamers.
'
8 King, Ocean Steamers.
'
9 Ibid.20 Reports of the Secretary of the Navy and the Postmaster General, Communicating, in Compliance with a
Resolution of the Senate, Information in Relation to the Contracts for the Transportation of the Mails, by
Steamships, between New York and California.
21 Cong. Globe Appendix 31st Cong., 1st Session (1850): 1322.
and supported by American midshipmen. According to Texas Senator Rusk, "the arts of
peace shall be made tributary to the purposes of defense." 22
The first new American mail steamers took to the sea in 1850 and their record-
breaking speeds became a point of national pride.23 Supporters of American steam
navigation could only have been pleased to read the reaction of one observer from Britain
who declared that "the Cunard line has a lost pre-eminence to regain." 24 In a jab at
Cunard, which originated in Halifax, a writer in the town's own newspaper praised an
American vessel on the Liverpool-New York route by noting that "[t]he interior
arrangements of the Arctic far, very far, surpass in elegance any thing of the kind
previously seen in Halifax. '"25 The Arctic belonged to the New York and Liverpool
United States Mail Steamship Company, better known as the Collins Line for its first
director and a leading investor, Edward Collins. "Too much praise cannot be bestowed
on the patriotic pride and public spirit of Mr. Collins," gushed one American. But, he
continued, success in wresting mail a service-and thus control of communications
across the Atlantic-depended on more than the pride and spirit of American
entrepreneurs; steam mail service, after all, depended on a public-private partnership.
"We have very little doubt that if our Government extends the same fostering care to the
Collins' line that the British Government has to the Cunard, that Mr. C. in his next assay
will be able in reality to reduce the passage to eight days" from the already impressive
22 Reports of the Secretary of the Navy and the Postmaster General, Communicating, in Compliance with a
Resolution of the Senate, Information in Relation to the Contracts for the Transportation of the Mails, by
Steamships, between New York and California, 26.
23 Even before they were put to see, one observer declared the new ships would be "as fine a fleet of sea-
going steamers as the world has ever seen." "Ocean Steam Navigation," Niles' National Register 74, no.
1917 (1848): 267.
24 "Progress in Steam Navigation," The United States Postal Guide and Official Advertiser 1, no. 5 (1850):
151.
25 "United States Mail Steamer Arctic," The United States Postal Guide and Official Advertiser 1, no. 9
(1850): 277.
ten.26 The Collins' line so excited national sentiment that New York's Journal of
Commerce, ordinarily a vocal adversary of government subsidies, could make an
exception-at least until the venture could pay for itself. "It would lower the pride and
affect the reputation of the country to withdraw those great steamers from the ocean.'"7
By the mid- 1850s, Collins had four ships steaming between New York and Liverpool;
George Law and associates had four more ships on the line between New York, New
Orleans, Havana, and Chagres; and William Aspinwall had six vessels plying the Pacific
coast between Panama and San Francisco.28
The lines involved substantial money. The government paid the two companies
carrying mail from New York, across Panama, and to California and Oregon nearly
$600,000 a year.29 By 1854, government support totaled over five-and-a-half million
dollars in interest-free loans and payments to the three steamship companies. 30 As the
lines grew, Americans took advantage of the lines. In 1852 private Americans citizens
spent more than $200,000 sending mail between New York and Chagres. Between New
York and Liverpool, gross postage carried by the Collins line totaled over $273,000;
newspapers brought in an additional $279,000. Information, it is clear, was more than
just personal letters. Collins' company that year earned nearly $200,000 in revenue.
American mail traveled more frequently aboard Collins Line vessels than its British
26 "Atlantic Steamers," The United States Postal Guide and OfficialAdvertiser 1, no. 11 (1851): 339.
27 "Steamships," The United States Postal Guide and Official Advertiser 2, no. 9 (1852).28 Steamships: Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in Reference to the Adaptation of Ocean Mail
Steamers to War Purposes, H. Exec. Doc. 75, 33rd Cong., 1st sess. (1854).29 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, in Answer to a Resolution of the Senate Calling for the Amount
Expended for the Transporation of Troops, Supplies, and Munitions for the Land and Naval Forces in the
Pacific; Also, for the Transportation of the Mails for the Last Three Years, Senate Ex. Doc. No. 57, 33rd
Cong., 1st sess. (1854).
30 Daniel Mace, Ocean Mail Steamers, H. Rep. No. 281, 33rd. Cong., Ist. sess. (1854).
competitor, Cunard: of the more than $400,000 earned by the United States for trans-
Atlantic postage, over sixty percent came from mail shipped aboard American steamers.3 1
Steam offered several advantages over sail: it was faster, independent of winds,
could leave on set schedules during any season, and usually arrive at predicable times.
Steam power not only appeared to defeat nature but the palpable limits of human
experience as well. "Time and space seem to be overcome, and the winds and tides in a
measure disregarded" observed Senator King.32 According to Pelatiah Perit, President of
the Chamber of Commerce of New York, "wherever the mail steamer has gone, and
whence it has come, by a law which was manifest on the scene of its first triumph, the
most valuable trade has followed in its course." Perit, of course, overstated both the ease
and certainty with which mail steamers captured international commerce. But by their
regularity and speed, the steamers diverted not only mail traffic from sailing vessels, but
the patronage of wealthy passengers and the carriage of luxury goods as well. Perit
lamented that American packet boats, "which once stood so high in the estimation of the
traveler, and which bore to our shores the most costly merchandise," were now "degraded
to the service of the emigrant, to the carrying of coal, crockery, and iron, and the bulky
products of our own soil."33
Yet the lines were not unmitigated successes, for they were limited by the
environment through which they steamed and the availability of resources they
consumed. Although the American mail steamers successfully and regularly transported
31 Mail Ocean Steamers: Letters Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means,
Transmitting Statements of Revenue Derived from Ocean Mail Steamers, House Misc. No. 17, 32nd. Cong.,
2nd. sess. (1853).
32 King, Ocean Steamers.
33 Memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of New York Praying That the Aid of the Government May Be
Granted for the Establishment of a Line of Mail Steamers through the Waters of the Pacific Ocean to the
Populous Cities of the Eastern World, Senate Misc.Doc.No. 10, 36th Cong., 2nd. sess. (1861).
letters, newspapers, and packages from U.S. to foreign ports, the Navy grew increasingly
dissatisfied with the mail steamers. Lieutenant David Dixon Porter, for example,
commanding the U.S. Mail Steamship Georgia on the route from New York to New
Orleans and Havana, regularly reported to the department that while his ship was fast and
reliable, he often relied on auxiliary sails and could not push the ship's engines too hard
because coal supplies were so hard to come by and rapidly exhausted.34
The Navy quickly decided that mail steamers like the Georgia were poor
substitutes for ordinary naval vessels. Success in mail delivery involved maximizing
speed and required that coal would remain available, at least in the ports between which
the ships traveled. War vessels, in contrast, often had to travel unpredictable routes for
undetermined lengths of time. To permit a steamer, so tied to its fuel supply, to serve as
a war vessel in the antebellum period, these ships all possessed masts and sails and could
thus travel by wind. Aboard the mail steamers, however, the placement of their coal
bunkers and steam engines made adding appropriate masts impractical. Without this
option for raising sails, the mail steamers could only travel prescribed distances with an
assured coal supply at all ports, a constraint considered disqualifying by naval authorities.
According to one captain, "they are only fit for steam-tugs and transport vessels."35
*$*
But mail steamers were not created by legislation alone. Developing steam mail service
on a global scale was a much an environmental struggle as a political or financial one.
The experience of William Wheelwright, a mariner and entrepreneur from Newburyport,
34 Reports of the Secretary of the Navy and the Postmaster General, Communicating, in Compliance with a
Resolution of the Senate, Information in Relation to the Contracts for the Transportation of the Mails, by
Steamships, between New York and California, 114-8.
35 Steamships: Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in Reference to the Adaptation of Ocean Mail
Steamers to War Purposes.
Massachusetts, captures the difficulties faced in the establishment of the new industrial
ecology of steam. In 1823, Wheelwright arrived in South America, victim of a shipwreck
off of Buenos Aires. By the end of the decade, he had made his way to Chile's
commercial center, Valparaiso. There, he began a series of commercial and industrial
ventures, most significantly the establishment of a steamship line.
His principal motivation was the regularization of communication along South
America's Pacific Coast. After failing to find investors in the United States, he turned to
Great Britain, but quickly found his project vastly more difficult than he had originally
imagined. "Owing to the present irregularity of advices," Wheelwright explained in 1838
to investors in London, "vessels are often indefinitely detained at the different ports of
the Coast; and from the same cause no changes in markets can be beneficially and
mutually acted upon." In Wheelwright's view, the unpredictable arrivals and departures
of sailing vessels arrested otherwise attractive business opportunities. And if preserving
a British finger upon the pulse of Latin American commerce did not induce his backers to
support steam mail service, Wheelwright also appealed to their fiscal sense. By the late
1830s, Britain had offered millions of pounds in loans to South American governments,
though few countries appeared likely to repay them any time soon. Political unrest and
scant infrastructure hampered the development of stable state institutions. Wheelwright
argued that an effective transportation and communication network based upon steam
power would rid South America of these constraints. "The effect of it would be," he
insisted, "to strengthen the executive authorities, to promote the industry of the people,
and to contribute to an improved state of public and private credit."36 Steamships,
36 William Wheelwright, Statements and Documents Relative to the Establishment of Steam Navigation in
the Pacific; with Copies of the Decrees of the Governments ofPeru, Bolivia, and Chile, Grating Exclusive
however, consumed vast quantities of coal, and securing coal in South America proved
far more difficult that Wheelwright or his backers had first anticipated.
Wheelwright had good reason to believe coal would not present a problem to his
steamer project. He was assured of it by no less a figure than Robert FitzRoy, captain of
the Beagle during Charles Darwin's voyage around the world between 1831 and 1836.
"In my own mind," wrote FitzRoy to Wheelwright in 1838, "there is no doubt whatever
of the existence of coal in abundance at various places on the western coasts of South
America." Moreover, continued FitzRoy, "its quality is sufficiently good to make it
available for steam-vessels." 37 Wheelwright himself had investigated reports of coal in
the Chilean port town of Talcahuano in 1834. As he planned his steamship service, he
planned on obtaining inexpensive supplies from these or other Chilean mines nearby. If
necessary, he believed imports from Britain or Australia would provide additional
stocks.38 He was soon forced to reconsider these plans. Arriving in Lima in early
September 1840, he expected the first steamer of his fleet to join him within days. The
absence of coal in Lima's port of Callao, however, threatened to doom his steamship
service before it even began.
Privileges to the Undertaking (London: Whiting, Beaufort House, 1838), 7-8. For a near hagiographic
account of Wheelwright's life and legacy, see Juan Bautista Alberdi, The Life and Industrial Labors of
William Wheelwright in South America (Boston: A. Williams & co., 1877).
37 Wheelwright, Statements and Documents Relative to the Establishment ofSteam Navigation in the
Pacific; with Copies of the Decrees of the Governments of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, Grating Exclusive
Privileges to the Undertaking, 13. Whether FitzRoy had personal knowledge of this coal or not is unclear;
his account of the Beagle voyage spends two paragraphs citing other voyagers testifying to the presence
and quality of coal along the western South American coast. See Robert Fitzroy and Charles Darwin,
Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty's Ships Adventure and Beagle, between the Years 1826
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Circumnavigation of the Globe, 3 vols., vol. 2 (London,: H. Colburn, 1839), 423-4.
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Wheelwright began frantically searching for more fuel. Rumors of coal from the
nearby island of San Lorenzo failed to pan out, while anthracite he learned of from the
Cordillera proved too far to supply the port. Samples of "coal" from Piura province
turned out to be mineral pitch, useless for steaming. With few options for fuel remaining
and his charter from the government of Chile expired, he prepared to accept defeat. He
boarded his ship the Peru and left Callao for Valparaiso. There, to his surprise, he
discovered the Portsea had arrived with six hundred tons of coal. Wheelwright was
elated, but only until he discovered that the coal not only failed to generate steam, but
that it damaged his ships boilers as well. This episode, as Wheelwright recounted to his
directors in London, "has brought this beautiful enterprise, commenced under the most
brilliant circumstances, upon the verge of ruin."3 9 When the Peru left Valparaiso to
return to Callao, Wheelwright did not expect it to return again for lack of fuel. It did in
fact return, but only because the ship's captain encountered a shipment of wood in the
port which he promptly purchased and consumed. 40
For two-and-a-half months in early 1841, Wheelwright and Captain Peacock of
the Peru canvassed the Chilean coast from the river Maule to the island of Chilo6. They
made their way to Talcahuano, where Wheelwright had collected coal samples seven
years before, they deposited mining equipment, rounded up forty men living nearby, and
began mining.41 According to one observer, "it was found to give abundance of steam,
although yielding a large amount of residuum, and about 20 per cent. Greater
consumption than the best Welsh coals, requiring consequently more space in the ship
39 W. Wheelwright, "To the Directors and Proprietors of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," in
Goldsmiths'-Kress Library of Economic Literature, No. 33380.10. (1843), 34.
40 Ibid., 2-4.
41 Ibid., 17-21.
and greater labour in working."42 By 1843, Wheelwright's miners had excavated almost
5,000 tons; just over a decade later, that number stood at 30,000.43 All told, Wheelwright
estimated that his difficulties in supplying coal cost his company some £23,000--or
$121,000. 44 Although Chile undoubtedly contained substantial deposits of coal, turning
natural abundance into practical resources was far from easy.
Wheelwright's troubles obtaining coal in South America offer a microcosm of the
difficulties confronted by other American entrepreneurs seeking to extend steam mail
service in the Pacific Ocean. After the United States acquired California in 1848, more
and more Americans began looking to expand commercial opportunities in eastern Asia,
especially China, and steamers offered a tantalizing vision of connecting the world
through communication and trade. One booster of China-bound steamers, Perry McD.
Collins, expressed the momentum he felt towards westward expansion of mail, trade, and
telegraphs by urging national leaders in politics, commerce, and philosophy to "just keep
the ball in motion... and send the fleet and stately steamer across the gentle Pacific, and,
consequently, finish the last link in compassing the round earth with steam and
electricity."45
"This Island Possesses Coal Mines of Great Richness"
The U.S.S. Constitution was in a sorry shape when Navy Secretary David Henshaw
assigned Captain John Percival to supervise her repair in 1843. Ship and captain formed
42 William Bollaert, "Observations on the Coal Formation in Chile, S. America," Journal of the Royal
Geographical Society of London 25 (1855): 173.
43 Wheelwright, "To the Directors and Proprietors of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," 20. Bollaert,
"Observations on the Coal Formation in Chile, S. America," 20.
44 William Wheelwright, "To the Proprietors of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company," in Goldsmiths'-
Kress Library of Economic Literature; No. 33380.11 (1843), 5.
45 Perry McD. Collins, "Steam and the Telegraph to India and China," Hunt's Merchants' Magazine 45, no.
6 (1861): 603. Emphasis in the original.
a fitful match. The Constitution was one of only three ships-of-the-line remaining from
the original six built in 1797.46 After service in the War of 1812, she was in such need of
repairs by 1830 that she was almost abandoned. She was saved in part by the publicity
surrounding Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.'s publication of his poem, "Old Ironsides," a
celebration of her naval exploits. Almost fifteen years later, even the repairs had
degraded and the ship was performing a meager receiving duty in Norfolk. In 1843,
again threatened with decommissioning, the ship was again saved, this time by Percival.
The Captain had been looking for a respectable command, and was convinced he could
repair the Constitution at a minimum of expense to the government. When he succeeded,
his reward was to command the ship in an unusual voyage around the world.47
Percival's instructions from Washington arrived in January 1844, and directed
him to Mozambique and Madagascar, north to Cape Guardafui (the promontory of the
Horn of Africa that guarded the trade routes through the Gulf of Aden) and then further
east to Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. From Borneo he was to proceed to Malaya and into
the Gulf of Siam to open intercourse with Cochin China and islands of the China Sea.
His objectives throughout his travels included encouraging American trade, fostering
amity among nations, and gathering intelligence on "the people, resources and
commerce" along his journey. The Navy and State Departments considered this
intelligence essential to promote American commercial opportunities along the Indian
46 The other five were the Constellation, the United States, the President, the Congress, and the
Chesapeake. The Congress had been disassembled in 1836 while the Chesapeake and President were lost
to the British during the War of 1812. See James H. Ellis, Mad Jack Percival: Legend of the Old Navy,
Library of Naval Biography (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 152-3. Today, two ships still
remain-the Constitution in Boston harbor and the Constellation in Baltimore.
47 For the history of the Constitution and the origins of this mission, see Tyrone G. Martin, A Most
Fortunate Ship : A Narrative History of Old Ironsides, Rev. ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1997), 266-8, David Foster Long, "Mad Jack": The Biography of Captain John Percival, Usn, 1779-1862,
Contributions in Military Studies, No. 136 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 132-40, Ellis, Mad
Jack Percival: Legend of the Old Navy, 152-86.
Ocean rim. "The countries you will visit are vast and fertile," wrote Secretary of the
Navy David Henshaw, "and comparatively little known to the American people."
Though Henshaw sketched the framework of an itinerary for the Constitution, he
acknowledged that the ship's ultimate route depended on conditions of climate, weather,
health, and politics far beyond the limits of advance planning.48
With one exception. Henshaw insisted in his secret instruction that the ship visit
Borneo. "It is represented that this island possesses Coal mines of great richness," he
explained to Percival, "both for quantity and quality. Your enquiries will therefore be
especially directed to this subject, of finding coal that can be readily procured for the use
of sea steamers; and if deposits be found, easily accessible, for supplying steamers or
other vessels. You are authorized to purchase a right to such mine, for the United States,
of the Government which owns it, at a reasonable compensation." 49 Henshaw sought to
extend American steam service to southeast Asia, and hoped that securing coal from
Brunei would facilitate this project. The Secretary was, in effect, sending the Navy's
oldest vessel in pursuit of resources that would power vessels of the future. For the first
time in American history, energy resources had become the objects of foreign relations.
Henshaw's instructions betray an interesting fact. He observed that "[i]t is
represented" to the Navy that Borneo possessed substantial deposits of coal. Just who
was doing this representing? The Secretary does not say. A closer look inside the world
of trade and colonialism in southeast Asia, however, reveals the networks of knowledge
and resources that likely brought this news to the attention of Washington bureaucrats.
The uncovering of coal in Borneo reveals the complex interaction between trade,
48 David Henshaw to John Percival 1/22/1844, in The New American State Papers: Naval Affairs, Vol. 3:
Diplomatic Activities, ed. K. Jack Bauer (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981).
49 Ibid. Long, "Mad Jack": The Biography of Captain John Percival, Usn, 1779-1862, 136.
missionary activity, natural history, and the commercial rivalry between Great Britain
and the United States for Asian trade--and coal-in the 1830s and 1840s.
"A Beautiful Fact"
In 1836, a New York-based merchant house in Canton, Olyphant & Co., began outfitting
the brig Himmaleh to initiate trade with the Sultan of Brunei. Olyphant sought a revival
of trade in pepper, a commodity once harvested abundantly around Brunei by Hokkien
Chinese immigrants in the late eighteenth century but that had declined in more recent
decades. While the company planned this voyage, the British and Foreign Bible Society,
a missionary organization operating from Batavia and Manila, sought to further penetrate
into southeast Asia. Olyphant and the Bible Society agreed to work together, a
collaboration eased by the strong Quaker faith of the trading house's founder, David
W.C. Olyphant. The company, in fact, was one of but two western houses in Asia that
steadfastly avoided the opium trade.50
The Bible Society's Far Eastern representative, George Tradescant Lay, joined the
Himmaleh in Macao for a mission in which he would discover what he called "a beautiful
fact."51 Lay, a British missionary, had prior experience in the Pacific world, having
explored his other interest-scientific observation--while serving as naturalist aboard the
50 Bob Reece, "Two Missionaries in Brunei in 1837: George Tradescant Lay and the Revd J.T. Dickinson,"
Sarawak Museum Journal LVII, no. 78 (New Series) (2002). Olyphant was a successful New York
merchant who led the trading house bearing his name. For a brief biographical sketch, see Harrison Ellery,
"The Vernon Family and Arms," The New-England Historical and Genealogical Register XXXIII, no. 3
(1879): 317.
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the broader activities of the British and Foreign Bible Society, see Stephen K. Batalden, Kathleen Cann,
and John Dean, Sowing the Word: The Cultural Impact of the British and Foreign Bible Society, 1804-
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H.M.S. Blossom during its Pacific voyage in the late 1820s. 52 Ten years later, aboard in
Himmaleh during a turbulent north-east monsoon from Macao Roads to Singapore, Lay
continued his observations of nature. "It is said in Holy Scripture," he recorded, "that
evil appeareth out of the north, which is true when applied to the meteoric phenomena of
this hemisphere; and seems to be brought about by the collision of air-currents differing
widely in temperature." 53 For George Lay, science and God were never far apart.
Science and commerce were close for him as well. The Himmaleh reached the
Brunei River, the gateway to the city of Brunei, on May 10, 1837. After they arrived, the
ship's captain, A. V. Fraser, pursued Olyphant's commercial interests in pepper while
Lay explored the environs and made acquaintances with the local communities of
indigenous Dyaks and their Malay rulers.54 It was here that Lay stumbled upon
something unexpected. While a guest in the Sultan's palace in Brunei, Lay received a
sample of local coal brought to the court for his perusal. Intrigued, Lay pressed his hosts
for its origin. He could determine only that it came from "Kianggi," though to his
chagrin "no one could point out the spot, nor had any definite idea of the extent and limits
of this Kianggi." Eventually, a court official claimed to know the spot, and offered to
supply the Himmaleh.
52 William Jackson Hooker and G. A. Walker Arnott, The Botany of Captain Beechey's Voyage;
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There the matter rested nearly until the end of Lay's visit to Borneo. While
returning from a final trek outside the city, Lay and a companion paused for refreshments
beside a fresh spring. While his partner drank, Lay continued to explore. "I struck my
hammer upon what seemed to be a vein of sandstone," he later recalled, "but to my very
great delight, I discovered that it was the very thing I had so often sought for in vain, the
coal of 'Kianggi."' 55 New of this discovery, and the prospect of mineral riches from
Borneo, would soon reach both Britain and the United States.
Lay's report that Borneo contained substantial deposits of coal had a double
significance. First, for scientists in Britain, the discovery of coal veins in Borneo
suggested a global distribution of the mineral and a correlation between strata in different
parts of the globe. The earth, it would seem, possessed a logic to its layers of sandstones,
clays, and coals. As coal-bearing strata in Britain were increasingly understood in the
mid-nineteenth century, the discovery of geological correlations in other parts of the
world suggested that coal might be found in commercial quantities outside the British
Isles as well.56 Lay's findings in Borneo thus helped universalize British geology. "Its
existence among the sandstone at Borneo is a beautiful fact," Lay recorded of the coal,
"supports analogy, and shows us that in distant places on the earth's surface we may find
coal measures of a corresponding nature." Second, Lay's geological discovery had a
commercial corollary. For the entrepreneur, coal at Kianggi, and coal Lay would soon
encounter on the nearby island of Pulo Chermin as well, suggested opportunities for the
55 King and Lay, The Claims ofJapan and Malaysia Upon Christendom, Exhibited in Notes of Voyages
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expansion of steamship service and an accompanying expansion in trade to southeast
Asia.57
News of the "discovery" spread quickly. Lay published his memoirs of the 1837
voyage in New York two years later. In 1842 reports reached Singapore that British
agents had recently tested coal from Borneo, including some mined from Pulo Chermin.
The agents, members of a special "Committee for Investigating the Coal and Mineral
Resources of India," appointed by the British Governor of Bengal, had evidently learned
of this coal from Lay's memoirs, public correspondence in the region, or both. The
committee found that Pulo Chermin coal offered an outstanding steamship fuel. This
announcement inspired the editors of the British Singapore Free Press to applaud the
news. "There is no quarter in the East where a Coal Depot would be more valuable or is
more urgently required," they wrote. No other part of the world offered the British
greater promise of commercial gain while presenting even greater obstacles to the flow of
goods and information. British steamers in the region depended on coal from distant
Burdwan in Bengal or even more distant England. Penang and Singapore occasionally
exhausted their coal stocks altogether. British traders in Singapore believed that "a mine
at Borneo would serve to keep those two Stations well supplied and thereby greatly
facilitate our Steam communication with China." 58 Inadequate supplies of coal, not
insufficient government subsidies, had been limiting the growth of steam power in the far
east.
George Lay was not, however, the only British subject interested in Brunei. As
news of coal in Borneo percolated through the trading houses and consulates of southeast
57 King and Lay, The Claims ofJapan and Malaysia Upon Christendom, Exhibited in Notes of Voyages
Made in 1837, from Canton, in the Ship Morrison and Brig Himmaleh, 139.
58 "Borneo Coal and Mineral Resources of India," Singapore Free Press, Sept. 15 1842.
Asia, James Brooke was just beginning his career in Brunei's tangled politics. He did
not, however, travel to Borneo in search of coal. Brooke, an adventurer, admirer of
Singapore founder Sir Stamford Raffles, and heir to a substantial fortune, had grand
visions for the island, its people, and its resources. With proper aid from Parliament, he
anticipated subduing regional piracy, quashing the seemingly endless contests for power
within the Brunei court, and developing the resources and commerce of southeast Asia. 59
Brooke began his enterprise on Borneo pledging a different kind of empire, seeking "a
pure spot in the troubled ocean of colonial politics," as he called it. Should any local
resource draw investment from Europe, Brooke intended a share of that capital to enrich
the local court and encourage political stability and economic growth-and Borneo had
no shortage of local resources. 60 Brunei and Sarawak, together comprising the northwest
coast of Borneo, possessed a bounty of potential commodities, from the pepper sought by
Olyphant & Co. to even more exotic cocoa-nuts, birds' nests, and tortoise shells. The
island offered gutta percha, bees' wax, vegetable wax, and betel-nuts, as well as oils,
camphor, and ebony wood. And then there was the coal.61
Brooke had learned of Lay's coal discoveries of 1837, and since his own arrival in
Brunei in 1838, additional coal outcrops were discovered around the city. By March
1843, Brooke had concluded that the British government ought to secure an outright
monopoly of the coal and establish a naval station nearby.62 Nevertheless, he maintained
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Occupation of Labuan: From the Journals ofJames Brooke, Esq., Rajah of Sarawak, and Governor of
his skepticism that coal was in fact the most valuable offering of the region, and for
almost two years, little decisive action occurred. "The truth is," Brooke confided to a
friend on New Years' Eve, 1844, that British officials "are pottering about coal and
neglecting far greater objects." These greater objects included suppressing piracy,
stabilizing the court, and securing a British supremacy in commerce. "Coal there is,"
Brooke conceded, "the country is a coal country, but when gentlemen are sent to make
specific reports, it is not known that great difficulty exists in finding this coal, and that
the search, in a wild country, will occupy months, or else the report will be imperfect."63
Traces of coal, even coal suitable for steam engines, did not immediately translate into
the availability of the fuel.
More than anything, Brooke wanted some conclusive support from Parliament.
By the spring of 1843, he was growing impatient, confiding in his journal that "the
danger is that other countries may act before we do; indeed, I cannot disguise my
impression, that both French and Belgians would colonize provided they had a good
opening." 64 Neither the French nor the Belgians in fact intervened in Brunei for coal or
anything else. The threat to Borneo's coal would in fact come two years later from the
unexpected arrival of an American ship.
Before this ship arrived, however, Brooke would become definitively convinced
of the value of Borneo's coal. His mind changed after one more coal discovery that
persuaded him to reconsider the strategic and commercial value of the island. The
Labuan. Together with a Narrative of the Operations ofH.M.S. Iris, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (London: John Murray,
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discovery came just three months after Brooke recorded his New Years' Eve frustrations.
Word spread that a British naval Lieutenant exploring the harbor island of Labuan, just a
short distance north, had encountered a large coal seam. The outcrop was abundant and
easily mined. Captain George Mundy of the Royal Navy, a friend and admirer of
Brooke, related that engineers aboard the British steamer Nemesis "report it to be the best
coal for steaming purposes which they have met with in India." Easy to burn and
depositing only an inconsequential residue of ash, samples of Labuan coal made their
way to Britain, along with news of the discovery. Chemical experiments performed at
London's Museum of Practical Geology by Dr. Lyon Playfair confirmed its high carbon
and low ash content.65 Playfair's colleague, the geologist Henry de la Beche, advised
"that the coal of Labuan should be systematically and carefully worked, so that a hasty
and inconsiderate extraction, near the surface, may not impede or damage subsequent
workings at greater depth." 66 Brooke at last conceded that Borneo contained more coal
than even he had originally anticipated. "I now begin to think it really may become a
prize some future day to our steamers," he wrote. 67
"Labuan," where this coal was found, derived from a Malayan word for
"anchorage."6 8 The island was some eleven miles long, roughly forty square miles in
65 Playfair did note, however, that this sample might not represent the genuine quality of Labuan coal, since
it had been removed from the exposed surface (rather than mined from underground) and then transported
under harsh conditions, including "upon the back of a camel from Suez across the desert," the [--] miles to
England. Subsequent tests would indeed find Labuan coal with even higher carbon and lower ash content
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area, an isosceles triangle with a base in the south of nearly six miles and tapering to a
point in the north.69 It was near all the major commercial ports in southeast Asia: 650
miles from Manila, 707 from Singapore, 984 from Siam, 1,009 from Hong Kong. The
coal discovery, and reports of its steaming qualities, helped Labuan coal figure into great
(and rising) power struggles in southeast Asia. "Should there ever be another war," wrote
Brooke's friend Captain Mundy, "the command of this coal district will be of vast
importance; and in the mean time, the quickly increasing numbers of steamers in the
neighboring seas will probably draw their supplies from there."70
As the island was uninhabited, strategically located, and now known to contain
large quantities of coal, the prospect of a formal colony quickly arose. A new settlement
on Labuan "will almost perfect the chain of posts that connects, by means of steam
navigation, Southampton with Victoria in Hong Kong," reported the Singapore Free
Press. This network already linked England to China via coaling bases in Malta,
Alexandria, Suez, Aden, the Ceylon port of Galle, Singapore, and finally Hong Kong.7 1
"Thus in a very few years we may expect to see the world fairly belted by the steam navy
of England."72 Not a year later, the same newspaper would again praise Labuan coal,
"the working of which would be of incalculable value to the steamers now frequenting
1972), 311. See also Adrian Room, Placenames of the World, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &
Company, Inc., 2006), 208.69 Mundy and Brooke, Narrative of Events in Borneo, V 2, 335.70 Ibid., 349. Following a subsequent discovery of coal on the Borneo mainland, Mundy anticipated that
the diligent efforts of Brooke and his naval associates would reduce the cost of coal at Singapore by at least
three-quarters and open "this rich and magnificent country... to the commercial enterprise of Great
Britain." Mundy and Brooke, Narrative of Events in Borneo, V 2, 176.
71 "A New British Settlement," Singapore Free Press, October 10 1845. The article was originally
published in The Atlas (for India, China and the Colonies) on August 2. A gap in this chain existed
between Galle and Singapore; the authors of this article anticipated filling it with a station on either the
Andaman or Nicobar Islands-the latter preferably because a Danish expedition there had discovered coal.
72 Ibid.
that quarter of the world." 73 Americans took a similar view, and they wanted a share of
that incalculable value for themselves.
"Incalculable Benefits to Commerce"
By the time the Constitution approached Borneo in March 1845, the object of the ship's
visit there was known to the crew. One crewmember, Henry George Thomas, recorded
that "[w]e had reports that there was abundant coal in the area and we hoped that an
agreement between the Sultan and our country could be reached" over mining it. Thomas
and others had also heard rumors of Brunei's association with regional piracy, though the
crew's "[e]xtra defenses" proved unnecessary when the Sultan warmly welcomed the
ship's expedition with a nine-gun salute.74
Negotiations took place almost immediately. Percival, for his part, had long
suffered from gout, and found his condition deteriorating as the ship had approached
Brunei.7 5 Too ill to conduct diplomacy, he sent Lieutenant William C. Chaplin to the
royal court in his place. At the palace, Chaplin introduced his party as representatives of
the Sultan of America. He boasted of his nation's maritime strength and extent of its
trade. As he offered the Sultan samples of American goods, he announced his desire to
open a regular commerce with Brunei, in exchange for which he promised abundant
revenue from trade duties and the gift (from the American Sultan) of American
manufacturing. The Sultan, Omar Ali, acknowledged the offer but explained that only
73 "The Island of Lobuan," Singapore Free Press, Aug 13 1846.
74 Henry George Thomas and Alan B. Flanders, Around the World in Old Ironsides : The Voyage of USS
Constitution, 1844-1846 (Lively, Va. and Chesapeake, Va.: Brandylane Publishers, Norfolk County
Historical Society, 1993), 80-1.
75 Benjamin F. Stevens, " A Cruise on the Constitution," United Service 5 (Series 3), no. 5 (1904): 546.
weeks before, he had given the English "the exclusive right of trade in Borneo Proper and
now he could do nothing for America." Chaplin protested that such a policy ran counter
to the usual arrangements for trade. He insisted that it limited the development of
industry, the arts, and agriculture. As he informed Washington, he explained to the court
"that, the Divine Hand for a wise purpose had not [deposited?] the fruits of the earth
equally and alike upon every country and climate, and that when it was too late, the
Sultan might have cause to regret so ruinous a policy." Omar Ali remained unmoved,
explaining that with the absence of James Brooke, the new English Rajah, no substantive
business could be conducted without him.76
Nevertheless, Chaplin continued with his negotiations. When he broached the
subject of coal, it was no surprise that he was rebuffed a second time. According to
Chaplin's report, the Sultan explained that barely three weeks previously, an English
steamer brought "a special agent of the Queen of England who had purchased the
exclusive right to all the coal within the [Sultan's] dominions." At first, this response
tempted Chaplin to conclude that the court was merely bargaining for better terms in the
negotiation. Yet as he recalled events and observations from the preceding month,
viewed with a newfound clarity, he was convinced otherwise. Chaplin was aware, for
instance, of James Brooke's entreaties to the British crown to incorporate his influence in
Brunei into the formal British Empire. Chaplin finally realized as well the significance of
a November announcement from the Royal Navy creating a "Special Agent to the Island
of Borneo." The agent, Captain Bethune, had reached Singapore while the Americans
were recuperating there from some weeks of illness. Bethune promptly left his sailing
ship for a steamer, and unexpectedly altered the course of that ship for what was to the
76 Chaplin and Percival to George Bancroft, 4/9/1845, letter 105, Roll #321, "Captains' Letters," NAI.
Americans an unknown destination. All this "at a time when we had reason to know that
he was aware of the destination and object of this Ship." The conclusion was
unmistakable. Bethune had hurried to Brunei to conclude a commercial treaty before the
Americans could arrive. But the British had not only bested the Americans in acquiring
Bornean trade, but "that which is still more important," according to Chaplin, "the use of
the immense mines of coal supposed to exist, in this part of the Island, which in course of
time must render incalculable benefits to commerce, when Steam, already an important
auxiliary, becomes a chief agent in the Commerce of the world."77
Brooke had, by chance, been in Singapore when the Constitution touched at
Borneo. When he returned, the court reported to him that the Americans had proposed
protecting Brunei's government, acquiring exclusive privileges for mining the region's
coal, and securing a monopoly on the Borneo trade. For his part, Brooke doubted the
accuracy of the final stipulation, but worried nevertheless that the opportunity for British
supremacy in the region was fast disappearing. "The Americans act," he observed,
"while the English are deliberating about straws." 78 To his uncle, a Major Stuart, Brooke
made the similar point that the American arrival "proves that while one nation is
deliberating another can act."79
Why did the Americans fail in their negotiations? Muda Hassim, an influential
minister in the royal court had, in fact, "pledged to forbear from negotiation with other
powers, pending his negotiation with the English to repress piracy and to cede Labuan."8o
But the story was more complex. "It is probable," Brooke grumbled, "that from the
77 Chaplin and Percival to George Bancroft, 4/9/1845, letter 105, Roll #321, "Captains' Letters," NAI.
78 Mundy and Brooke, Narrative of Events in Borneo, V. 2, 33-4.
79 Brooke to Major Stuart, 7/4/1845, in Brooke, The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., Rajah of
Sarawak, Narrating the Events of His Life, from 1838 to the Present Time, 77.
80 Mundy and Brooke, Narrative of Events in Borneo, V. 2, 22.
badness of their interpreter (who was formerly my drunken servant), that the demand for
exclusive trade has been erroneously understood." Brooke, however, was grateful for the
misunderstanding. He believed that had the Americans been better prepared, the court
would readily have consented to their request, much to the detriment of his imperial
project. He brooded about the shifting alliances of the Brunei court, only one faction of
which he supported. "Even now they twit our party with the Americans doing at once,
what the English cannot do, they are blamed for repulsing the Americans and for
preferring our friendship," he wrote of the situation. He considered Percival's as
evidence of his own inability to control the situation. He feared, in fact, that he was
himself trapped within the snares of local politics. His imagery for describing his state is
particularly revealing: "I can see no direct and immediate line of conduct, which can
extricate our friends, and in the mean time we are in a wretched, inefficient steamer,
which could, on occasion, neither fight or run away." In contrast, "The Americans would
act first and inquire afterwards-and they are right."8,
Nevertheless, the danger for Brooke, at least for the moment, had passed. The
Constitution left after its officers were rebuffed at the Sultan's court. The French did not
arrive and neither did the Belgians. A year and a half of negotiations later, in November
1846, Brooke received instructions from Viscount Palmerston through Sir Thomas
81 Percival biographer David Long misunderstood entirely the significance of Brooke's explanation for the
American diplomatic failure, as subsequent sentences from Brooke's letters reveal. Long quotes Brooke's
May 22 (not May 2, as Long has it), 1845 letter to John C. Templer (not Temple), from Brooke's published
letters (which consists of three volumes and not two). Long's attribution to Brooke that the court would
have granted the Americans "the moderate terms that they desired" appears nowhere in this letter or
elsewhere in the volume. Brooke, The Private Letters ofSir James Brooke, K. C.B., Rajah ofSarawak,
Narrating the Events of His Life, from 1838 to the Present Time, 65-7.
Cochrane to formally take Labuan for England.82 Sultan Omar Ali and Captain Rodney
Mundy signed the treaty ceding Labuan on December 18, 1846.83
As the British government continued its expansion of steam communication in
southeast Asia, the coal fields of Labuan grew in significance. By the late 1840s, mining
coal there and the nearby coast of Borneo was well under way.8 4 "The European
governments have during late years made careful researches to ascertain the distribution
of coal fields," wrote Horace St. John, noting discoveries of coal in India's Ternnasserim
provinces, along the Malay Peninsula, on Sumatra, Borneo, and many other less familiar
locations. Only in Labuan, however, were large enough deposits, suited for steaming
purposes, discovered by Europeans.s5 According to Hugh Low, by then Labuan's
Colonial Secretary, coal "will prove of the greatest value to our increasing steam
communication with the East. It has been tried by various government steamers, the
engineers of which pronounce it to be of the finest quality, superior to that imported to
Singapore from England."86 Further, he added, "[o]ne of the principal reasons which has
caused our government to form the settlement at Labuh-an is the value that this mineral
will prove both in time of peace and in case of war."8 7
Joseph Balestier, Special Agent
82 Mundy and Brooke, Narrative of Events in Borneo, V 2, 335.
83 Ibid., 295-6.
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(London: Longman Brown Green and Longmans, 1853), 349-50.
86 Hugh Low, Sarawak: Its Inhabitants and Productions: Being Notes During a Residence in That Country
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The American effort to obtain coal from Borneo had one final act. It involved a colorful
figure named Joseph Balestier, a son-in-law of Boston's Paul Revere and a man already
well informed about Bornean coal. When he was the newly appointed U.S. consul to
Singapore in 1836, he had aided Olyphant & Co. in preparing Captain Frasier and the
brig Himmaleh for their commercial and missionary voyage to Borneo.8 8 His association
with Olyphant would have made him one of the first to hear of George Lay's discoveries.
Almost ten years later, he almost certainly knew about the Constitution 's secret
instructions to secure a coal supply for American vessels as well, for while still consul in
Singapore when the ship arrived en route to Borneo, he greeted the Americans when it
docked and hosted Percival in his mansion and plantation some three miles from the
city's central business district.89
In mid-August 1849, Secretary of State John Clayton contacted Balestier to
undertake a series of diplomatic missions in southeast Asia. Appointing him "Special
Agent of the United States to Cochin China and other portions of South Eastern Asia,"
Clayton included in his instructions a request to visit the Sultan in Brunei. Two
circumstances drew Clayton's attention to Borneo. First, British naval expeditions to
crush piracy around the China sea aroused American expectations of expanded, safe
commerce in the region. Second, Clayton recounted the object that attracted the
government to Borneo five years earlier, "the abundant deposits of fossil coal, suitable
for the purposes of Steam Navigation, at Labuan, Sarrawack [sic], and in other districts
on the coast of that Island." Percival had failed to win a concession to this coal, arriving
too late for an outright grant by the Sultan to work the coal fields but too early to secure a
88 King and Lay, The Claims ofJapan and Malaysia Upon Christendom, Exhibited in Notes of Voyages
Made in 1837, from Canton, in the Ship Morrison and Brig Himmaleh, vii-xi.
89 Stevens, " A Cruise on the Constitution," 543-4.
deal with the British to purchase from their own concession on Labuan. In 1849, with a
British company mining coal on the island, Clayton hoped to remedy this situation with
"treaties of amity and commerce" between the U.S. and Brunei with the sanction of both
the Sultan and Rajah Brooke.90
At Macao, Balestier met the U.S.S. Plymouth at the end of December, and two
months later he boarded the ship to begin his mission.91 After a failed diplomatic venture
in Cochin China, Balestier and the Plymouth made their way to Borneo.92 Balestier's
general mission involved extending diplomatic recognition to Brooke's government in
Sarawak as well as securing the commercial treaty with the Sultan of Brunei that Percival
and Chaplin had failed to do five years before. Although Brooke himself was not present
on the island (once again), both objectives were met, though the Americans were barred
from trading for Brunei's antimony, a mineral Brooke kept as a monopoly for exclusively
British consumption. From Brunei, Balestier and the Plymouth sailed to Labuan, where
they continued their negotiations. "Mr. Balestier's object in coming to this place,"
recorded a young American officer aboard the Plymouth named George Welsh, "was to
make inquiries concerning coal, its price, and at what price it would be furnished
90 John Clayton to Joseph Balestier 8/16/1849, in M77, Roll #152; Diplomatic Instructions of the
Department of State, 1801-1906: Special Missions" Dec 15, 1823-Nov 12, 1852, Vol. I, NAII (College
Park, MD).
9~ George P. Welsh, "Journal Aboard the U.S.S. Plymouth, 1848-1851," in Papers of George P. Welsh, Box
3, LoC Manuscripts., entries for Dec 23, 1849 and Feb 21, 1850.
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imprisoned French missionary threatened with execution, Percival demanded his release from the Cochin
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American steamers, besides to form a sort of treaty with the Sultan of Borneo." Balestier,
Welsh, and the rest of the crew discovered that the British had by then already set up a
company to mine coal "of a very superior quality," easily mined near the surface and
evidently abundant. The mining company sold the coal to British vessels for $4.50 a ton.
For Americans, they agreed to $6.00 a ton. Coming in second had its consequences.93
In Borneo, Balestier observed "immense natural riches" along the northwest
coast, inducements to commerce with the west that might lure American merchants.
Trade, he hoped, would displace piracy, returning the island to lucrative commerce in
tropical agriculture and forestry, articles "to which may now be added bituminous coal of
the very best quality in the greatest abundance," Balestier wrote home to Washington, "in
exchange for which a new avenue will be opened for the export of our cotton clothes and
other commodities thus creating a new & valuable trade to us and giving importance to
the treaty just concluded." 94
Balestier's mention of cotton clothes suggests American expectations for U.S.
commerce with Borneo in particular and China and southeast Asia more generally. In the
mid-nineteenth century, cotton maintained a unique position in both the American and
global economy. In the United States, cotton cultivation shaped both the southern
plantation economy and the developing New England industrial economy of cotton
mills.95 Cotton was also essential to foreign trade. Throughout the century, raw cotton
comprised by far the nation's most valuable article for American export: over the twelve
93 Welsh, "Journal Aboard the U.S.S. Plymouth, 1848-1851." Entries for May 26 and June 6, 1850.
94 Joseph Balestier to John M. Clayton 6/24/1850, in M37, Roll #9: RG 59, Records of Department of
State; Despatches from Special Agents of the Department of State, 1794-1906 vols. 18-19; vol. 18 -- Joseph
Balestier, NAIIl (College Park, MD).
95 For cotton's role in the world economy, see Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the
Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War."
months ending on June 30, 1845, cotton exports totaled over $51 million, comprising just
over half the value of all U.S. exports.96 Most U.S. cotton went to Britain, where the
burgeoning industrial cities like Manchester spun cotton fabrics for further exportation.
American cotton that was not exported traveled north, to the growing mill towns New
England mill towns.
Although China's overall fraction of American foreign trade remained minimal in
the nineteenth century, this trade was comprised overwhelmingly of American cotton
goods, and China represented the largest single market for finished American textiles.97
In 1850, the $1,203,000 worth of cotton cloth delivered to China represented fully 81.0%
of all American exports there.98 Moreover, considered as a single market, China
consumed the largest share of American textiles sold abroad anywhere. In 1845, nearly
35% of exports of finished textiles landed in China. Although that figure dropped to
about 10% in the mid-1850s, it rebounded again by 1860, a year that saw a more than
doubling of value exported from just fifteen years earlier.99 These factors, beyond crude
calculations of China's vast (and presumed cotton-needy) population, contributed to the
allure of the Chinese market for American textiles.
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for raw cotton, they still represented over a third of all U.S. exports of manufactured cotton. See Letter
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Britain remained the U.S.'s only significant competitor for the cotton trade with
China, though the textiles they produced for Chinese markets differed. Chinese
consumers, particularly the peasants and urban poor who comprised the bulk of the
population, had long preferred thick, heavy fabrics, similar to centuries-old domestic
hand woven fabrics considered more suitable for winter chills. British manufacturing
specialized in high thread count textiles, preferred by wealthy urban elites, but few else.
With relatively high cotton prices, adapting their manufacturing techniques to produce
thicker fabrics were prohibitively expensive. American producers, on the other hand,
possessed a cheaper supply of domestic cotton and mills already structured to produce
coarse fabrics. Americans were aware of Chinese consuming preferences and sought to
exploit it against their British competitors.100 "It is quite clear, therefore," emphasized
mail steamship enthusiast and Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs
Thomas Butler King in 1848, "that the great field for American enterprise and skill, in
our intercourse with China, lies in the adaptation of our cotton fabrics to the wants and
tastes of the Chinese."' 0 1
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Balestier saw his mission as helping further this American cotton trade with the
far east. Securing access to Borneo coal was a step towards developing the transportation
and communication infrastructure this trade might require. For Americans, however,
interest in Borneo's coal would quickly wane as efforts began to find alternative supplies
of coal in eastern Asia. With the death of President Zachary Taylor on July 9, 1850, the
incoming Fillmore administration shook up the Cabinet. John Clayton left the State
Department, replaced by Daniel Webster, who returned to a post he had filled previously
during the Harrison administration between 1841 and 1843. Webster's enthusiasm for
Balestier's mission waned, and noting that the endeavor "has not, thus far, produced any
important result, and does not seem to promise much for the future," the new Secretary of
State ended the mission.102 Webster, however, soon had other ideas about finding coal in
the far east.
Commodore Perry's Pacific
"Of late years," began the account of Luo Shen, "the intercourse between China and the
State of California, in America, has greatly increased in extent and frequency." Shen was
a Chinese teacher employed as a clerk for Matthew Perry's chief interpreter, S. Wells
Williams. "In consequence," Shen continued, "the government of the United States was
anxious that steam vessels should run between the two countries, and it became necessary
to have an arrangement by which they could purchase coal at the Japanese islands, which
United States and the Commercial and Agricultural Advantages of Cultivating Tea, Coffee, and Indigo, the
Date, Mango, Jack, Leechee, Guava, and Orange Trees, Etc. With a Review of the China Trade (New-
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to the United States, merely to be the bearer of the unimportant Convention, which you announce as having
been concluded by yourself with the Sultan of Brunei." Daniel Webster to Joseph Balestier 2/15/1851, in
M77 Roll #152, RG 59, NAII (College Park, MD).
lie between America and Asia."' ' 3 This was a view of Perry's mission to Japan that put
resources and the construction of a communication infrastructure immediately at the
forefront. Coal, in fact, shaped Perry's expedition. He planned for it, he searched for it,
and he negotiated for it. He sent his men on geological expeditions to uncover it and he
began the construction of depots to store it for steamships. Upon returning to America,
he lectured about the importance of American colonies in the far east to ensure the
availability of coal to American commerce. Coal was found around the world. Perry
understood that the difficulty was getting it where you wanted it.
Commodore Matthew C. Perry left Norfolk for Madeira in late November 1852.
His final destination was Japan, but he thought as carefully about how to get there as he
did about what to do upon arriving. Much of this planning involved coal. His ship, the
Mississippi, had been specially outfitted to hold 600 tons of coal, some 150 tons beyond
its original design. The ship had been reconfigured to ensure the Mississippi could travel
farther without stopping to refuel. These stops were essential to the mission, for without
replenished supplies, none of his steamships would survive the voyage east. Perry
anticipated an initial coaling at Madeira, then subsequent stops at the Cape of Good
Hope, Mauritius, and Singapore. 104 Along the way, however, Perry realized his ship was
103 [Luo Chen], "Journal of the Second Visit of Commodore Perry to Japan," in Narrative of an American
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104 Matthew Calbraith Perry and Roger Pineau, The Japan Expedition, 1852-1854; the Personal Journal of
Commodore Matthew C. Perry, Smithsonian Institution Publication 4743 (Washington: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1968), 3.
consuming more coal than he had expected. Unseasonably foul winds and weather were
delaying the voyage from Madeira along the African coast, and as the ship slowly
consumed its limited fuel supply en route to the Cape, Perry ordered an unplanned stop at
St. Helena for an emergency refueling. Steam engines may have helped ocean vessels
travel along sea routes unconstrained by the currents of wind or water, but they did not
make sea travel immune to Nature.
That Perry could coal at all at Capetown and Mauritius was the result of judicious
planning and a dash of good fortune. Before leaving Norfolk, Perry had arranged with
the shipping firm of Howland & Aspinwall to dispatch two ships from New York loaded
with Pennsylvanian anthracite coal to sail ahead of the Mississippi. Both ships arrived at
their destinations only days before Perry. Perry believed that without them, purchasing
coal for the Mississippi and Susquehanna, as well as the Powhatan and Allegheny that
were following them, would have involved "great difficulty."' 0 ' The arrangement with
Howland & Aspinwall was a success, and Perry noted that future commanders of steam
vessels should likewise send cargoes of coal ahead of themselves to ensure an adequate
supply once they arrived at their ports of call along the way to their destinations.10 6
At Ceylon, the British maintained a large supply of coal but the frequent arrival of
steamships, some ten a month, led the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company (the P&O) that oversaw the supply, to forbid the sale of British coal to foreign
naval ships. Perry could only scrounge a meager supply from the local Bengali
government. 107
05os Ibid., 35.
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Perry's difficulties obtaining coal persisted in Singapore. The British port had
become a major coaling depot for mail steamers, facilitating "a constant postal
communication, by means of the English and one or more Dutch steamers, with Hong
Kong, Penang, Batavia, Shanghai, Calcutta, Madras, Bengal, Bombay, Ceylon, the
Mauritius, Cape of Good Hope, and, by the Red Sea, with Europe and America." This
mail communication kept Europeans and Americans in constant contact wherever they
might be conducting business. Despite the operation of these mail steamers, "[t]here was
not a pound of coal ... to be purchased at Singapore." Perry sighed that "there was
reason to fear that the Mississippi would be deprived of her necessary supplies." Perry
was learning, in fact, the cost of Percival's failure to secure a coal concession in Borneo
before the British. By the time of Perry's arrival in Singapore, the Labuan mines were
producing a substantial 1,000 tons a month, but the P&O again maintained a lock on the
supply, consuming it entirely in their own vessels.10 8
Good fortune assisted Perry again, however, as P&O coal supplies had fallen low
in Hong Kong. Although it had enough coal for both ports in Singapore, the company
lacked an available ship to transport it. A deal was reached. Perry was permitted to coal
the Mississippi at Singapore provided he return the same amount upon a later visit to
Hong Kong.o09 Incidents like this one convinced Perry and his officers to ration their
coal consumption and jealously guard what supplies they were able to amass in various
Asian ports.
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That guarding was not always successful, as suggested by the frustration Perry
found storing coal in Shanghai. Perry left coal he had purchased there under the
protection of a storekeeper named Amory, whom he forbade to release any amount
without Perry's written permission. Perry was concerned, in particular, with the
prospects of the French or Russian navies from taking advantage of his actions in Japan
before he himself could complete his negotiations there. A Russian vessel arrived in
Shanghai in November 1853, and when the Russian admiral approached Amory for a
loan of twenty tons of coal, Amory, under Perry's orders, refused. The Russians,
however, maintained an agent in Shanghai, who served a second role as the American
vice-consul--at the time the State Department permitted such an apparent conflict of
interest. The agent pressured Amory to release the coal, which he eventually did. When
he learned of the transaction, Perry was predictably outraged, blaming both Amory the
consular system which he called "fraught with much evil." He would not fire Amory, as
he was concerned such a move might offend the Russians, but his hopes of using the little
coal he collected in Asia to his advantage had clearly failed." 0o
For the duration of the mission, Perry and his ships scrounged southeast Asia for
coal supplies. Some continued to be shipped from the United States, other loads were
purchased from British or Asian suppliers. His supplies were precarious and dealers
unreliable. "At no time" Perry observed, "have we had more than fifty days of steaming
for the three steamers." Moreover, this limited supply shaped voyage itself, with Perry
limiting travel for "its provident and economical use." At their usual pace, his ships
10 Arthur Walworth, Black Ships OffJapan; the Story of Commodore Perry's Expedition (New York,: A.
A. Knopf, 1946), 127-8.
consumed between 28 and 32 tons of coal a day."' This was the logistical situation in
the Pacific faced by the United States in the 1850s, and as his mission wore on, Perry
began to tire of relying upon coal supplied by others.
A vast improvement, he thought, would see Americans developing a coaling
network of their own. An important element of this network, Perry believed, would
involve discovering alternative sources for coal in the mines of various Asian countries, a
project Perry initiated with a series of geological expeditions. These expeditions played
as significant a role in the Japan expedition as Perry's planning for strategic outposts. 112
There were two geological expeditions of note. Together, they suggest the ways
in which studying natural history was not merely a opportunistic addition to commercial
and naval expeditions in the mid- 19t" century but central to it. These missions must be
understood in a broader context of western scientific observation. The observational
skills of a Charles Darwin were, of course, rare. So too were voyages primarily devoted
to exploration, like that of the American naval officer Charles Wilkes in his Exploring
Expedition in the Pacific between 1838 and 1842. But natural history, embracing botany,
zoology, and geology, as well as observations of cultures, currents, and climates, formed
the foundation of trade and diplomacy. The products of Nature were not only the objects
of commerce, but as food and fuel, sustained the voyagers themselves as they traveled.
11" Commodore Perry to SecNav 2/2/1854 in Matthew Calbraith Perry, Official Correspondence, U.S.
Senate Exec. Doc. Serial No. 751, Doc. No. 34 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1855), 142.
112 The importance of these expeditions is clear from the literary form by which Perry publicized his
mission to Japan. Upon returning to the United States, Perry collaborated with the Reverend Francis L.
Hawks to produce an official narrative of his voyages. The narrative was published in three volumes in
1856. In an unusual action, both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives issued their own editions.
Volume I is the familiar narrative: the account of the voyage, mostly from Perry's perspective, in
chronological order. It remains the standard first reference for the mission, even as its errors and omissions
have been clarified by subsequent scholarship. The other two volumes are much less familiar, but it is no
accident that they both cover scientific observations-Volume II on natural history and Volume III on
astronomical observations. Perry, and his publishers, understood that collecting reports on agriculture,
celestial navigation, and geology were directly tied to contemporary and anticipated needs for commerce
and defense.
The first substantial geological expedition of the Japan voyage occurred in what
Americans then called the Lew Chew Islands, now known as the Ryukyu group, home of
Okinawa. In January 1854, Perry dispatched his geologist, the Reverend George Jones,
to explore reports of coal on the island. Four officers accompanied him: Dr. Daniel
Green, to study disease and agriculture, Dr. Charles Fahs, to study botany, Dr. James
Morrow, studying both botany and agriculture, and Wilhelm Heine, the expedition's
artist. Jones took responsibility for observing the geology of the island. Two enlisted
crew came along as well to manage food and supplies. Adding to the the party, some
thirty residents of the island also joined them as they began their trek. Their mission, as
Jones affirmed in his report to Perry, "was to examine some indications of coal at Shah
bay," coal Perry hoped might support American steamers. 113
The group trekked north from Napha in early February, composing geological,
botanical, agricultural, and medical observations. At Farnigi, some fifty-five miles north
of Napha, the party encountered their first indications of coal. They found traces of
conglomerate, a jumble of diverse rock fragments fused into a single mass.
Conglomerate passed into coarse sandstone, and coarse gave way to fine. For seven
miles, sandstone alternated with slate, until the group encountered "some outcroppings of
the black bituminous slate," the kind, Jones noted, "usually accompanying coal." Three
miles further and they reached Shah Nehatu, or Shah anchorage. There they found an
even larger deposit of the bituminous slate. The village of Shah itself sat atop a small
island in the bay. As the Americans circumscribed it in their boat, they observed
additional outcrops of the slate. Slate, however, even bituminous slate, was not coal, but
113 Rev. George Jones, "Report of an Exploration of Great Lew Chew," in Narrative of the expedition of an
American squadron to the China seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the
command of Commodore M.C. Perry, V. 2, House Ex. Doc. 97, 33rd. Cong., 2nd. sess. (1856).
was often found near it, frequently forming the ceilings of coal mines in America.
Nevertheless, Jones acknowledged that the evidence for coal on Lew Chew remained
circumstantial: "I wish to guard against too sanguine or certain expectations," he
explained his report to Perry. The slate would not burn and, as Jones noted, "for steam
navigation, it would be useless." Even so, the expedition had suggestive evidence that
coal might still be found around Shah.1 14
The second and more extensive coal expedition occurred five months later. While
visiting the Japanese port of Simoda in June 1854, Perry instructed Captain Joel Abbot of
the Macedonian to detach from the fleet and sail to Formosa. Perry gave Abbot two
objectives. First, inquire on the island for American sailors thought shipwrecked nearby.
Second, as in the expeditions on Lew Chew, to explore for coal. Perry offered specific
instructions. According to the letter of dispatch, Abbot was to ascertain "the convenience
of procuring and shipping it; the productiveness of the mines; the quality of the coal for
steaming purposes; its cost per ton of 2,240 pounds at the mines; the convenience and
cost of shipping, &c., &c." Geological exploration was again delegated to George Jones
while Abbot was instructed to inquire whether coal might be purchased there directly. If
so, Perry sent along the storeship Supply to collect as much as 300 tons-but only if it
was relatively inexpensive. Higher prices (Perry quoted $20 a ton) were to decrease the
volume purchased. The Macedonian and Supply left Simoda on June 26. "
114 Rev. George Jones, "Report Made to Commodore Perry of a Geological Exploration, Etc., of the Island
of Great Lew Chew," in Narrative of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in
the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M.C. Perry, United States Navy, by
Order of the Government of the United States, V. 2., House Ex. Doc. 97, 33rd. Cong., 2nd. sess. (1856).
115 "Instructions and Report in Relation to the Island of Formosa and Manila," in Narrative of an American
Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command
of Commodore M.C. Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States, ed.
Francis L. Hawks (Washington, D.C.: [33-2 House Ex. Doc. 97], 1856), 137-8, 42.
Jones' presented his expedition for coal in Formosa in the style of a travel
narrative. As best he could, he obscured the fact that he was not exploring virgin land for
coal outcrops but searching diligently for Formosan coal mines already in use. He first
tried to gather information about coal from the residents of Kelung, the port where the
Macedonian dropped anchor. To his frustration, they refused to share any information.
"Nearly all that we have learned about the coal in this region has, therefore," Jones noted,
"been by pushing and persevering investigations, in the face of constant attempts of the
inhabitants to mislead us or to blind us as to the facts." When Jones persisted with his
pushing and persevering, he met little resistance, though his actions along the way
suggested that the "native" recalcitrance was well founded. 116
The Macedonian had arrived in Kelung on Tuesday morning, July 11. That
afternoon, Jones shuttled ashore with the ship's purser, two midshipmen, and the master's
mate, "determined to commence our explorations before the authorities could suspect our
object and throw difficulties in the way," he explained. After collecting an interpreter
from Amoy, the group were led to a house in town with a large pile of some ten or twelve
tons of coal. The owner offered to sell it to the visitors for a few dollars a ton. The coal,
reasoned Jones, was probably mined nearby, and the group "set out on an exploratory
walk" to a valley in the east. Residents of Kelung tried discouraging this walk, insisting
no coal was to be found there. The party, collecting scraps of coal from their path,
ignored them and continued on. The locals from Kelung followed them as far as mile out
"
6 Naturally, Jones does not speculate on why the residents of Kelung refused to help him. Perhaps they
worried about the intensions of the Americans, or perhaps they were concerned more with their own
government. Rev. George Jones, "Reports Made to Commodore Perry of a Visit to the Coal Regions of the
Island of Formosa," in Narrative of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the
Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M.C. Perry, United States Navy, by
Order of the Government of the United States, V. 2, House Ex. Doc. 97, 33rd. Cong., 2nd. sess. (1856).
of town, where a handful of coal piles again encouraged the Americans. Only then did
their discouragers return home.
Alone, Jones and his group continued along a path that cut through another valley
heading south. Along the way, "with the help of some country people," they were led
further to where Jones triumphantly declares, "to our great pleasure, [we] discovered
some mines." With nighttime approaching and lacking lanterns or other tools, the party
returned to the Macedonian, "gratified with our first day's work."" 7
The next day, Jones, Abbot, and the purser, Richard Allison, returned to shore for
the coal that Jones had located at the house in Kelung the day before. This time,
however, the owner explained he could not, in fact, sell the coal to the Americans. He
did not explain why, but Jones surmised that "the mandarins had interfered," and in his
opinion, "the man seemed almost afraid to speak to us." The ruling mandarin, described
by Jones as the "Hip-toy" Le-chu-ou, met the party, explained that the coal could in fact
be sold, but that it came from an island some 100 miles away. 1 8 Confused, and
skeptical, the crew returned again to the ship.
The following morning, Jones, the midshipman Williams, and four sailors (armed,
Jones noted), returned to the island to explore the mines they encountered the day before.
The party first found three separate entrances to the mine, each about thirty inches wide
and four feet tall. A short crawl inside brought the Americans to the coal seam.
Horizontal drifts stretching along the length of the seam for what Jones estimated to be
about 120 feet indicated the extent of the workings of the mine. The report noted that the
miners there evidently used only a sharp pick to remove the coal, and carted the pieces
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
they dislodged from the seam away in baskets. Jones believed this method led to
substantial waste, pulverizing the coal into an unusable dust. Jones, however, "found no
difficulty in getting it out in large pieces, of which, as specimens, we brought away as
much as we could carry." Further exploration and negotiations continued over the next
few days. Jones was hardly "discovering" coal in any meaningful sense; he was finding
mines already in use and planning for their extension to serve needs of western
commercial steamers.' 19
Monday began early. One of the two midshipmen who had accompanied Jones
on the first day of exploration, Kidder Randolph Breese, penned an entry in a friend's
journal explaining, with both humor and irritation, the events of his day. "I started this
morning at half past four in the cutter for the famous mines of Formosa," he began, "from
which so much benefit to the whole world (some few speculating Amer[ican] merchants)
is to be derived, and for which I, poor fellow, was turned out of my ship to incommode
some and benefit others." Breese spends most of the rest of the entry complaining about
being forced into the coal exploration business and his repeated failures to secure
breakfast. 120
This time, Jones, the reluctant Breese, and purser Allison were joined by two
Chinese guides ("who to serve Mammon forgot their master," according to Breese) and
an interpreter. The guides had earlier been promised by the local mandarin, but he had
seemed to reconsider out of fear of a reprimand from the mainland. The men
nevertheless had arrived at the ship the night before, offering to help the Americans if
"119 Ibid.
120 Breese in John Glendy Sproston and Shiho Sakanishi, A Private Journal of John Glendy Sproston,
U.S.N, Monumenta Nipponica Monograph (Tokyo: Sophia University in cooperation with Charles E. Tuttle
Co. Tokyo Rutland Vt., 1968), 70. (Entry of July 17, 1854.)
first they were disguised as sailors. They had promised not to disclose their participation
if promised a hefty reward. Jones agreed, provided the men spend the night aboard the
ship to be sure of their intentions. 121
When the party, disguised guides and all, set off for the mines Monday morning,
they were thus expecting substantial "discoveries," and they were not disappointed.
Jones had been suspicious when Le-chu-ou claimed the town's coal came from 100 miles
away. With the help of the guides, they found it was closer to a mere three miles.
Slipping by a channel in the bay and turning past the "Sphinx Head" promontory, the
party came upon the coal mines in a location that "was also everything that could be
desired." l22 After they learned of the mine, Le-chu-ou permitted them to purchase coal
there. They paid about $3 a ton for about 12 tons. 123 Another midshipman, John
Sproston, who learned of these events from his friend Kidder Breese, noted that the
exploration was successful, "a great source of satisfaction to all, as it has placed beyond a
doubt the fact of the existence of extensive veins of coal upon the Island, of easy access,
and from all appearances of good quality." He added an observation that placed the coal
expeditions on Formosa into a larger context of fuel supplies and markets in the far east.
"When we consider," he observed, "that not three hundred miles from this port
(Shanghai) coal is selling for $60 a ton, it is truly astonishing that more notice has not
been taken of the existence of it here, and [a] depot for the useful article established."' 24
Perry would later cite the knowledge gained on this exploration as material support for
121 Breese in Ibid. Jones, "Reports Made to Commodore Perry of a Visit to the Coal Regions of the Island
of Formosa."
122 Jones, "Reports Made to Commodore Perry of a Visit to the Coal Regions of the Island of Formosa."
123 "Instructions and Report in Relation to the Island of Formosa and Manila," 142.
124Breese in Sproston and Sakanishi, A Private Journal ofJohn Glendy Sproston, U.S.N, 71-2.
steam power and a future American colonization of the region to compete with Great
Britain.'25
Returning
Perry carried the findings of these coal expeditions, as well as his agreement with Japan
to provide coal to American steamers, back to the United States. In a paper read before a
packed crowd at the American Geographical and Statistical Society in New York in 1856,
he observed the prospects for "a flourishing trade" with Japan and "the boundless
elements of trade" offered by China. Of all the products of Asia, however, Perry noted
the "one mineral that calls for special remark." Coal, Perry observed, had become "the
most valuable to commerce of all the minerals since the introduction of steam in aid of
navigation." As he had learned while traveling to Japan, the availability of coal
circumscribed the limits of steam communication. It meant the difference between a
successful voyage and being stuck in port. Perry encouraged his American audience that
coal could be found in China, as well as in Japan, Formosa, and Borneo. 126 But even as
Perry's plans gained domestic support, American relations with the far east were
interrupted by a convulsive Civil War.
125 M.C. Perry, "Remarks of Commodore Perry on the Expediency of the Extension of Further
Encouragement to American Commerce in the East," in Narrative of an American Squadron to the China
Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M C.
Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States, V. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 97, 33rd.
Cong., 2nd. sess. (1856).
126 Perry, A Paper by Commodore M. C. Perry, U.S.N., Read before the American Geographical and
Statistical Society, at a Meeting Held March 6th, 1856, 7-8.
Chapter 2: Race, Technology, and the Politics ofMineral Wealth on the American
Isthmus
Ambrose W. Thompson knew of Matthew Perry's pursuit of coal in the far east.
Thompson, an inventor, entrepreneur, and inveterate promoter, agreed with the
Commodore that obtaining coal for the Pacific was a grand project of national
importance. His papers reveal his interest. Appended to a long essay in Thompson's
files was an asterisked excerpt from the first volume of Perry's Narrative of the Japan
expedition published in 1856: "It was not practicable to make any arrangement with the
'Labuan Coal Company'-" it read, "for the whole produce of the mines under their
control was exhausted by the Oriental & Pacific S.S. Co." 1
The quote referred to Perry's experience in Singapore, the port in which the
Americans had been unable to obtain any coal for their vessels despite the city's regular
supply from Labuan. Labuan coal-coal from the concession obtained by James Brooke
for Britain and lost to John Percival aboard the U.S.S. Constitution-was purchased on
an exclusive contract by the British steamship company and was thus unavailable to ships
of other companies or navies. Glued to the left of the quote was a newspaper article
describing Labuan coal. Thompson's papers reveal that he thought broadly about the
geography of coal, geography that was global in scope.
For Thompson, however, the far east was too far away. From the early 1850s,
Thompson labored to develop a major coal mine, as well as a major trans-isthmian road,
I"Untitled Essay Beginning "Trading" Dated in Pencil "1866 My 30"," in LoC, Papers of Ambrose W.
Thompson, Box 43, Chiriqui Improvement Co., 1865-1866. The original quote from the Narrative omits
the words "Coal" in the name of the British mining company and "S.S." for the steamship company. See
Perry and Hawks, Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan,
Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M.C. Perry, 129.
naval stations, and colony of Americans, on the isthmus of Chiriqui, a province of New
Granada on the border of Costa Rica.2 After obtaining and consolidating a series of
grants and concessions there in the middle of the decade, Thompson embarked on an
ambitious scheme to interest the United States government in isthmian coal for
consumption in the Caribbean and Pacific, a plan that by the Civil War involved
resettling freed blacks in Chiriqui in order to mine coal for the Navy and to develop the
territory as a major outpost of American geopolitical power. President Lincoln and much
of his cabinet would endorse the plan, and from the middle of 1861 through the end of
1862, tried to make it happen.
While historians have long been interested in Abraham Lincoln's efforts to
colonize freed blacks in various places-including Liberia, Haiti, and Central America-
they have not grasped the fundamental context of industrialization and the challenges that
fueling American power had posed over the preceding two decades.3 Lincoln had been
attracted to the idea of colonization, but his particular enthusiasm for Chiriqui stemmed
from its promise of addressing a second, less visible obstacle to American development:
coal in distant ports. Why voyage to Borneo or Japan for coal, asked Thompson, when
coal in the nearby Caribbean could be mined instead? And who better to mine this vital
coal than freed blacks? Thompson and eventually Lincoln, believed that the fuel
imperatives created by steam power provided a new and enticing solution to the country's
social dilemmas around race. Through the reconnaissance of scientists and engineers and
2 With American assistance in 1903, this province would break away from Colombia to form the nation of
Panama, but in the 1850s, it was subject to shifting borders and political authorities.
3 On Lincoln and colonization, see Benjamin Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1962), 108-23, Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877
(New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 6, James M. McPherson, "Abolitionist and Negro Opposition to
Colonization During the Civil War," Phylon 26, no. 4 (1965), Paul J. Scheips, "Lincoln and the Chiriqui
Colonization Project," Journal ofNegro History 37, no. 4 (1952), Warran A. Beck, "Lincoln and Negro
Colonization in Central America," Abraham Lincoln Quarterly VI (1950).
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the wide dissemination of their reports, Lincoln and his supporters increased their
enthusiasm for solving two pressing problems at once. But Thompson was not the first
American to insist that steam navigation could be used to solve the pressing racial
tensions that threatened to tear the country apart. The idea dated, in fact, to 1850, and it
reveals how technology enticed some Americans to believe that could solve the complex
social dilemmas that race posed in the 19 th century.
Steamships and Slavery
At the beginning of the 1850s, as national political debate continued on the federal
subsidization of mail steamship lines, a group of Americans began advocating the
adoption of these steam lines to address the nation's most pressing social issues, slavery
and the commingling of races in the United States. Mail steamers became, in effect, a
solution in search of a problem. Not only could steam lines be used to carry inter-
continental mail and advance commerce, went the argument, but they could be used to
resettle free blacks in Africa. The solution to the race problem was imagined to come
from the new technological opportunities offered by steam power, not the painful and
difficult process of social accommodation. The driving force behind the steamship plan
was the American Colonization Society.
The American Colonization Society was founded in Washington, D.C. by the
Reverend Robert Finley in 1816. Like many of his contemporaries, Finley believed the
intermingling of races in the United States presented the greatest obstacle to the social
health and stability of the young republic. For Finley, the problem was larger than
slavery; following a common argument, the mere coexistence of different and
presumably unequal races on the American continent compromised the political and
social well-being of all groups. Removing people of African descent from the country,
Finley argued, would allow the distinct races to flourish in their own ways in their own
spaces. Finley looked to Africa as the logical location for a colony, a choice that would
have the added inducement of offering a Christianizing influence over the heathen
continent.
Like other benevolent societies operating in the early 19th century, the American
Colonization Society pursued an agenda of social change; uniquely, however, it staked its
success from the beginning on federal support, both financial and political. Attracting
such prominent and politically diverse figures as Washington lawyer Francis Scott Key,
Kentucky's Speaker of the House of Representatives Henry Clay, Clay's principal
political opponent Andrew Jackson, and long list of statesmen and clergy, the
organization quickly grew. The Society's most lasting accomplishment came in
December 1821, with the purchase (quite literally at gun point) of a tract of land on Cape
Mesurado along Africa's Grain Coast. The new settlement, christened Liberia, had
within its first year 135 black colonists formerly of the United States and struggling to
survive. 4
The fortunes of the Society rose and fell over the next three decades with political
shifts and alternating periods of debt and solvency. Every year, scores, and sometimes
even hundreds of blacks made the voyage to Liberia. Despite the steady flow of
emigrants, interest among the larger American black population remained miniscule, and
the Society struggled to turn its vision of settlement into a political, social, and
4 By the Civil War, over 10,000 American freedmen left for Liberia, and an additional 5,000 went by the
end of the century P. J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York,:
Columbia University Press, 1961), 15-35, 59-68, 251.
demographics fact. New technology presented a new opportunity. During a temporary
surge in popularity and influence in the early 1850s, proponents of African colonization
in the Society began arguing that funding steamship lines offered the most efficacious
solution to the colonization problem, thus linking the continued settlement of Liberia to
the possibilities of steam power. Judge Joseph Bryan of Alabama first conceived of the
plan in 1850, and submitted it to the House of Representatives for consideration.
Bryan's plan linked the existing interest in mail steamers to the fundamental issue
of race. In their memorial, Bryan and his colleagues proposed establishing a line of four
steamships (which they would operate for a profit), of 4,000 tons apiece, to steam
regularly between the United States and the western coast of Africa. The ships would
ferry black colonists eastward, contribute to the national assault on the maritime slave
trade, transport mail, and promote trade between Africa and North America. As
considered by the House's Committee on Naval Affairs, the new line would provide an
auxiliary steam fleet for the Navy, for like other mail steamship lines then being
established, these ships would be commanded by American naval officers and operated
by naval engineers. The Secretary of the Navy could enlist the vessels into active naval
service if needed. More importantly, the committee concluded that the line would
address the two elements of the race problem: it would smother the source by helping
police the continued African slave trade and it would remove the toxic social
consequences by transporting willing free blacks to Africa. 5
The Committee recommended a fleet of three steamships. One would leave New
York with colonists every three months for Savannah, where it would load both freight
5 Report of the Naval Committee on Establishing a Line of Mail Steamships to the Western Coast ofAfrica,
and Thence Via the Mediterranean to London: With an Appendix Added by the American Colonization
Society, (Washington, D.C.: Gideon & Co., 1850), 3, 8-9.
and mail. A second ship would leave Baltimore, with stops in Norfolk and Charleston,
and a third would leave New Orleans with stops in the West Indies. All three ships
would then steam to Liberia, discharge their passengers and cargo, and stop at any
desired port along the African coast before heading to Gibraltar with mail for
Mediterranean destinations. Final stops in Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain would
conclude the voyage before the ships returned to the United States.6
It would be easy to assume that the members of the Colonization Society, as well
as representatives on the House Naval Affairs Committee, were not interested in
steamships per se, but instead merely capitalizing on the political support gathering in
Washington behind the enlargement of the nation's steam navy. If money was to be had
from Congress for mail steamers, according to this view, why not take advantage of it for
colonization purposes? While the Colonization Society and the committee no doubt tried
to take advantage of prevailing political winds, it would be too simple to dismiss their
support of Bryan's steamship proposals as mere opportunism. Steamships offered an
incentive its proponents believed would overcome what they considered the explanation
behind the long-standing reluctance of free blacks to emigrate: the length and discomfort
of the journey. "That the free negroes of the U.S. will be induced to go in large numbers
to Liberia," explained the report on the plan from the House's Committee on Naval
Affairs, "if a quick and pleasant passage by steam vessels be provided... cannot admit of
any doubt." Moreover, since the ships could carry as many as 1,500 6migr6s at a time,
the Colonization Society would be able to take advantage of tremendous economies of
scale as the costs for transporting each colonist would presumably plummet.7
6 Ibid., 23.
7 Ibid., 15, 27-8.
American missionaries in Africa believed the steamships would aid their work.
According to D.T. Harris, an American in Liberia, the steamship plan "is bold and
original, and if it succeeds, will give an impetus to colonization, that will either surpass
the most sanguine hopes of its friends, or else rebound to the joy of its enemies."8 Others
praised the plan with biblical imagery, writing of the vessels as ships rescuing blacks
from a modern day deluge. "Let these steamers," wrote the missionary John Seys, "like
so many arks, be provided for them, and the God of Ham as well as of Japhet will shut
them in, and guide them safely above all the waves of prejudice, and bear them to a better
country." 9 In the 19" century, if the steamer was a modem ark, then technology, not
divine intervention, was the principal agent of salvation.
Support of the plan, soon known as the "Ebony Line" of steamships, also came
from state and municipal governments. The diversity of bodies that lent their imprimatur
to the plan suggests the wide support the idea had among the nation's political elite in
both northern and southern states. The Virginia Reform Convention, the constitutional
convention convened in 1850 to resolve tensions between the white populations of the
eastern and western parts of the state, supported the Liberian-bound steamers. Members
of the Commonwealth's legislature agreed.'0 The Mayor and Boards of Aldermen and
Common Council of Washington, D.C. offered their endorsements, along with the
Governor and Legislature of New Jersey; the Governor, Speaker of the Senate, and
members of the Legislature of Delaware; the Mayor and Common Council of Brooklyn,
8 D.T. Harris, "Letter from D.T. Harris, Liberia," African Repository 27, no. 2 (1851).
9 John Seys, "The Line of Steamers to Africa," African Repository 27, no. 6 (1851).
1o Memorial of Members of the Virginia Reform Convention in Favor of the Establishment of a Line of Mail
Steamers between the United States and the Western Coast ofAfrica, Senate Misc. No. 19, 31st. Cong., 2nd
sess. (1851), Memorial of Members of the Legislature of Virginia in Favor of the Establishment of a Line of
Mail Steamers between the United States and the Western Coast ofAfrica, Senate Misc. No. 18, 31st.
Cong., 2nd. sess. (1851).
New York; and ninety legislators from Pennsylvania." The state of Maryland pledged
$200,000 in support, and Virginia $40,000 a year. 12
Religious bodies and newspapers similarly offered their endorsements. The
Steamship plan received the full support of the Lutheran Synod of Virginia, which urged
Congress to pass the bill.13 The Nashville Union observed that the steamers would
stimulate trade, especially American textiles in exchange for the agricultural produce of
Liberia. 14 The African steamers also received the editorial support of the N. Y. Express.15
The Colonization Society's official organ, the African Repository, later explained
that the organization had been reluctant to embrace the plan at first, given both the ships'
anticipated costs and the meager numbers of free blacks then interested in emigrating.
Yet the Naval Affairs Committee's endorsement encouraged the Society's full support.
As the organization concluded its explanation of its shifted view, it noted "[t]he vast
importance of such a line of steam ships" to American trade and "great and important
results" that will accrue to the cause of emigration.' 6
The Society hailed the four steamship plan as an essential inducement to mass
emigration. Steam reduced the duration of ocean voyages, and members of the Society
asserted that regular mail steamers would stimulate free blacks to embrace a return to
their ancestral continent. They proclaimed that regular steamship service to Liberia
would trim the trans-Atlantic voyage to a mere fortnight. The Society imagined the
11 Cong. Globe 31st Cong., 2nd Session (1851). Cong. Globe 31st Cong. 2nd Session (1851).12 Report of the Naval Committee on Establishing a Line of Mail Steamships to the Western Coast ofAfrica,
and Thence Via the Mediterranean to London: With an Appendix Added by the American Colonization
Society, 16.
13 "Action of the Synod of Virginia on Colonization, and the Proposed Steamships," African Repository 26,
no. 12 (1850).
14 Nashville Union, "The Colonization of Free Blacks. Steamships to Africa," African Repository 27, no. 7
(1851).
15 N.Y. Express, "A Line of Steamers to Africa," Christian Register, Aug 3 1850.16 "The Great Steamship Enterprize," African Repository 27, no. 1 (1851).
engines of steam awakening the dormant engines of commerce, strengthening the bonds
of trade between the Africa and the Americas while releasing the United States from the
intolerable burden of slavery. "The steamships must be built," opined proponents of
colonization. "The great work must be done."17
But "the great work" languished in a fiercely divided Congress. 18 Emigration was
opposed by many abolitionists, who looked suspiciously at colonization as a plot by
southern slave holders to remove free blacks while still maintaining slavery. On the other
hand, some slaveholders opposed it because they feared it an opening salvo against
slavery that would ultimately lead to abolition. By the summer of 1854, Congressional
support remained tepid and the technical constraints of steamship construction became
more evident. The original proposal for four, 4,000-ton ships became three ships at "not
less than 1,200 tons." The emigration of 1,000 to 1,500 passengers per voyage became a
meager 350. Ships costing as much as $900,000 became ships of $120,000. The
fourteen-day passage became twenty two or twenty three, "quicker time requiring a
consumption of coal very much greater in proportion than the gain in speed, the room for
which is a very important consideration in a voyage so long." 19 Mere enthusiasm,
whether technological or political, was an insufficient guarantor of success.
Despite the advocacy of the American Colonization Society, Congress ultimately
declined to act on the Ebony Line proposal. Opponents of slavery viewed emigration not
as a resolution to the slavery issue, but as a buttress to it. They accused slavery
supporters as hoping to deport free blacks, "who constitute the chief source of
17 "'but Will They Go?"' African Repository 26, no. 10 (1850).
18 "The Liberia Steamships," African Repository 26, no. 11 (1850).
19 H.M. Scheiffelin, Thomas W. Williams, and James Hall, "Report of the Committee on Steamships to
Liberia, Made to the Executive Committee of the American Colonization Society, July 28, 1854," African
Repository 31, no. 2 (1854).
disturbance and danger to Slavery," in order to maintain slavery itself.20 Opponents of
the Ebony line in Congress also railed against its expected cost. Citing the contract
delays and cost overruns of the mail lines already granted, they argued that while perhaps
meeting the desires of the American Colonization Society, a steam line to Liberia would
not fulfill the other tasks delegated to it: supporting the U.S. Navy, suppressing piracy, or
increasing international commerce. 21 But as the nation began heading towards a more
violent resolution of the race question, the Ebony Line would stand out as only the first
effort to turn the technology of steam power to the service of resolving racial conflict.
The next began in a little known province of New Granada, the mid-19th century republic
that embraced Colombia, Panama, and parts of other Central and South American States.
Encountering Chiriqui
The American isthmus, the narrow strip of land separating the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, had attracted European interest since the time of Columbus. Columbus, in fact,
left his mark there in 1502 by naming the body of water on the Caribbean side of what
became the Province of Chiriqui, "Almirante Bay," after his naval rank of Admiral. In
1510 Vasco Nufiez de Balboa fled Hispaniola for Panama to avoid repaying debts and
became the first European to cross the isthmus and see the Pacific Ocean. After Balboa
claimed the land for Spain, a Royal Road across the isthmus began carrying to Spain
bullion from Peru and Asian trade from Manila. As a global crossroads, Sim6n Bolivar
would call Panama "the center of the universe." But as Spanish power in the Americas
20 "The Colonization Society--Agitation Again," National Era V, no. 5 (1851).
21 Walter R. Johnson, The Coal Trade of British America, with Researches on the Characters and Practical
Values ofAmerican and Foreign Coals (Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia: Taylor and Maury (Wash) and
A. Hart (Phila), 1850).
declined in the late 18th and early 19 th centuries, and as individual states declared their
independence, the significance and centrality of the isthmus waned as well.22
By the middle of the 19 th century, it had become clear that geography alone was
an insufficient source of greatness. Some Central American states concluded that given
their natural riches and proximity to the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,
they were missing only the right sort of population to turn gifts of nature into political
and economic strength. Observing that "the wealth and power of nations depend on the
importance of their population," for example, the government of Costa Rica sought to
encourage immigration to their state through a colonization project. On October 16,
1849, the government of Costa Rica granted Gabriel Lafond, director of the French
assurance company, L 'Union des Ports, twelve leagues of land stretching between Bay of
Golfo Dulce along the Pacific coast and heading inland, land bounded by Punta Gorda
and the river Chiriqui. Within the area enclosed in this grant, Lafond received title to its
supposedly abundant natural resources, including forests, rivers, mines, and coastal
islands. In exchange for the land titles, Lafond pledged to recruit European settlers. The
entrepreneur was to have the first batch of colonists in Golfo Dulce within three years,
and fully one thousand within four years after that or lose the grant.23 At the same
moment Americans encouraged blacks to colonize Africa, Costa Rica encouraged
Europeans to colonize Central America. Both plans anticipated voluntary emigration,
22 John Haskell Kemble, The Panama Route, 1848-1869 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1943), Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. 3-22, John Major, Prize Possession: The United States and the
Panama Canal, 1903-1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. 9-33.
23 According to the grant, the population of the region was purposefully excluded from Lafond's authority.
"Grant of the Territory in Costa Rica to the Concessionaries [16th October, 1849]," in Colonisation of
Costa Rica, for the Development of Rich Mines of Its Gold, Silver, Lead, Copper, Iron and Coal, and for
Opening a New Route between the Atlantic and Pacific, ed. James Silk Buckingham (London: E. Wilson,
1852). Buckingham published his tract with English translations of the largely French and Spanish
originals.
however, and the enthusiasm of their promoters failed to capture the imagination of their
intended audiences.
The area in which Lafond's grant was located was called Chiriqui, and it stretched
between the Caribbean and Pacific along the disputed border between Costa Rica and
New Granada. Golfo Dulce was located along the isthmus's Pacific Coast, however, and
transportation for as large a settlement project as Lafond envisioned introduced obvious
challenges in transplanting settlers from Europe. Five months after Lafond's agent,
Colonel Rafael Escalante, and Costa Rica's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquin
Bernardo Calvo, agreed upon the terms of the colonization project, Lafond received an
additional concession to facilitate the journey of potential colonists. The new grant
embraced a strip of land one league wide, winding from the Caribbean-facing Bocas del
Toro to the intended settlement at Golfo Dulce, with an eastern boundary running roughly
along the contested border between Costa Rica and New Granada. Constructing a road
connecting the Atlantic and Pacific through this narrow band would become a principal
object of Lafond's company, known as the Atlantic and Pacific Junction and Costa Rica
Colonisation Company.24
Constructing a road required surveying the land, and Lafond turned to a series of
engineers for expert advice. The engineers envisioned ultimately building a railroad, but
only after initial steps of simpler road construction. Jacques de Courtines, a civil
engineer who had previously served on a failed French canal project in Panama,
examined the route in 1850. De Courtines proposed beginning with a simple mule road,
two meters wide, to initiate the flow of colonists and goods. A four meter-wide carriage
24 "Grant of the Route across the Isthmus, a League in Breadth," in Colonisation of Costa Rica, for the
Development ofRich Mines of Its Gold, Silver, Lead, Copper, Iron and Coal, andfor Opening a New Route
between the Atlantic and Pacific, ed. James Silk Buckingham (London: E. Wilson, 1852).
road, bordered by fences, would come next, followed eventually by an eight meter-wide
road, ideally to accommodate a railroad.25 Another agent, Louis Cheron, spent forty days
trekking through the ceded territory. He reported on the land's potential for cultivation,
the health of the climate, and comfort of the atmosphere. Timber grew in abundance, as
did vanilla and sarsaparilla for medicines and bananas, sugar cane, maize, rice, and a
wide spectrum of fruits. Wild boars, jaguars, monkeys, and tortoises abounded. As for
minerals, Cheron reported gold, silver, and coal. Worried that he might be accused of
overstating the riches of the land, he wrote to his employers that "I can assure you that far
from exaggerating, I have left much to be added."26
Cheron's mention of coal would prove to be of great importance for future
colonization efforts for this border region between Costa Rica and New Granada. In
1850, certainty of coal along Lafond's land remained unclear. Coal seams were
suspected on the Caribbean side. A naval captain and senator from the nearby Province
of Veragua confirmed this likelihood, "as small pieces [of coal] have been discovered in
a river which falls into the Bay de l'Admiral, probably having been carried down by the
current."27 Two Frenchmen, Captains Colombel and Lallier, spent six months in 1851
exploring the granted territory for Lafond. During a visit to Punta Arena, they learned of
25 De Courtines anticipated that the successful railroad would capture traffic then confined to following the
route around Cape Horn, some 850,000 tons worth in 1850. While de Courtines wrote with an engineer's
precision about costs and the promoter's enthusiasm for success, he warned Lafond about the pitfalls of
national pride. "If," he noted, "in 1846, on my return from Panama, I had taken my plan of a Railway to
England or the United States, instead of persisting in wishing to execute a French work, it would have been
already executed, and the public would have reaped the advantage.
"I conjure you, then, to beware of an exclusive patriotism in this affair, and to receive such
propositions as may be made to you, from whatever quarter they may come."
26 "Louis Cheron to M. Rafael Escalante, July 3, 1850," in Colonisation of Costa Rica, for the Development
of Rich Mines of Ilts Gold, Silver, Lead, Copper, Iron and Coal, and for Opening a New Route between the
Atlantic and Pacific, ed. James Silk Buckingham (London: E. Wilson, 1852).
27 "La Barribre to Mr. Victor Herran, Sept. 13, 1850," in Colonisation of Costa Rica, for the Development
ofRich Mines of Its Gold, Silver, Lead, Copper, Iron and Coal, and for Opening a New Route between the
Atlantic and Pacific, ed. James Silk Buckingham (London: E. Wilson, 1852).
newly discovered coal beds reported in Costa Rican journals. And while they handled
"some specimens of carbonized or anthracite wood,"28 they refrained from confirming the
existence of large beds. Shortly thereafter, news spread among Lafond and his associates
of the certainty of a coal seam along the Pacific side of the isthmus, near the town of
Terraba in Costa Rica. The French Admiral, Odet Pellion, who followed Colombel and
Lallier to Golfo Dulce in June 1852, also acknowledged reports of coal at Terraba, and
while he lacked adequate time and resources to explore for it himself, he recovered some
samples and instructed his ship's surgeon to examine them. The surgeon, meanwhile,
could only get as close to the coal as the captain of the port of Punta Arenitas, who had
himself observed the coal seams. The seams, he explained, were a variety of lignite-
low carbon, young coal. This captain, however, insisted the coal was suitable for the
steam engine he intended to construct in his port. Admiral Pellion, though hopeful, could
only assure Lafond that existence of coal was certain, but its quality only knowable after
further exploration and experiment.29
Subsequent information forwarded to Europe provided additional evidence of the
Terraba coal and introduced a new feature that distinguished this isthmian project from
others before it. Terraba coal was found in a bed six miles long and 180 feet wide. The
Costa Rican Colonisation Company was operating in a period of industrial power, in
which coal rested at the center. Lafond's promotional pamphlet advertised that "this
discovery alone must give an immense advantage to the Golfo Dulce over all other ports
28 "Report of Captain Colombel on Golfo Dulce, Received 25th of September, 1851, to Serve for the
Colonization and Explanation of the Maps of This Part of the Pacific Coast," in Contracts for Coal [36-1
House Rep. Report No. 568] (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1860), 75.29 "Extracts from the Report of Admiral Odet Pellion on Golfo Dulce, Made in June, 1852, after the
Hydrographical Explorations of Captain Delapin, Commanding the Corvette "La Brillante," And Addressed
to His Excellency the Minister of Marine of the Empire of France," in Contracts for Coal, House Rep. No.
568, (1860).
along the coast, in determining the most appropriate line of Route from Ocean to
Oceans." Appropriate, because the settlement offered an ideal station for replenishing
steamers along the fuel-starved coast. "The discovery of the mine of Coal..." wrote one
San Jos6 merchant in December, 1851, "is certain; there is not only one, but many, and
all of excellent quality, for I have seen specimens of them at the house of the President,
and some of them appeared to me very superior." This report relied on both the weight of
eye-witness testimony and the authority of associating the material evidence with a senior
public official.3 °
Despite its promising beginning and the enthusiastic reports of engineers and
officers, by the middle of the 1850s, Lafond's project had struck insurmountable
obstacles. Capital from French investors dried up with the outbreak of the Crimean War
in 1854. In addition, Lafond likely succumbed to the fierce competition with other
isthmian schemes. These other plans included the highly successful Panama Railroad,
supported by John Lloyd Stephens, William Henry Aspinwall, and Henry Chauncey;
Cornelius Vanderbilt's concession for a canal, railroad, and carriage road across
Nicaragua; and New York's Hargous Brothers' original concession from Mexico for a
route across the isthmus of Tehuantepec. 31 Nevertheless, Lafond's early promotion of
Chiriqui would be continued and in a manner that would quickly connect the isthmus
with the racial politics of the United States.
Several American interests had followed Gabriel Lafond to the Chiriqui isthmus.
As a consequence of the claims and counter-claims to Chiriqui by the governments of
30 James Silk Buckingham, Colonisation of Costa Rica, for the Development of Rich Mines of Its Gold,
Silver, Lead, Copper, Iron and Coal, andfor Opening a New Route between the Atlantic and Pacific
(London: E. Wilson, 1852), 28, 34.
31 Paul J. Scheips, "Gabriel Lafond and Ambrose W. Thompson: Neglected Isthmian Promoters," The
Hispanic American Historical Review 36, no. 2 (1956): 213-6, 19.
Costa Rica and New Granada, occasionally the grants they issued overlapped, perhaps
deliberately. Santiago Agnew--or James Agnew as he had been known in his native
United States-received a land grant in October 1852 from the government of New
Granada for lands around Golfo Dulce on the isthmus's Pacific side (and overlapping
with Lafond's grant from Costa Rica). Agnew intended to begin colonizing the coastal
land. On the Caribbean side, James Alfonso Morel acquired a concession for coal land in
1854 from the government of the New Granada's district of Bocas del Toro. Between
1854 and 1856, both Agnew and Morel would discharge their grants to a new interest, the
Chiriqui Improvement Company.32
The Chiriqui Improvement Company was established by Ambrose W. Thompson
to develop his financial and political interests in Central America. Thompson, born in
Lewes, Delaware but a long time resident of Philadelphia, had long been interested in
steam navigation. In 1851, he patented a new design for a ship's propeller, and had
previously tried to gain federal grants for steam packet lines.33 By the middle of the
decade, he set his primary interest on Chiriqui, where it would remain until his death in
1882.
Thompson himself obtained a concession from Chiriqui to construct a road
between the Pacific town of David, Chiriqui's capital city, and the Chiriqui Lagoon, on
the Caribbean side. By 1855, Thompson and his company had assembled a substantial
collection of grants and land titles with the multiple objectives of colonization, resource
development, and transportation across the isthmus. Unlike rival isthmian schemes,
32 Paul J. Scheips, "Ambrose W. Thompson: A Neglected Isthmian Promoter" (University of Chicago,
1949), 27-30, Contract for Coal, House Rep. No. 568, 36th Cong., 1st. sess. (1860), "The Chiriqui
Improvement Company and Ambrose W. Thompson: Abstract of Titles," in LoC, Papers of Ambrose W.
Thompson, Box 45, second folder, 1-6.
33 Ambrose W. Thompson, "Propeller," in Google Patents, ed. United States Patent Office (U.S.A.: 1851).
however, Thompson's Chiriqui grants encompassed the unusual presence of possibly
large quantities of coal. As Thompson was quick to realize, in an age of industrial power,
this coal might be as valuable as the right of way across the isthmus.34
As with Lafond, Thompson's success in building his Chiriqui Improvement
Company depended on the representation and circulation of scientific authority. His
promotional documents were marked by the conspicuous inclusion of reports by civil
engineers, results of geological and chemical analysis, and testimony by professional and
often government sponsored scientists like Dr. Newton Manross and James Cooke.
While the New World promoter described natural abundance and climatic healthfulness
since the days of Richard Hakluyt and John Winthrop, by the mid-19 th century, these
statements earned credibility by their proximity to dispassionate accounts of minerals and
soils by certified experts.
Thompson's company, in fact, presented its business decisions as dependent on
scientific study. While the earliest reports of coal from Lafond's company conveyed
hints, rumors, and circumstantial evidence, Thompson mobilized expert authority from
the outset. Even when the company did report rumors, its public presentation of its
decisions about them were rooted in expert evidence. Writing of the territory embracing
the Chiriqui Lagoon, for example, a company pamphlet extolled reticence in the absence
of knowledge. "These lands were believed to contain inexhaustible mines of bituminous
coal;" the report observed, "but the Company did not deem themselves warranted in
disposing of their shares, or providing large means to develop these mines, until a
34 Scheips, "Ambrose W. Thompson: A Neglected Isthmian Promoter", 27-30, Contract for Coal, "The
Chiriqui Improvement Company and Ambrose W. Thompson: Abstract of Titles," 1-6.
geological examination should give positive value to their proceedings." 35 While later
promotional efforts suggest that Thompson indeed believed in the potential of his
concessions beyond the available evidence, his efforts to persuade others and to entice
investors always depended on certified expert advice.
The first desired geological examination of Chiriqui came from Dr. Newton S.
Manross, a Yale graduate who had recently completed his doctoral studies at G6ttingen.
Manross had experience in geological expeditions, having trekked through South
America searching for gold in 1853 and reporting on Trinidad's Pitch Lake in 1854.36
The eminent Professors Benjamin Silliman of Yale and Edward Hitchcock of Amherst
College suggested the young geologist to Thompson, and as if to provide additional
credibility, their names were conspicuously cited in Manross's own findings. To
examine the potential for mining and road construction, two engineers also explored the
region as well.37
Manross focused on exploring for coal. Determining the age of Chiriqui's coal
seams was an essential part of promoting Thompson's colonization project, for fixing the
age of the coal allowed the mineral to be correlated with coal from other, better known
parts of the world and hence evidence of its quality for various applications like cooking,
coke making, or raising steam. Manross found fossil shells and sooty tree trunks lying on
either side of the coal-bearing strata. In both cases, the species there resembled those still
living nearby. Since older coal typically contained fossils of long extinct species, the
35 Chiriqui Improvement Company, Geological Report of Professor Manross, with Accompanying Papers,
Maps, &C. (New York: George F. Nesbitt & Co., 1856), 3.36 For a brief biography of Manross, see Eddy N. Smith et al., Bristol, Connecticut: "In the Olden Time
New Cambridge", Which Includes Forestville (Hartford, Conn.: City Print. Co., 1907), 463, James Grant
Wilson and John Fiske, Appleton's Cyclopaedia ofAmerican Biography, vol. 4 (New York: Appleton,
1888), 194-5.
37 Chiriqui Improvement Company, Geological Report of Professor Manross, with Accompanying Papers,
Maps, &C., 3-5.
Chiriqui strata appeared relatively young. The absence of older fossils afforded evidence
as well. "None of the peculiar fossils of the older coal formations were detected in these
rocks," Manross observed. The surrounding strata of rock similarly appeared relatively
young. Taken together, these observations pointed to beds from the older Tertiary (no
more than 65 million years old or so) or more recent still. By age then, Manross noted,
"the coal of this region is therefore similar to that so extensively worked in France,
Belgium, and many parts of Germany."38 Linking these European beds to the Chiriqui
ones served both the geological purpose of surveying land and the rhetorical purpose of
certifying the quality of the coal.
James Cooke, the Chief Engineer of the Company, likewise provided a detailed
report of Chiriqui, its resources, and the possibilities of constructing a road across the
isthmus. Like Manross, he noted the seeming ubiquity of coal there, by both the
Caribbean and Pacific termini of the proposed route and most likely, he noted, along the
proposed path of the road itself. And the road, according to the engineer, would do more
than just bridge the isthmus. He described in his report how the "[t]he Chiriqui road will
... from these natural advantages, secure to itself the great travel not only from the cities
of the United States to California, but also from England to Australia and the East
Indies." According to Cooke, Chiriqui would connect cities and nations around the
globe. If its resources were insufficient to impress potential investors of the value of the
route, Cooke noted, unlike the rival routes across Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, Darien,
Panama, and Guatemala, the province of Chiriqui was the most healthy, for it lacked "the
decaying matter of their swamps and marshes [that] impregnate the air with their
38 Newton S. Manross, "Report of Prof. Newton S. Manross, to the President and Directors of the Chiriqui
Improvement Company," in Geological Report of Professor Manross, with Accompanying Papers, Maps,
&C. (New York: George F. Nesbitt & Co., 1856), 7-8.
destroying miasma."3 9 These scientific reports gained an additional level of credibility
by their publication in scientific journals with national circulation. In 1857, for instance,
the Mining Magazine, a short-lived New York journal, reproduced verbatim Manross's
geological report and Cooke's engineering report.40
Thompson's Company publicized three conclusions from the geological report.
First, that the area of the Chiriqui grant contained not only "superior quality" coal but
coal "in inexhaustible quantities." Since these mines, the only ones then known along the
isthmus, all belonged to the Chiriqui grant (a fact contested by Costa Rica), the Company
boasted that it could monopolize the valuable production of steam fuel for both nearby
Caribbean and Pacific ports. Second, and equally importantly, this coal was found "in
the most favorable places for mining," permitting both inexpensive production to out-
compete imported British and American coals and easy transportation "from the very
mouths of the mines into the largest class vessels." For Thompson and his associates,
controlling this coal and the harbors from which ships could procure it introduced a new
economic geography to the isthmus. With the increasing establishment of steam lines for
mail and passenger service, monopolizing the region's only coal fields distinguished the
Chiriqui Company's lands from competing isthmian schemes, positioning this narrow
strip of land as a heady contender for the routes between England and Australia and the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. Finally, Thompson expected European
and American colonists to be drawn to Chiriqui's supposed gold mines and farm land.
The order of these statements is suggestive that coal-and in particular coal for
39 James B. Cooke, "Report on the Proposed Chiriqui Road," in Geological Report ofProfessor Manross,
with Accompanying Papers, Maps, &C. (New York: George F. Nesbitt & Co., 1856), 24-6.
40 "Art. VI.--Chiriqui Improvement Company--Report of Prof. Newton S. Manross," Mining Magazine 8,
no. 3 (1857).
steamships--not colonial settlement per se, was foremost on the mind of Company
directors.4'
The Politics of Steam
As his company's geological reports increasingly suggested the prevalence of coal in
Chiriqui, Thompson began promoting his land in Washington not only as a site of
colonization or isthmian transit, but as a unique site for fueling American power. After a
year of negotiation, on May 21, 1859, Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey signed a
contract with the Chiriqui Improvement Company that involved paying the company to
provide inexpensive coal to the Navy at Chiriqui and allowing the government to use land
there for naval purposes.42
The House of Representatives' Committee on Naval Affairs considered approving
the Toucey contract a year later. It concluded that Thompson's title was subject to
question, especially whether he had fulfilled certain conditions placed upon him, like the
development of a carriage road across the isthmus. Nevertheless, reports from residents
and government officials of New Granada suggested that Thompson was indeed on track
to complete the road on time, and that he was supposedly spending substantial sums of
money in the process-a good indication, to the committee, that his claims were
legitimate. Although two members dissented from the report, the committee offered its
41 Chiriqui Improvement Company, Geological Report of Professor Manross, with Accompanying Papers,
Maps, &C., 4-5.
42 "J.S. Black to Isaac Toucey, 5/11/1859," in Contracts for Coal [36-1 House Report No. 568]
(Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1860), 35-6.
provisional approval on the condition that the President appoint a scientific commission
to examine the territory for its coal, roads, and harbors.43
After the Civil War, the Buchanan administration's interest in naval stations and
coal mines in Chiriqui would appear as a policy dead end, but in 1859 and 1860, it
represented a crisp expression of the contours of American foreign strategy. The
Committee on Naval Affairs explained the stakes by noting that that the foreign trade of
Latin America exceeded $338 million, while only about one-seventh of that figure
represented trade with the United States. Britain absorbed the lion's share. The chairman
of the committee, Maine's Congressman Freeman Morse, linked this British success in a
territory he believed to include the natural trading partners of the United States to the
rival's aggressive investment in mail steamship subsidies. "Mail steamers afford great
facilities to mercantile communities," he wrote in the committee's report, "and wherever
first established between countries divided by oceans, or like Central and South America,
having no communication with the great markets of the world by railroad, are always
followed by a remunerative trade to the country starting and sustaining them." The
United States had erred over the previous decade, the committee concluded, in failing to
keep pace with British subsidies. Contracting with Thompson's Chiriqui Company
offered a substantial remedy. The United States would receive in Chiriqui excellent
harbors, a right of way across the isthmus, and, not insignificantly, rights to the
province's coal.44
The other major isthmian routes, across Panama, Nicaragua, and Tehuantepec,
universally lacked substantial harbors. The Panama road, for example, connected the
43 Contract for Coal.
44 Ibid.
town of Aspinwall on the Atlantic side to Panama on the Pacific. Steamers from San
Francisco could only moor three and a half miles from Panama itself, due to the shallow
water there, and travelers required the inconvenient and time consuming ferrying by
lighters to the shore. The other two routes possessed similar limitations. 45
As news of the contract spread, it provoked a barely muted denunciation from
some quarters. In one unsigned letter to the editor of the New York Times, ostensibly
from Panama, the writer assailed the government for its failure to confirm the status of
Thompson's grant, a problem that would resurface several times in the later 19 th century.
The author identified three fundamental problems with Thompson's claim. First,
Thompson himself had not fulfilled the terms of his grant from the Province of Chiriqui
in failing to begin construction of his road within the prescribed two years initially
stipulated. According to the grant, this failure should have annulled his claim. Second,
this grant could not have been legally extended, for the body that issued it, Chiriqui's
Provincial Legislature, dissolved when the province was incorporated into the new state
of Panama. Under these circumstances, only the Government in Bogota, according to the
critique, needed to extend the grant, which it was prevented from doing by the terms of
its earlier contract with the Panama Railroad Company which stipulated a 49-year
monopoly on building isthmian roads. Thompson had earlier skirted the issue by
asserting that he was not building a new road, but merely "improving" and enlarging an
older one. Predictably, the critiquing author disputed the validity of that argument as
well, claiming that large portions of this supposed path were barely passable (though he
conceded their use by natives) and that building a mule path or railroad clearly violated
the spirit of the restrictive grant to the Panama Railroad Company. Finally, the author
45 Ibid.
noted that the stated objective of moving U.S. troops across the isthmus on Thompson's
road was flatly prohibited according to the terms of Thompson's own (and perhaps
lapsed) grant from the Provincial Legislature, for it stipulated that Thompson's rights to
use the road could not be assigned to a foreign power without the express permission of
the government. In short, the writer claimed that Thompson's grant was invalid, illegal,
and unhelpful in any event.46
Importantly, while the anonymous author assailed Thompson and his Chiriqui
Company, he affirmed the objects of the contract. "The importance of securing these
privileges for the use of the United States cannot be too highly appreciated," he wrote.
These privileges included the use by the Navy of capacious isthmian harbors on both the
Caribbean and Pacific coasts, in which the department could moor "at all times ships of
the largest class, and an unlimited number of them" and establish bases for supplies; the
privilege of transporting troops and munitions from one side of the isthmus to the other-
a coveted object in the effort to unite the booming west coast with the east; and finally a
steady source of coal for the Navy in both Caribbean and Pacific waters. Even as he
attacked the Thompson contract, the author noted that these goals were "objects of great
importance to the United States, and, if attainable, ought not to be overlooked. ' 'A
46 [anon], "Another Mule Job," New York Times, January 28 1860.
47 Ibid. Thompson's supporters were quick to counter this very public assault in Thompson's own home
city. The attorney Joseph B. Stewart penned a response to the anonymous letter in February disputing
many of its claims, though with questionable efficacy. To the attack on both the quality of the granted land
and the status of the grant itself, Stewart offered the credibility (and credulity) of the Buchanan cabinet
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to residence in Panama and his possible financial interest in the rival Panama Railroad Company. Joseph B.
Stewart, "The Chiriqui Company," New York Times, February 21 1860.
In June 1860, Congress directed the President to select "some competent person
or persons" to determine once and for all the prospects for coal, naval stations, and
railroad building in Chiriqui. The $10,000 Congress appropriated was not much, but it
provided President Buchanan the chance to select members for an exploratory expedition.
The President appointed Captain Frederick Engle of the Navy to lead the survey with an
engineer, First Lieutenant James St. Clair Morton, a geologist, Dr. John Evans, and a
hydrographer, William N. Jeffers, to accompany him. The expedition left Norfolk aboard
the U.S.S. Brooklyn, captained by the David Farragut, on August 13 hi, 1860 and arrived
at Chiriqui's harbor of Boca del Toro on the 2 3 rd. There, the expedition divided into four
exploratory teams. The topographical engineer, James St. Clair Morton, took charge of
the party surveying the route for a railroad. The appropriation for the project restricted
Morton to only six assistants, as well as Thompson's son, Ambrose Thompson, Jr., and a
guide and nine native porters hired upon landing. The team quickly split into two, one
half sent to examine the Pacific coast and the other the Atlantic. 48
Early reports from the commission suggested "that the coal deposits found were
amply sufficient to supply naval coal depots on either side of the Isthmus."49 Rumors
about the proposed railroad route were mixed. One account had the surveyor, Lieutenant
Morton, finding that available paths were both too long and cutting through too much
elevation.50 Another report ostensibly from a commission member just returned to
Norfolk claimed that Morton had located a feasible path, Chiriqui's harbors "unequaled,"
48 "Chiriqui Survey," Baltimore Sun, July 19 1860, "By Telegraph for the Baltimore Sun," Baltimore Sun,
July 26 1860, "The American Navy. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy," The Philadelphia
Enquirer, December 6 1860.
49 "Eastern News by Mail," The Desert News, November 21 1860.
50 "The Chiriqui Expedition.--Panama, Thursday, Nov. 15, 1860," The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 27
1860.
and coal "discovered of superior quality and in inexhaustible quantities."51 According to
The Philadelphia Inquirer, the Panama Railroad, which had long denied Thompson and
Chiriqui's claims about roads and resources, expressed surprise at the results of the
commission's exploration. Jeffers conducted his hydrographic survey, concluding that
"no finer harbors than these can be found," and since an earlier, published Royal Navy
survey of 1838 so precisely measured the hydrography of Chiriqui Lagoon, much of the
hard work was already done. 52
The expedition and interest in Chiriqui's coal underscored the unique obstacles
and opportunities facing steam navigation in the Pacific. Unlike steam lines in the
Caribbean, Mediterranean, or Persian Gulf, or Atlantic and Indian Oceans, steamships
seeking to traverse the Pacific in the 1850s lacked a regular coal supply. Most steaming
coal in the Pacific was anthracite shipped there as ballast from half-way across the world,
an expensive process that was reflected in the price of the fuel. High fuel costs
discouraged steam line investment. While the American ship Golden Age successfully
steamed the route between Australia and Panama in 1854, the vessel was quickly sold
and the line discontinued when the cost of fuel proved prohibitive. The possibility of
Chiriqui's coal fueling the expansion of steam navigation in the Pacific Ocean thus
occasioned substantial enthusiasm. According to The Philadelphia Enquirer, the report
of the Chiriqui expedition was "exceedingly cheering" and looked forward to the day
when "American steam vessels will... soon be found in Chinese ports, and the trade with
Asia may be diverted to San Francisco." 53
51 "Result of the Chiriqui Commission," The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 29 1860, "The Chiriqui
Commission--Arrival of the Brooklyn," Baltimore Sun, November 29 1860.
52 "Our Washington Letter," The Philadelphia Inquirer, December 1 1860.
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The New El Dorado
Only a few months after Thompson had signed his contract with the Buchanan
administration, the province of Chiriqui, previously hardly mentioned or even known
within the United States, became the subject of an extraordinary press coverage. Over
the summer, news trickled into the country of remarkable discoveries of gold in the
province. The contrast between reports of the gold rush and Thompson's promotional
efforts could not have been more striking. While Thompson based his scheme on
geologists and engineers, the gold seekers traveled to the isthmus on rumor and hope.
Thompson sought legal rights to land, even amid shifting political boundaries, while the
gold seekers cared about land only to plunder it. Thompson perceived the great wealth
that lay in the geography of coal deposits, while the gold seekers sought the quick and
fungible material wealth of gold.
In June 1859, news reached the United States of residents of Chiriqui uncovering
gold relics buried in the cemeteries of long vanished native tribes. The earliest reports of
the discoveries published in the United States doubted the claims emanating from the
isthmus, but over the summer, additional letters confirmed the basic outline of the story
and further stimulated the excitement over gold. The gold seekers described finding solid
gold animal figures buried in graves, known as huacas. The figures, sealed within
earthenware pots and buried four or five feet underground, were called in local dialects
"sapos, calmones, camarones, borigueros, aquilas, palomas, plastas, y otrasfiguras de
oro." By these various names, one eye-witness reported that they included golden "birds,
savage beasts, toads, fishes, men or women, and many symbolic things-some having a
man's body, with the beak of a bird, or a hideous head, resembling nothing of late known
in ornithology, ichthiology [sic], zoology, or any other ology." One report suggested that
fifty thousand dollars worth of these figures had already been uncovered. 54
Anecdotes from Chiriqui conformed to the familiar form of the mineral rush
narrative. After the initial discovery, a local town was vacated of its population who had
left seeking gold. Elections supposed to take place were cancelled after no voters arrived,
all similarly preoccupied searching for gold. Instant wealth drove one native insane. One
gold seeker hired natives at astronomical wages, evidently made possible by the
abundance of gold, to locate additional objects. Experts, in the form of Californian
miners, arrived to identify the source of gold that produced the ritual artifacts.5 5 There
were also hyperbolic assertions about the find. The Daily Evening Bulletin of San
Francisco called the find "one of the most singular of all the singular gold discoveries of
the past twelve years," no small claim from a Californian paper.56
The origins of the Chiriqui gold rush had begun amid rumor. One account
suggested that a large tree had collapsed in a heavily forested cemetery, its unearthed
roots extracting a mound of dirt along with it, thus exposing the buried gold underneath
to a passer-by.5 7 According to another version, related in June 1859, the gold rush
resulted from a more human intervention. A native named Roberto Delai, who had long
plundered Indian graves at Bugaba near the border with Costa Rica for the earthenware
pots and stones buried near the surface, one day dug several feet deeper to the depth of
54 "The New Gold Excitement," Ohio Statesman, August 11 1859, ""Los Huacales" Of New Granada.
Interesting Letter from the Grave Diggings," Daily Evening Bulletin [San Francisco], September 13 1859.
5s "The New Gold Excitement.", "Interesting from the Isthmus: The Chiriqui Gold Excitement--Great
Stampede for the Grave Diggings," Baltimore Sun, August 13 1859, "The Chiriqui Gold Fever," Baltimore
Sun, August 3 1859.
56 ""Los Huacales" Of New Granada. Interesting Letter from the Grave Diggings."
57 "The Pacific Coast," New York Times, August 1 1859.
the skeletons. By the skeletons he uncovered the figure of a solid gold bat. Delai
managed to hide his discovery for some time, but word eventually seeped out, and the
full torrent of a gold rush began. Other grave robbers found golden plates, still others
animal figurines.58 Yet another account, perhaps the most reliable given the author's
first-hand investigation of the story, placed the initial discovery in November 1858, and
that digging from then until the beginning of the next July, a two farmers had unearthed a
total of 125 pounds of golden figures.5 9 All accounts agreed that the first discoveries
occurred on burial grounds, and it was to ancient native burial grounds that the rapidly
arriving gold seekers flocked.
News of would be gold rush spread quickly throughout the United States. Papers
covered the story in Baltimore, San Francisco, San Antonio, Columbus, Ohio, and
Amherst, New Hampshire, to name a few. Some reported through correspondents in
Central America, others printed letters from witnesses or reprinted stories from other
cities' papers. Not every publisher appeared terribly sanguine about a gold rush on an
ancient Indian burial ground. New Hampshire's Farmer's Cabinet concluded one article
on the gold fever by reminding its readers of the alleged source of the gold. Quoting the
Panama Star, it noted that "[i]n all the wars between ... tribes no enemy was ever guilty
of disturbing the resting places of the dead. '"6  One correspondent discouraged the arrival
of additional gold-seekers on account of serious rain (possibly a self-serving warning, of
58 "Interesting from the Isthmus: The Chiriqui Gold Excitement--Great Stampede for the Grave Diggings."
For a similar version of this article, see also "The Chiriqui Gold Discoveries," Farmer's Cabinet, August 17
1859.
59 ""Los Huacales" Of New Granada. Interesting Letter from the Grave Diggings."
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course), adding that "there are graves enough for ten thousand to keep robbing for the
next hundred years.""6 The moral valence of this statement is certainly unclear.
Chiriqui had become what a New York Times correspondent labeled "the grave-
diggers' 'El Dorado."' The most ambitious treasure hunters skipped the cemeteries and
searched for the gold mines from which they supposed the gold figurines had been
formed. Cautious reports from the isthmus noted that no gold mines were then known,
and that the gold figures had probably been assembled over a period of centuries from
very small quantities discovered here and there, perhaps in stream beds.62
Ambrose W. Thompson, the main promoter of land in Chiriqui, insisted that he
held the title to the entire swath of land on which the gold rush was taking place, and he
wanted a part of it, if only to further his larger plans. Thompson's Chiriqui Improvement
Company allegedly hired local Indians to plunder the Indian cemeteries for golden
artifacts. 63 In August, Thompson began advertising the intention of the Chiriqui
Improvement Company to send "[a] superior steamer" to the gold-rich graves. In an
ineffectual protest against the flood of treasure seekers, Thompson explained that "[t]he
Indian tombs containing gold are upon the lands which belong exclusively to the Chiriqui
Improvement Company" and that "none but those having permits from the Company will
be permitted to enter upon the lands." There is no evidence that gold seekers were
deterred by these warnings. Whether Thompson viewed the discoveries as a threat to his
investment or a boon, he did try to capitalize on it; in addition to planning the gold
61 "Chiriqui Grave Diggins [Sic]," Daily Columbus Enquirer, September 3 1859.
62 "The Pacific Coast."
63 Baltimore Sun, August 13 1859.
expedition of his own, he also invited gold seekers to consider settling on his lands in
Chiriqui permanently.64
Thompson seems to have made little headway, either for a gold expedition or in
recruiting colonists. Inevitably, a more sober picture of the gold "deposits" had emerged.
Only one in twelve to fifteen graves contained the mysterious golden objects, far from
every grave as had been previously asserted. The graves without gold contained more
mundane pottery, whistles, tools, or idols. More importantly, by the end of August, the
Chiriqui graves had been thoroughly looted, and no new sources of figures or gold itself
had been found. A New York Times correspondent estimated the total value of the
plunder thus far had been a modest $100,000.65 Far from the millions of dollars
enthusiastically claimed for future looting, a correspondent with a San Francisco
newspaper reported the likely results would be between a few hundred and a few
thousand for the following digging season.66 According to a correspondent for the
Charleston Mercury, the Chiriqui gold fever had begun to decline in New York as well.
Neither Thompson's "unmentioned inducements" for colonists to settle there nor a band
of gold-seekers who had purchased the former Revenue Steamer Nautilus to mount a
mining expedition met with much interest.67 A letter published in the New York Times
estimated that some 2,000 treasure seekers had converged upon the huacas in the summer
of 1859, but that as early as the middle of July, the gold excavations had largely ceased.68
The only huacas that evidently contained golden figurines had been thoroughly stripped
64 See the advertisements, for instance, in "Chiriqui Gold Region [Classified Ad]," New York Times, August
6 1859, "Chiriqui Gold Regions [Classified Ad] " New York Times, August 12 1859.
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67 "Correspondence of the Mercury," Charleston Mercury, August 12 1859. See also "Later from the
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68 "Arrival of the North Star," New York Times, August 12 1859.
of their riches. New York's gold rushers suffered more than a financial loss; several died
while others fell ill. 69
Some figurines made their way to Europe and New York for sale to collectors. 70
By October, a French trading house in San Francisco was advertising its collection of
Chiriqui huacal, and rumors spread that they were, in the words of the San Francisco
press, "manufactured for the occasion." Further investigation revealed "large quantities
of these monsters abroad," and collectors were cautioned about investing in the electro-
plated fakes.7
It was only after the disappointing confirmation that the huacas were largely
empty of the expected gold figurines that two Californian prospectors who had voyaged
to Chiriqui at the end of August returned to New York with some samples of gold and
seemingly countless stories of their seven week adventure. The men had early on
decided to leave the grave robbing to others and instead uncover the source of the gold
itself. According to their account to the New York Times, this prudence endeared them to
a native tribe living by the coast, which provided guides into the interior. After
prospecting in the mountains of the Cordillera, they claimed to have uncovered "better
diggings than were ever found in California"-a claim bolstered by their individual fame
as successful prospectors there in 1849. After returning to New York to purchase mining
equipment and sending gold samples to President Buchanan in Washington, the men
intended to return to Chiriqui. Lest the reader remain skeptical about the final outcome
of the expedition, the Times assured its readers that the recent incorporation of this
unfamiliar, tropical territory into modern networks of steam power would soon reveal the
69 San Antonio Ledger and Texan, April 21 1860.
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answer. The explorers' "sanguine expectations as to the final pecuniary result..."
concluded the paper, "cannot long remain in uncertainty in this age of quick travel, fast
dissemination of news, and eager watching for splendid speculations." 72
It is not clear whether the gold rush, or its rapid deflation, influenced Thompson's
negotiations with the U.S. government. The Chiriqui Improvement Company never
mentions the event in its own documents, but considering the torrent of news the rush
generated-in all sections of the country and in large cities and small towns-this
absence is conspicuous. Thompson had spent the previous half decade consolidating
grants to assure his company's sole legal authority over Chiriqui. Perhaps the flood of
gold seekers, few of whom bothered with the niceties of titles and property claims,
revealed that Thompson's assertions to authority in the region were flimsier than he had
previously suggested. Perhaps the disappointment of discovering so little gold in a place
touted by Thompson as possessing it suggested additional doubts about his other claims,
to coal in particular. Whatever the consequence, by early 1860, the gold rush had
subsided, and Thompson's contract with the Navy Department was placed before
Congress.
Steamships and Slavery
The election of Abraham Lincoln interrupted Thompson's negotiations with Washington.
The new administration was, at least at first, unfamiliar with the promoter's contract with
Secretary Toucey to supply coal for the Navy. Even if it had known about it, the cabinet
was quickly confronting more pressing business as the nation careened towards war.
Thompson managed to make his case, however. Over the first two years of the conflict,
72 "Gold-Hunting in Chiriqui," New York Times, December 24 1859.
the combination of racial crisis and the continuing-and even increasing-interest in
steam navigation combined to create a new proposal for linking the destinies of Chiriqui
and the United States. Thompson proposed, and Lincoln endorsed, a plan to colonize
freed blacks in Chiriqui to mine coal for the government. If slavery remained the central
social issue of the United States in 19th century, the problems of industrialized energy
unfolded alongside and interwoven with it.
Historians have long been interested in the Lincoln administration's efforts
towards colonizing free blacks as a permanent solution to the race and slavery conflicts
that had caused the war. As noted above, projects for colonization had existed almost
throughout the entire 19t h century, but Lincoln's evident personal interest in colonization,
alongside the halting actions he took towards emancipation, have remained particularly
intriguing. Lincoln had, in fact, long affirmed the principles of colonization, although he
had never taken an active role in furthering the process along. During the 1850s, the
politically maturing Lincoln had viewed colonization as the ideal solution to the nation's
racial problems, but remained unable to imagine a practical manner of carrying it out. "If
all earthly power were given me," said Lincoln in his August 21, 1858 debate with
Stephen Douglas in Ottawa, Illinois, "I should not know what to do as to the existing
institution. My first impulse would be to free all the slaves and send them to Liberia,-to
their own native land. But a moment's reflection would convince me that whatever of
high hope (as I think there is) there may be in this, in the long run, its sudden execution is
impossible." Lincoln thought too concretely to be enticed by a chimerical vision.
Logistics mattered. How would the colonists make a living in their new home? Who
could provide sufficient ships to move them or capital to pay for it? With such questions
unanswered, the vision remained addressed until Lincoln was in the political position to
do something about it.73
When Lincoln became president, he took a variety of actions towards addressing
the racial tensions, though his early years in office were marked as much by his inactions.
At first, Lincoln had resisted taking steps to end slavery, preferring instead to frame the
developing war as a defense of the Constitution and about the preservation of the nation
itself. In 1861, Lincoln rejected all offers by blacks to form military regiments to support
the North, rebuked officials who declared slaves captured within their jurisdictions freed,
and only signed the Confiscation Act, a bill declaring slaves used to support the
Confederacy forfeited, out of political necessity. His decisions were instead focused on
limiting the spread of slavery. In May 1861, he issued a presidential order directing the
Secretary of the Interior to enforce long ignored laws banning the Atlantic slave trade.
The following Spring, he submitted a bill to Congress to compensate states who
emancipated their slaves. And central to Lincoln's thinking about these soon-to-be
emancipated slaves was that they would chose to leave the United States upon receiving
their freedom. 74
Ambrose W. Thompson first met the president on April 10, 1861, only two days
before the opening volleys were fired at Fort Sumter. On the 1 lth, Thompson penned a
long letter enumerating his opinion of the practical ways of addressing the growing crisis
of secession. Nowhere does he mention Chiriqui, his contract with the Navy Department,
73 Lincoln had actually first spoken these words in a speech at Peoria in 1854, the text of which he read
aloud four years later to counter Douglas's claim that he "was engaged at that time in selling out and
Abolitionizing the old Whig party." Edwin Erle Sparks, ed., The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858,
Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Volume III, Lincoln Series, Vol. 1 (Springfield, Il:
Illinois State Historical Society, 1908), 100-01.
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or colonization, though the two might have discussed any of these topics in their meeting
from the day before. 75
Over the following months, news of the Chiriqui lands did eventually make their
way back to the Navy Department. Gideon Welles, its new secretary, may have learned
of Chiriqui from New York's Charles B. Sedgwick, the new Chairman of the House's
Committee on Naval Affairs. In 1860, Sedgwick had penned the Minority Report to the
committee's evaluation of the Thompson-Toucey contract, producing a list of objections.
His complaints were both of a legal and a geological nature. He had questioned the right
of a private company to convey what amounted to naval rights to one country within the
sovereignty of another and he had rejected the claim that Thompson could permit foreign
troops to use the road without the permission of the New Chiriqui government. As to the
supposed coal deposits, Sedgwick noted that he was unsatisfied that workable coal
existed at Chiriqui at all. "Not so much as a single ton of good coal has ever been taken
from any such mine," he complained, noting that merely noticing coal along a coastal
cliff did not inspire confidence for a practical mining operation. Worse still, the Navy
had not pursued a thorough investigation of the supposed beds, the titles were
questionable, and there were no guarantees in the contract for the Chiriqui Company to
produce any coal--only that the American government itself could begin mining for
itself.76 Sedgwick had emerged in the House as one of Thompson's biggest critics.
Barely a year later, in August 1861, that criticism had turned into praise. "I know
of no other coal deposits on the Atlantic Coast south of the Potomac," Sedgwick wrote to
75 "Ambrose W. Thompson to Abraham Lincoln, 4/11/1861," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Series 1.
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Welles, "& I consider it of the last importance that a supply of coal depots should be
secured from for the use of our Navy in the Gulf & on the Pacific." The Representative
explained to the new Secretary his experience with Chiriqui and its coal, and how he had
previously "devoted much time to its investigation." His opinion had shifted after
additional grants from New Granada eliminated the uncertainty surrounding the
legitimacy of Thompson's titles, and the government's own geological expedition
convinced him of the character and availability of the province's coals.77
Thompson had likely coordinated Sedgwick's appeal to Welles. Only a day after
the Representative had drafted his letter, Thompson sent his own note to the Navy,
confirming new terms for a proposed lease of Chiriqui to the government. Thompson
promised Welles that the Chiriqui Improvement Company could supply as much coal as
the Navy desired in the Chiriqui Lagoon for half the cost at any point in the preceding
decade. With a railroad across the isthmus, Thompson guaranteed the delivery of coal at
the Pacific's Golfo Dulce at half the cost of other Pacific coals.78 With this first formal
broaching of the subject in August 1861, Thompson presented the advantages of Chiriqui
very similarly as he had to the Buchanan administration: as a matter of fueling American
power on either side of the isthmus and strengthening the ties of east and west.
The matter quickly reached the President, who referred it to his brother-in-law
and confidant, Ninian Edwards. Edwards proved very taken by the reports of the 1860
Chiriqui Surveying Expedition, noting the government affiliation of its leaders (in the
army, navy, or other executive department) and the respectability of Charles Jackson, the
77 "C.B. Sedgwick to Gideon Welles, 8/7/1861," in LoC, Papers of Ambrose W. Thompson, Box 7, General
Correspondence, July-December 1861. How a copy of Sedgwick's letter found its way into Thompson's
papers is certainly interesting, and raises the question of a new relationship-financial or political-
between the two men. I have found no evidence thus far to substantiate this possibility.
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Boston geologist and chemist who had examined the coal samples brought back.
Published statements from the government of New Granada assured him of the legality of
Thompson's grant.79
Most importantly, Edwards described the "vast saving" to be expected from
acquiring rights to Chiriqui's coal. The Navy paid $14.00 per ton in the Caribbean and
Gulf, and Edwards expected those prices to drop by more than half with the new mines. 80
With then current consumption, the government would save over $100,000 a year in
Atlantic waters alone. Should the railroad across Chiriqui be completed as well, another
$130,000 might be saved per year in Pacific waters. These direct savings for fuel would
be compounded by additional advantages as well. The Navy would no longer need to
keep its expensive supply ships floating off the ports of Aspinwall and Panama in favor
of depots on shore, perhaps saving over half a million dollars a year. Furthermore,
Chiriqui offered a new source of valuable timber for shipbuilding. The vast harbors of
the Chiriqui Lagoon offered unprecedented strategic advantages in the Caribbean, as
well, where it "might save whole squadrons." And during wartime, by then no mere
hypothetical event, Edwards looked to the prospects of fueling the Union Navy-with
savings he suggested in the neighborhood of nearly $2 million a year. Almost as an
afterthought, Edwards noted that the lands might also be employed for colonization.8
79 
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The difficulty remained in working out a deal favorable to the government.
Thompson had proposed separate contracts for each element of the deal-for supplying
coal, leasing the land, and so on. Edwards worried that with such an arrangement, should
the Chiriqui project fail to produce coal, the government would still be saddled with
paying for the land leases it did not want or need absent the fuel. Since the "main object"
of the plan was fueling the Navy, Edwards suggested to his brother-in-law that a single
contract ought to be drafted that would ensure that receiving coal remain the key
stipulation.8 2
Lincoln referred the matter to Welles in the Navy Department. The secretary was
cool on the project from the beginning, later recalling that his inquiry into the Chiriqui
plan convinced him "that it was a speculating, if not a swindling scheme," about which
he alerted the still enthusiastic president. The president instructed the Navy to support
the plan and to pay Thompson's Chiriqui Improvement Company $50,000 to begin
colonization and mining. Welles insisted that his department was restricted by law to
purchase coal on yearly contracts from the lowest bidder. Only after learning of this
restriction did Lincoln reluctantly rescind his order.8 3
Lincoln then turned to his Secretary of Interior, Caleb B. Smith to confirm
Welles' claim. Lincoln wrote enticingly to Smith of the potential of the contract. The
foreign nations from possessing land within another "in the manner of private individuals." As Edwards
read Vattel, there was nothing stopping the United States from legally acquiring Thompson's grants. See
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president enthusiastically noted that four executive departments-War, Navy, the Post
Office, and Caleb's own Interior, "may all derive benefits from the proposed contract."
While the first three departments might all benefit from the reduced cost of coal, it was
Interior's charge to return Africans captured in the slave trade. With a base in Chiriqui,
the expenses of this work might be measurably reduced. Moreover, the possible colony
would provide an outlet for Lincoln's own interest in the emigration of free and freed
blacks. Already in 1861, Lincoln was considering how to combine the coal and
resettlement problems into a single solution.8 4
After nearly two weeks of study, Smith returned with a very different opinion
from Gideon Welles. "I apprehend the Hon-Secretary [Welles] has no had leisure to
examine at length the legislation of Congress upon this subject," he wrote caustically.
Far from the Navy Secretary's assertions of insufficient authority, Smith replied that at
least three acts of Congress suggested far greater flexibility in dealing with coal. Smith
ridiculed the claim that an 1843 law requiring competitive bidding for "all provisions and
clothing, hemp, and other materials of every name and nature" should be interpreted to
include coal. Fuel was too important, Smith argued, to be subject to such a binding
constraint and classified with mundane supplies. "It can hardly be supposed," he
asserted, "that Congress designed to prevent the Navy Department from purchasing such
supplies of fuel as might be needed at remote Stations thousands of miles from our own
coast except upon contracts made after advertising." Even more clearly, the Navy's
Appropriation Act of 1850 explicitly gave the secretary special authority over coal,
granting him the "power to discriminate and purchase, in such manner as he may deem
proper, that kind of fuel which is best adapted to the purpose for which it is to be used."
4 "Abraham Lincoln to Caleb B. Smith, 10/23/1861," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers.
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Finally, and most concretely, the Navy's Appropriation Act of 1845 explicitly excused
"ordnance, gunpowder, medicines, or the supplies which it may be necessary to purchase
out of the United States" from the requirements of competitive bidding. And lest the
president mistake the aim of his legal argument, Smith declared his own opinion of the
Thompson contract, an opportunity with which he was "strongly impressed" about the
coal and harbors Chiriqui had to offer the United States.8 5 Smith was also concerned at
the time that the Navy might forsake a rare opportunity to secure the coal before another
nation claimed it for itself.86
Political momentum built up behind the Chiriqui plan. Another Lincoln
confidant, the influential former editor and Republican party founder, Francis P. Blair,
Sr., drew an analogy with the British in India. There, according to Blair, a private
company supported by a rising geopolitical power consolidated rule over a fractured
polity. In consequence, Britain acquired a vast empire, political stability on the
subcontinent, countervailing power against European rivals, and, of course, commercial
opportunities.8 7 For Blair, Central America represented the India of the United States.
Thompson's offer of Chiriqui offered the administration tantalizing solutions to the most
pressing issues facing the divided nation: a home for emigrating blacks, a reliable path
across the isthmus, and a buffer against the incursion of European influence on the
continent. He grandly insisted that "Chiriqui may be made the pivot on which to rest our
85 "Caleb B. Smith to Abraham Lincoln, 11/4/1861." On the acts Smith discussed, see Richard Peters, ed.,
The Public Statues at Large of the United States ofAmerica, from the Organization of the Government in
1789, to March 3, 1845, vol. V (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1856), 617, 794, George Minot, ed.,
The Statutes at Large and Treaties of the United States ofAmerica. From December 1, 1845 to March 3,
1851, vol. IX (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1862).
86 Gideon Welles and Edgar Thaddeus Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under
Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Boston, New York,: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 151.
87 Blair's assertion that the East India Company "brought under subjection all their [the Mughal rulers']
elements of disorder and debility-their discordant castes & religious antipathies" just four years after the
Mutiny of 1857 suggests more than a little wishful optimism on his part.
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lever to sway Central America and secure for the free states on this continent the control
which is deemed necessary for the preservation of our Republican Institutions."88 In
effect, Chiriqui became a fantasy upon which Blair projected his deepest hopes for
averting the worsening national crisis.
For Blair, Chiriqui represented only the beginning of American colonization
projects. The U.S. Minister to Guatemala had altered him of that nation's willingness to
support a colony of freed blacks, if only to counter the British settlement of Belize. An
additional land grant from Honduras, along the border between those two states, would
offer yet another trans-isthmian railroad route and Blair enthused that "American
Merchants, mechanics, planters and manufacturers would do the rest and spread much
more rapidly these new Colonies on the coasts of Central America East and West, than
our earlier colonies of Jamestown and Plymouth spread along the shores of the Atlantic."
Yet enthusiasm and confidence in American ingenuity-whether regarding the skills of
freedmen in raising cotton or engineers in laying railroad tracks-were no substitute for
the material reality of terrain and the presence of promised resources. Thompson's
promotional documents, and even the Chiriqui survey of the previous administration,
could only be trusted so far, and Blair proposed (with the consent of Thompson himself),
the appointment of yet another official investigator. Blair suggested Henry T. Blow, then
serving as Lincoln's Minister to Venezuela, and a man with experience in business,
railroads, and steamships; "a practical miner," Blair called him, adding that he had "made
88 "Francis P. Blair, Sr. To Abraham Lincoln, 11/16/1861," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers.
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his fortune in that line." A confirmation from Blow of the earlier Chiriqui surveys would
add measurably to the government's case for both coal and colonization. 89
Thompson embraced Blair's proposal and he immediately outlined a plan for the
critical mission to Chiriqui. He would personally steam immediately to Havana with
sealed orders to the American consul and any available "commander of any national
steamer which might be in port" to carry him to Venezuela. There he would retrieve
Minister Blow and proceed to Chiriqui to begin their inspection. "I can show Mr. Blow
the coal," Thompson wrote, "the magnificent harbors, the splendid cotton lands, fertile
beyond conception," and so on he continued listing the natural bounty he expected to
find.90
Thompson requested that the President permit his son, Ambrose, Jr., to
accompany Blow on his quickly materializing mission.9 1 Blair agreed, and immediately
drafted two letters for Lincoln's signature. The letters represented a crystallization of
Blair's plans for advancing the Chiriqui cause. The first letter instructed Simon
Cameron, Lincoln's soon to be dismissed Secretary of War, to relieve the younger
Thompson of his current duties in favor of the special mission to Chiriqui. The second
had Secretary Welles order a naval vessel of his choosing to carry Thompson to meet
Blow in Venezuela and then transport both of them to Chiriqui. Neither letter was
89 Ibid. Blair included in his letter to Lincoln a pamphlet of Thompson's listing several advantages of a
colony in Chiriqui: the projection of American influence into the Gulf and Caribbean, a route to the west
coast, a supply of coal at reduced prices for both the Gulf and Pacific naval squadrons, a territory for the
settlement of emigrated blacks, and finally, the prospects for a new steamship line for mail and defense
along the entire route from east to west coasts. "Memoranda of Proposals, to Secure to the Government of
the United States, Enclosed in Francis P. Blair Sr., Saturday, November 16, 1861," in LoC, Abraham
Lincoln Papers, Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916.
90 "Ambrose W. Thompson to Francis P. Blair, 11/17/1861," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Series 1.
General Correspondence. 1833-1916.
91 "Ambrose W. Thompson to Francis P. Blair, 11/18/1861," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Series 1.
General Correspondence. 1833-1916.
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evidently sent, and Blow's mission to Chiriqui, for some reason, never materialized. 92
Other events in Washington were quickly changing the political ground for the Chiriqui
proposal.
On April 16, 1862, Congress emancipated the slaves of Washington, D.C. Slave
owners of the District who declared allegiance to the Union were eligible for up to $300
per freed slave. As part of the act, Congress also appropriated $100,000 to allow the
president to begin colonizing not only the newly free but also all "such free persons of
African descent now residing" in Washington. Congress mentioned Haiti and Liberia
specifically, but added "such other country beyond the limits of the United States as the
President may determine." The president was permitted up to $100 per potential
emigrant.93
Several people immediately considered the relevance of Thompson's land in
Chiriqui. In the Cabinet, Caleb B. Smith from Interior connected the growing needs of
naval power with the political interest in the emigration of free blacks from the United
States. Less than two weeks after Congress passed the act, Smith wrote Thompson,
asking whether his Chiriqui Improvement Company would be willing to accept free black
"colonization and settlement" in New Granada. Just as the American Colonization
Society had argued a decade before with its mail steamship plan for Liberia, Secretary
Smith linked steam power to the pressing racial conflicts facing the United States.94
92 "Francis P. Blair to Simon Cameron, 12/1861, Draft," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Series 1.
General Correspondence. 1833-1916.
93 George P. Sanger, ed., The Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations, of the United States of
America. From December 5, 1859, to March 3, 1863, vol. XII (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1863), 378.
94 "Caleb B. Smith to Ambrose W. Thompson, 4/26/1862," in LoC, Papers of Ambrose W. Thompson, Box
7, General Correspondence, September-December, 1862.
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Only the day before Smith sent his letter, Thompson's son, Ambrose, Jr., had
himself drafted a letter to the president. The younger Thompson was then serving as a
Captain in the Army's Quartermaster's department, and he wrote from Winchester,
Virginia, only about 80 miles from the capital. He had been awake for three consecutive
nights, but Ihe feverishly drafted and redrafted his letter, completing it only after midnight
on April 2 4th. He embraced the opportunity of welcoming freed blacks to Chiriqui, and
he urged his father to support the colonization plan. His experiences in the war, with the
poverty of freed slaves, coupled with his judgment of the political mood in Washington,
clearly influenced his interest in colonization. The younger Thompson still mentioned
the "inexhaustible coal beds of fine quality," the abundance of fish, game, and plants, and
a healthful and varied climate. He called Chiriqui "the Switzerland of tropical America,"
offering "a preponderating influence in Central and South America," naval advantages,
and a tighter connection between the nation's eastern and western coasts. But it was now
the solution to racial conflict to which the younger Thompson appealed most, for at
Chiriqui the United States had found "a country in which the negro could himself work
out, with every advantage on his side, the social problem of his race." To demonstrate
the minimal expense required to initiate the project, he enclosed a tabulation, no doubt
suggested by his experience as an assistant quartermaster, of the supplies and costs
needed for the initial settlement. Sending the letter to his father, he asked that if it met
his approval, that it be sent directly to the president.95
Lincoln charged Secretary of the Interior Smith with devising ways to comply
with the colonization provision of the act freeing slaves of Washington. Smith was
95 "Ambrose Thompson to Abraham Lincoln, 4/25/1862," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Series 1.
General Correspondence. 1833-1916.
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partial to Chiriqui over rival possibilities. Liberia was a problem both because it was
expensive to travel there and because, as Smith put it, "the unwillingness of the colored
populations to emigrate there"-no small problem. Haiti, though closer, raised three
concerns, one religious ("the predominance of the Catholic religion"), one cultural ("the
low grade of civilization there"), the last geopolitical ("a fear that the Spanish
Government will secure the control of the entire Island"). Other proposals reached the
administration for colonies on the Spanish side of the island of St. Domingo, as well as
Honduras and Costa Rica, but the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 seemed to prevent the
fortification or colonization of most, or all, of Central America. Smith seemed to believe
that the treaty could be sidestepped if a private company conducted the colonization. But
there remained Chiriqui, available for colonization, and also beyond the reach of Clayton-
Bulwer because it was not considered part of Central America proper. Smith claimed
"that the province of Chiriqui presents greater advantages both in view of the interests of
the emigrant and economy to the government than any other point that has been
suggested." He looked at the plan "but as the commencement of a great national scheme
which may ultimately relieve the United States of the surplus colored population." 96
Prospects for the colonization of Chiriqui gathered steam into the summer of
1862. Like Smith, John P. Usher likewise urged the President to accept the contract.
Reviewing its terms in August 1862, Usher, then the Assistant Secretary of Interior,
insisted that not only would the country support the plan, but that the small but effective
congressional resistance met during the Buchanan administration had dissipated.
According to Usher, the financial interests of Ambrose W. Thompson and the political
96 "Caleb B. Smith to Abraham Lincoln, 5/9/1862," in LoC, Papers of Ambrose W. Thompson, Box 7,
General Correspondence, September-December, 1862.
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and strategic interests of the nation at war coincided. Nevertheless, he addressed the
lingering concern about the quantity and quality of coal there. The terms of the contract,
he explained, protected the government, for they shielded the government from spending
any money on mining before an official survey could be undertaken and the coal tested
for its capacity to raise steam. In addition, whatever the government did invest in mining,
its capital would be returned as mined coal. Thus colonization and mining would
reinforce one another. "The advantage you gain in this," Usher wrote, "is the
employment of the blacks and the obtaining the coal, when the government must want it
in large quantities." 97
Usher's "advantage" cut to the heart of the administration's interest in Chiriqui.
Neither black colonization nor industrial power alone justified interest in the isthmus, but
the two taken together. Coal did not offer one mode of employment among other
possibilities, instead it formed the heart of Chiriqui's usefulness to the United States.
A week after Usher's endorsement of the plan, on August 14, Lincoln invited to
the White House a delegation of black representatives led by Edward M. Thomas,
president of the Anglo-African Institute for the Encouragement of Industry and Art. The
other four, recently freed slaves, were deliberately chosen to not represent leaders of the
black community. According to an account of meeting published by the New York
Tribune the following day, Lincoln assumed a patriarchal tone, speaking of the suffering
experienced by both blacks and whites and the impossibility of true equality within the
same nation. To this gathering of free residents of Washington he instructed that "[flor
the sake of your race you should sacrifice something of your present comfort" and
97 "John P. Usher to Abraham Lincoln, 8/8/1862," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Series 1. General
Correspondence. 1833-1916.
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asserted that given the relations between the races, "[i]t is better for us both, therefore, to
be separated.""98
But where to go? Lincoln was deliberately unclear on this point. He mentioned
Liberia and noted equivocally that "[i]n a certain sense it is a success," but not ideal as a
colony. Instead, the President spoke vaguely of a place in Central America, not
mentioning Chiriqui by name, but clearly implying to anyone knowledgeable of it. This
place was nearer to the United States, along a great commercial route, rich with natural
resources and a healthy climate, and with a climate "suited to [his guests] physical
condition." But most importantly, it had coal. Lincoln put great emphasis on this
colony's coal fields, and he explained why. "Why I attach so much importance to coal
is," read the account in the Tribune, "it will afford an opportunity to the inhabitants for
immediate employment till they get ready to settle permanently in their homes." Farming
took time, but coal mining offered instant work. "Coal land is the best thing I know of
with which to commence an enterprise." 99 Coal would link the colony's labor to the
industrial steam network of the Caribbean and Pacific.
Lincoln's address was widely reported in both the white and black presses.
Lincoln reportedly received "twenty or thirty responses" to his proposal, all but one in
favor of the plan and many volunteering their families for resettlement. l0 0 Nevertheless,
most American black communities rejected the idea. One group in Philadelphia informed
the President of the moral weakness of the plan. Another in Queens County, New York
98 Abraham Lincoln, Roy Prentice Basler, and Abraham Lincoln Association (Springfield Ill.), The
Collected Works ofAbraham Lincoln, History Book Club ed., 9 vols., vol. 5 (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953), 371-5, Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro, 115-9.
99 Lincoln, Basler, and Abraham Lincoln Association (Springfield Ill.), The Collected Works ofAbraham
Lincoln, 371-5, Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro, 115-9.
100 Farmer's Cabinet, August 8 1862.
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explained that the United States was their home as well. Some directly ridiculed the
mining proposal that was so central to the plan. "'Coal land,' you say, 'is the best thing I
know of to begin an enterprise."' wrote A.P. Smith of Saddle River, New Jersey to the
president, "Astounding discovery! Worthy to be recorded in golden letters like the Lunar
Cycle in the Temple of Minerva... Twenty-five Negroes digging coal land in Central
America! Mighty plan! Equal to about twenty-five Negroes splitting rails in
Sangamon."'lo
Like A.P. Smith, historians have been critical of Lincoln's plan, and dismissed his
emphasis on coal as unworkable. But Lincoln, Ninian Edwards, Usher, and the Blairs
approached the project very seriously. Why? Their interest in the project reflects their
familiarity with, and understanding of, the government's nearly two decades of interest in
supplying coal for American vessels in the Caribbean and especially the Pacific that
stretched back to Borneo, Japan, and Formosa. The contours of the plan were shaped in
the historical context of industrialization and the rise of steam navigation. The social
problems created by American racial politics occurred alongside one of the most
significant technological transformations in world history. Both race and technology
created problems, and Lincoln hoped that adding two problems together might create a
solution.
The Twilight of Chiriqui
Lincoln's continued promotion of the Chiriqui resettlement scheme irritated Joseph
Henry. In the 1860s, Henry was perhaps the most widely known and distinguished
101 Smith quoted in Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro, 116-8.
112
scientist in America. In 1846, he had left a distinguished career at Princeton, where he
had pursued a series of innovative experiments in electromagnetism, to lead the new
Smithsonian Institution, a position he still held during the war.102 Secretary of State
William Seward had contacted him for scientific advice on Chiriqui's coals, a favor he
was happy to provide. Henry had written a firm, though fair, report critiquing the quality
of the coal and its possible use for steam power, conclusions he explained in greater
detail to Seward personally. If Seward was already convinced, the message had clearly
not yet reached the President, as evidenced by his widely publicized speech of August 14,
1862. Writing to his close friend, head of the U.S. Coast Survey, Alexander Dallas
Bache, Henry observed that "I was much surprised to find that he [Lincoln] believed in
the humbug coal mines of the Isthmus." Henry found the whole matter dubious. Not
only had he rejected the findings of the earlier government reports, but he claimed that
Thompson, whom he mockingly referred to as "St. Ambrose," had dangled before him "a
direct offer... of a share in the speculation" if Henry produced "a favorable report" to the
government. No evidence has been found that corroborates this assertion (it might well
have happened in a conversation), but it fits with Henry's suspicion that money, not
sound geology, was driving the plan. 103
Two weeks later, on September 5, Henry again wrote Seward, and this time he
was very blunt with his conclusions. "I hope the government will not make any contract
in regard to the purchase of the Chiriqui district until it has been thoroughly examined by
102 On Henry's early life and career, see Thomas Coulson, Joseph Henry: His Life and Work (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950), Albert E. Moyer, Joseph Henry: The Rise of an American Scientist
(Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).
103 "Joseph Henry to Alexander Dallas Bache, 8/21/1862," in The Papers ofJoseph Henry, ed. Marc
Rothenberg, Kathleen W. Dorman, and Frank R. Millikan (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press
distributed by Braziller New York, 1972).
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persons of known capacity and integrity," a statement clearly undermining the skill and
integrity of the isthmus's prior surveyors, at least some of whom he doubted the
truthfulness of. Henry also provided an additional scientific analysis of the coals by an
unnamed colleague. Unlike the conspicuous use of names and authority to buttress the
claims of earlier Chiriqui observers, Henry did not pursue this rhetoric of authority.
Instead of revealing that it was his friend, Pennsylvania's respected state geologist John
Peter Lesley, who conducted tests on the coal, Henry identified him only as "a gentleman
who has been extensively engaged in geological surveys and has published a work of
much merit: on coal."' 0 4
Henry's obfuscation of Lesley's identity is curious. Lesley was widely known in
and out of scientific circles. He was also, like Ambrose W. Thompson, a resident of
Philadelphia, raising the likelihood that Lesley might have some personal knowledge of
Thompson and his business affairs. Henry admitted that he was "some what suspicious"
of Lincoln's plan to settle freed slaves to mine Chiriqui coal for the Navy, but agreed to
pursue the matter to "be true to my self and the government." Suggestive of the evident
tangle of scientific knowledge, wartime politics, and questionable international business
ventures, Henry sought from Lesley not only his technical insight into Chiriqui coal, but
also "any other reliable information" that might aid the government, which from Henry's
perspective probably meant exposing Thompson as unsuitable for the contract. 105
Henry's care in presenting this authority suggests that his omission of a name was
deliberate, perhaps so as not to reveal that the "independent judgment as to the general
104 An omission that has confused some historians about Lesley's identity.
105 "Joseph Henry to John Peter Lesley, 5/28/1862," in The Papers of Joseph Henry, ed. Marc Rothenberg,
Kathleen W. Dorman, and Frank R. Millikan (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press distributed by
Braziller New York, 1972).
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character of the coal" was not really that independent at all. Henry's participation in the
politicization of science does not invalidate his conclusions, but it does indicate the
already politicized nature of scientific surveys and a prominent scientist's requisite
strategizing. 10 6
As far as chemistry is concerned, Lesley was unequivocal in his assessment.
"There can be little danger of going wrong in an opinion upon a Tertiary coal," he replied
after examining samples Henry had sent him. Tertiary coal, Lesley explained, was
readily distinguishable from coal from the more desirable anthracite and bituminous
mines of his native Pennsylvania. Tertiary coal was above all younger-more recently
formed-than most Pennsylvanian coal, sometimes hundreds of millions of years
younger. Typically, coal that young had not yet been subjected to the kinds of
underground pressures and chemistry that removed impurities like sulfur and
concentrated the mineral's combustible carbon. The coal also traveled poorly. "A
boxfull [sic] sent to the Academy of Sciences, Philadelphia," Lesley noted, "has slacked
down to a boxfull of coal dirt." If that was insufficiently problematic, the coal was also
prone to spontaneous combustion, a disastrous liability for a coal transported by wooden
ships.10 7 With the authority of "the experience of the world in the use of coal," Lesley
suggested that the defects of Chiriqui coal, like all other soft, young coals, would prevent
their economic use as a steaming fuel, as exported semi-bituminous and anthracite coals,
even when shipped from the United States or Great Britain, would arrive in sufficient
quantities to price the lower quality coal out of the market. He called Chiriqui coal "as
106 "Joseph Henry to Frederick W. Seward, 9/5/1862," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers.
107 For a fictionalization of the hazards of spontaneous combustion at sea, see Joseph Conrad's novella,
Youth, the author's first story introducing the figure of Marlowe. Joseph Conrad et al., Youth ; Heart of
Darkness; the End of the Tether, Penguin Twentieth-Century Classics (London, England ; New York,
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nearly worthless as any fuel can be" and asserted that he believed "the property will
always be of little or no value to its owners." 10 8
To Lesley's analysis, Henry added evidence from within the Smithsonian itself.
While he had never, and would never, visit Panama, Henry rejected the conclusions of an
earlier government report (ambiguously referenced in a letter, but possibly the report of
the Chiriqui Commission that had spent several months exploring the region on behalf of
Congress in 1860). Geologically, he insisted, Chiriqui coal could not compare with the
familiar steaming coals of Britain and the United States because the geological age of
isthmian strata was simply too young for the presence of high quality coal.109 With
chemistry and geology on his side, Henry considered the case of Chiriqui coal closed.
Nevertheless, throughout September, Lincoln and his cabinet considered the
Chiriqui colonization question. Caleb Smith continued to push how Thompson's
Chiriqui grant could be used to address the coal question and the slavery question at once.
"Each was to assist the other," noted Gideon Welles in his diary. Freed slaves would
colonize Thompson's land in Chiriqui, where they would mine coal for the Navy. To
vitalize the project, Smith proposed the Navy provide Thompson with $50,000 for the
first batch of coal.110
The Attorney General, Edward Bates, similarly supported the emigration of free
blacks. Before the war he had approved of the work of the American Colonization
Society and its efforts in settling Liberia, but increasingly considered Africa's political
and geographical distance from the United States an impediment to the project's success.
Instead, like others, he began to look towards "the tropical regions of America." Drawn
108 "Unknown [John Peter Lesley] to Joseph Henry, 9/5/1862," in LoC, Abraham Lincoln Papers.
109 "Joseph Henry to Alexander Dallas Bache, 8/21/1862."
110 Welles and Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 151.
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to the territory between Venezuela and the Yucatan Peninsula, Bates had considered a
settlement there a fruitful approach to solving the slavery question, although, as he noted
in his diary, "I have never made a point of it, and do not now." When Lincoln proposed
to his cabinet in September 1862 supporting the resettlement of free and soon-to-be free
blacks in various states and colonies of Central America, Bates thoroughly supported the
signing of treaties to advance the plan. "The more the better," he noted, though he
cautioned that "such treaties ought to be single, confined to that one object, so as to
avoid, if possible, all other debateable [sic] questions, and all disturbing elements." Bates
did not specify what "disturbing elements" he had in mind, although it seems probable
that he meant Welles' resistance to Thompson's Chiriqui proposal, which would have
forced his department to purchase coal the Secretary did not want through contracts he
did not believe valid. In Bates' view, tying the resettlement question to the older
question of fueling the Navy in the Pacific merely hindered the success of both
projects.II
But opposition to Chiriqui colonization also came to Lincoln's cabinet from
another quarter, this one more influential than Henry or Lesley. Governments of Central
American nations were not enthusiastic about either the terms of colonization or the
manner in which it was announced. Before Lincoln's speech, the American Minister
Resident to Costa Rica, Charles N. Riotte, had begun mentioning the prospects for
founding a colony of freed slaves almost as soon as he had arrived at his post in San Jos6.
111 The Attorney General also specified that the resettlement project should unfold as an emigration to
existing states, rather than as a colonization by the United States-not, evidently, because of the inevitable
opposition of Central American governments and European colonial powers, but because of the obligation
it would have imposed on the United States of governance and defense. Edward Bates, Howard K. Beale,
and Mary Parker Ragatz, The Diary ofEdward Bates, 1859-1866, Annual Report of the American
Historical Association for the Year 1930, Vol. 4 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1933), 113,92, 262-4.
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He reported to Washington a cautious response, but in the middle of May 1862, the
country's Secretary of State, Francisco M. Iglesias, started officially inquiring into the
motives and intentions of the Union government, fearful that the United States planned a
major diplomatic coup without the knowledge or consent of Costa Rica.112 Responding
from Washington, Secretary of State Seward encouraged Costa Rica to submit a proposal
for a coastal colony, but cautiously noted that other states had similarly expressed interest
in a settlement, that freed slaves would only emigrate on their own volition, and that the
President and Congress's own positions were still being formed." 3
After Lincoln's much publicized address at the White House, the public mood in
Costa Rica quickly soured. Lincoln's reported use of the phrase "a highway from the
Atlantic or the Caribbean sea to the Pacific ocean, to possess on both sides harbors
among the finest in the world, rich coal mines..." evidently signaled not an interest in
developing a colony anywhere in Central America, but one specifically in Chiriqui.
According to Minister Riotte, Lincoln's speech "has created a deep sensation," with the
prospect of a colony and especially one at Chiriqui. Riotte reported that the Costa Rican
congress remained enthusiastic about granting land, but that Chiriqui lay along the
disputed boundary between Costa Rica and New Granada, and since Thompson's land
claims were contested, the U.S. should avoid paying Thompson as middleman for the
project. "Land in abundance," Riotte assured Washington, "and of the choicest quality,
will be forthcoming, gratuitously offered by private persons, communities, associations,
and states; while, in purchasing, the government would most surely be swindled, and the
112 C.N. Riotte to William H. Seward, 5/15/1862 and F.M. Iglesias to C.N. Riotte, 5/15/1862, in United
States. President, Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress at the
Commencement of the Third Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress, 5 vols., vol. 1 (Washington D.C.:
G.P.O., 1862), 887-8.
113 Seward to Riotte, 6/4/1862, in Ibid., 888.
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poor negroes robbed or perched upon miasmatic or miserably poor locations." 114 The
states themselves, Riotte argued, should be negotiated with (and compensated), not a
questionable private corporation.
These states themselves pressed their case in Washington. Luis Molina, head of
the joint Legation of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras to the United States, protested
that while the governments of Central America embraced the principles of emigration,
they were affronted at not being included in planning the project. It appeared that the
United States sought to create an independent colony in Chiriqui, a prospect the existing
nearby states vehemently opposed. Moreover, while the race of potential emigrants was
not a particular concern, Molina observed that the project reeked of "the purpose of
importing a plague of which the United States desire to rid themselves." Thompson had
no legal right to Chiriqui, Molina asserted, for that land belonged not to New Granada but
to Costa Rica, and he accused the promoter of "solving the ancient problem... of making
gold out of that which has no value."'115 Newspapers reported that other Central
American diplomats likened the colony to the disastrous filibustering expeditions of
William Walker in the 1850s. 116
The trouble resulting from Lincoln's speech was exacerbated by Senator Samuel
C. Pomeroy. Lincoln had appointed the Kansas Senator to begin carrying out the Central
American colonization project. To inaugurate the colony, Pomeroy sought a contingent
of 500 freed blacks. They would steam from New York in early October, and while he
sought some women, the colonizers were limited, at least at first, to small families.
114 C.N. Riotte to William H. Seward, 9/14/1862 in Ibid., 888-9.
115 Luis Molina to William Seward, 9/19/1862 in Ibid., 899-900.
116 "The Colonization Scheme," Baltimore Sun, September 22 1862. [originally from New York Tribune]
"Northern News," Macon Telegraph, October 6 1862.
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Unmarried, adult men would receive a grant of twenty acres, families of five, forty acres,
and larger families, eighty. To encourage the plan's success, the government intended to
provide food and domestic animals, along with equipment for farming and mining. 17
When Pomeroy consulted Welles about the Chiriqui plan on September 10 1862, the
Navy Secretary related his suspicions of Thompson and skepticism about the legality of
his grants. Should the administration persist in its commitment to colonizing the isthmus,
as Welles recalled the conversation in his diary, negotiations should be with the
government of New Granada or other Central American states directly, "not through
scheming jobbers" like Thompson. 18 Pomeroy, much to consternation of Welles and
every government of Central America, continued promoting the plan.
Although the resettlement plan received some support from the black community,
most reactions were either indifferent or outright hostile, as evidenced by a clash on
Thanksgiving Day, when Pomeroy, along with Harriet Beecher Stowe and other
abolitionists, attended a banquet for freed slaves in Washington. The Senator spoke
glowing of Chiriqui colonization, displaying samples of the region's resources before the
gathered crowd. As he concluded his presentation, a escaped Virginian slave and
preacher rose and attacked the project-and Pomeroy himself-calling colonization in
Central America a trap for an even worse form of slavery. The Senator could offer no
response.19
117 "The Negro Colonization Scheme," Farmer's Cabinet, September 18 1862.
118 Welles, in fact, speculated that Pomeroy held a financial stake in the colonization plan, an idea tempered
only by the continued support of Lincoln, Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, his father, the power
broker Francis P. Blair, as well as "one or two men of integrity and character." Welles and Welles, Diary of
Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 123.
119 "Letter from St. Louis," Daily Evening Bulletin [San Francisco], December 23 1862.
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This domestic opposition, combined with the resistance of Central American
governments, ultimately doomed Chiriqui colonization. Seward tried reassuring Luis
Molina and other diplomats that their concerns should be put to rest. Congress prevented
the President any colonization plan at site lacking the consent of appropriate foreign
governments, he insisted, and Senator Pomeroy misunderstood the limits of his
instructions. With relations between the United States and the Central American states
already so tenuous, Seward could hardly afford additional antagonism. 120
Conclusion
Lincoln's interest in a colony of freed black slaves in Chiriqui gained momentum because
it fit neatly into his and much of his cabinet's ideas about building the United States as a
world power. Chiriqui, unlike Liberia, could be brought into the growing geographical
network of steam power. In 1861, Lincoln was discovering in coal what the American
Colonization Society had found in steamships a decade before: technology, and
especially the construction of technological networks of steam power, seemed to offer
precisely the "earthly power" that Lincoln bemoaned he lacked in Peoria in 1854.
But the project would never come to fruition. Opposition from Henry at the
Smithsonian emboldened Secretary Welles, ostensibly the cabinet officer with the most at
stake in the material aspects of the project. Protestations from the legations of Central
America were even more formidable, for the North needed as much diplomatic support as
it could get in the early years of the war.
120 United States. President, Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress
at the Commencement of the Third Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress, 889-98. A copy of Seward
9/24/1862 reply to Luis Molina is also found in Ambrose W. Thompson's General Correspondence papers.
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In 1864, Thompson announced to the government his intention of offering his
Chiriqui land to the government of Great Britain. He wrote to John P. Usher, by then
Secretary of the Interior, asking for copies of the government's surveys of Chiriqui so
that he could bring them with him to England. Perhaps he needed the reports, or perhaps
he sought a counter-offer from the Lincoln administration. He received neither. Usher
acknowledged Thompson's new plan to travel to England, but noted that the contract
with the President was still in effect whenever the President decides to invoke it. "I
entertain a high opinion of the International value of this property and of the benefits to
be derived thereupon by extended commercial relations between maritime nations," he
wrote. Yet while the land remained important, with the emigration of freed blacks no
longer a realistic proposal, the timely mix of race and technology had passed. 121 By
1864, the Union was facing difficulties with coal far larger and more immediate than
might be solved with mining in Chiriqui alone.
121 "J.P. Usher to Ambrose W. Thompson, 3/18/1864," in LoC, Papers of Ambrose W. Thompson, Box 43,
Chiriqui Improvement Co., 1864.
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Chapter 3: The Geography of Power
Despite its history of territorial acquisition, the United States' pursuit of coaling stations
under American sovereignty after the Civil War presented a new phenomenon. "This
policy is quite distinct from a general mania for annexing territory," noted the New York
Times in 1891, "although it might in some cases pave the way to the latter, and has often
been opposed on that ground."' According to the Times, the hunt for coaling stations
"has its origin in a state of things quite outside the experience of the founders of the
Republic." Steam power, in this analysis, "created the need of foreign coaling stations,
which, acquired in times of peace, could be relied upon also in war." The increasing
construction of ships without sails, relying only on their steam engines, appeared to
increase the importance of these stations.2
The interest in acquiring coal that began in the Navy in the 1840s and 1850s was
accelerated by the naval experience of the Civil War. Diplomatic difficulties with
European states, particularly Great Britain, suggested to officials in both the State and
Navy Departments the utility of the United States possessing its own coaling stations in
strategic locations, especially in the Caribbean and Pacific. Efforts to acquire these
stations began immediately after the war, and continued throughout the remainder of the
century. Projects for coaling stations in Samoa and Oahu succeeded. Many more failed,
as suggested by this wish list from the Navy in 1884, which sought stations at "some or
all of the following points: Samana Bay [San Domingo], or some port in Haiti; Curagao,
S"Foreign Coaling Stations," New York Times, May 6 1891.
2 Ibid.
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in the Caribbean Sea; Santa Catharina, in Brazil; the Straits of Magellan; La Union, in
Salvador, or Amapala, in Honduras; Tullear Bay, in Madagascar; Monrovia, in Liberia;
the Island of Fernando Po; Port Hamilton, in the Nan-how Islands of Corea.... Similar
stations should in addition be maintained, on at the best point on the Atlantic side of the
Isthmus of Panama and another at the islands of Flamenco, Perico, Calabra, and Ilenoa on
the Pacific side, now owned by American corporations." 3 The United States built none of
these stations in the 19th century, but it did haltingly seek many of them.
But an analysis of most negotiations for American coaling stations in foreign
waters suggests that the American "need" for coaling stations flared up most often when
American diplomats and cabinet Secretaries were on the defensive, trying to prevent
foreign nations like France, Britain, and Germany from acquiring stations in sensitive
locations. Between the end of the Civil War and 1898, the most debated "necessary"
coaling stations were ones pursued on the defensive. The diplomatic efforts to obtain
coaling stations on St. Thomas and Haiti in the 1860s and 1890s highlight this dynamic.
American policy makers, however, did not address the coaling problem through
diplomacy alone. They also supported the efforts of scientists and engineers to find
technical ways to decrease the American naval dependence on coal and hence to decrease
the importance of possessing strategically located territory. These approaches included
researching the chemistry of coal combustion, redesigning steam engines, and exploring
for coal in distant territory. Taken together, the pursuit of coaling stations and the
application of science and engineering reveal the complex ways the changing technology
of steam power influenced American foreign policy in the late 19 th century.
3 William E. Chandler, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1884, V. 1, H.exdoc.1/1O,
48th Cong., 2nd. sess. (1884), "Foreign Coaling Stations."
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A War of Industrial Power
Just eighteen days after arriving at Hatteras Inlet to begin blockading the southern harbor,
Union Commander Stephen C. Rowan struggled to find coal. The Atlantic blockade was
a central Union strategy to suffocate the Confederate economy from its vital foreign
trade, especially with Britain. But most Union vessels depended on steam power, and
supplies of coal were difficult to obtain when far from northern ports. A failure to
acquire the fuel would doom the blockade, a fact with which Rowan struggled daily. "I
have already informed you that I wanted coal," Rowan wrote to the commander of the
Atlantic Blockading Squadron in late September 1861. "I have now to state that unless I
receive coal within the next ten days we shall not be able to move even the little tug
Fanny." He requested an immediate shipment. While any coal was better than no coal,
Rowan noted that ideally the Navy would deliver multiple shipments and keep the ships
of his blockade in action. Anything less would mean defeat.4
The shadow of the Civil War loomed over the development of American
diplomacy surrounding coal and American geographic expansion in the later 19th century.
Many post-war cabinet members, senior officers in the Army and Navy, and important
diplomats had observed both the advantages and the limitations of coal-fired steam power
in war first hand, and carried that education into their subsequent policy decisions. A
major lesson they learned was that modern industrial warfare was global in scope. If the
Civil War between the Union and Confederacy on land was by definition a domestic
conflict, their naval war saw few boundaries. Both navies had major operations in the
4 "S.C. Rowan to Gideon Welles, 9/3/1861 and S.C. Rowan to S.H. Stringham, 9/21/1861," in ORUCN
(Ser. 1, v. 6, 1897).
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Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico, and their activities stretched to
Europe, the coast of Africa, and the Pacific Ocean-not to mention the extensive
operations on inland rivers. As the first major war powered at sea by steam, the Civil
War revolutionized American ideas about warfare, technology, and the geographic reach
of the United States. Examining how the Union and Confederacy dealt with coal during
the war suggests the kinds of questions that would confront policy-makers afterwards. 5
Supply lines at sea stretched deep into the country, and the functioning of the warring
navies depended on the battles waged on land. These battles affected the availability of
coal for naval use. The Union occupation of Chattanooga in August 1863, for example,
isolated the productive coal mines of Tennessee that had been supplying Georgia, South
Carolina, and the much of the Confederate Navy. Mines in North Carolina and Alabama
were slow to increase production, though the activities of a Confederate mining bureau
helped substantially. As early as 1863, the Confederacy began substituting wood for coal
in its steamers, particularly in the fuel-starved ports of Charleston and Savannah.6
The: Confederacy also found that coal purchased in foreign ports varied greatly in
quality for steaming. The officers of the Confederate steamer Florida discovered this
problem after loading coal in Havana. The new supply would not raise steam, and a
board assembled by the ship's commander hastily concluded that "[i]t does not make a
5 For an overview of the naval aspect of the Civil War, see Spencer C. Tucker, Blue & Gray Navies: The
Civil War Afloat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), William H. Roberts, Civil War Ironclads:
The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), David
A. Mindell, War, Technology, and Experience Aboard the USS Monitor (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2000).
6 "John K. Mitchell to S.R. Mallory, 11/16/1863," in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies
in the War of the Rebellion, ed. United States. Naval War Records Office. and United States. Office of
Naval Records and Library. (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1917). Hereafter cited as ORUCN, Page: Series,
Volume, Year.
126
lively fire." More efficient coals loaded in Mobile lay beneath the newer coals from
Havana, and the board recommended digging down to the better coals, throwing the
Havana coals overboard, and steaming as quickly as possible "to the nearest English port
where we can get coal."'
Despite better supply lines overall, the Union, too, often suffered for coal. Rear-
Admiral John A. Dahlgren expressed his frustration at one such shortage some six
months after assuming charge of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. In February
1864, Dahlgren found coal stocks at Port Royal, South Carolina dangerously low. A
dispatch from Washington had promised 2,000 tons at the beginning of the month. The
only ship that actually arrived carried a mere 300 tons. This addition brought the
Squadron's reserve stocks to a paltry six or seven hundred tons. "This will be expended
in a very brief time," Dahlgren wrote to the Navy's Chief of the Bureau of Equipment
and Recruiting, "and will leave me in a very embarrassing situation." The Admiral asked
for an immediate shipment of 10,000 tons. Dahlgren's demand for coal spoke for more
than the need for mobility; coal was also essential for providing heat and health even in
mild South Carolina. "The Bureau is, of course, aware of the consequences of the vessels
being without coal," Dahlgren observed, "particularly at this season, when it is essential
to our own safety as well as for blockading the rebels."8
If obtaining coal in continental waters was difficult, it was harder still in the
islands of the Caribbean and harbors of the larger Atlantic. There, Union and
Confederate navies found themselves subject to the constraints of international law, the
political decisions of individual governments, and the availability of coal itself-supplies
7 "J.N. Maffitt to S.R. Mallory, 1/27/1863," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 2, 1895).
8 "John A. Dahlgren to A.N. Smith, 2/20/1864," in ORUCN (Ser. 1, v. 27, 1917).
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usually well beyond their control. The differential treatment of Union and Confederate
vessels coaling in foreign waters in particular raised the ire of both warring governments.
In May 1863, the Union consul in Bahia, Brazil, for example, reported that the
Confederate ships Alabama and Florida had recently steamed into port for coal. Only a
few days earlier, an English bark, the Castor had also arrived, ostensibly steaming from
Liverpool to Shanghai loaded with coal and two hundred pound cannons and seeking
refuge from the weather. Word quickly reached the consul that the Castor had, in fact,
planned a rendezvous with the Confederate ships to supply them with fuel and munitions.
Over his protests, the transfer of coal and presumably cannons to the Georgia occurred
under cover of darkness, and the Confederate ship were only ordered to leave the port the
following morning. The Bahian government's complicity in supporting the Confederate
ships infuriated the consul.9
Great Britain, however, presented the greatest obstacle for fueling both the Union
and Confederacy. Although international legal experts disagreed on the precise status of
coal during wartime, most agreed that providing it to combatants must be limited so as to
avoid inadvertently (or deliberately) aiding one over the other. To protect its neutrality as
a non-belligerent, the British government decided early in the conflict to supply both
Union and Confederate steamers in need of fuel with sufficient coal only to steam to their
nearest home port. Sometimes, additional constraints were imposed.10
9 "Thomas F. Wilson to O.S. Glisson, 5/25/1863," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 2, 1895). Bahia would remain a
favored coaling port for Confederate blockade runners. In December 1863, the British ship Berbice
unloaded some 900 tons of coal there, though suspiciously not to a coal merchant but the same firm that
facilitated the earlier refueling of the Alabama and Georgia. In January 1864, the Annette arrived loaded
with coal, supposedly bound for Hong Kong, but rumored to be supplying the Confederacy. "Thomas F.
Wilson to William H. Clark, 1/28/1864," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 2, 1895).
10 As Kenneth Blume has shown, the application of neutrality varied considerably among different British
colonies and under changing diplomatic circumstances. See Kenneth J. Blume, "Coal and Diplomacy in
the British Caribbean During the Civil War," Civil War History XLI, no. 2 (1995).
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When the U.S.S. Dacotah needed fuel in the Bahamian port of Nassau, for
example, the British colonial government there consented only on the condition that the
American consul, Samuel Whiting, would pledge that for the ten days after the Dacotah
refueled, she not pass within five miles of any island of the Bahamas. The Americans
were dissatisfied with the constraint but had little choice but to comply. "The Dacotah is
in urgent need of fuel," wrote Whiting to the islands' governor, "and, in his emergency,
Captain McKinstry has been compelled to give the unusual assurance your Excellency
has seen fit to require."'' To Consul Whiting, these constraints were never applied as
stringently to Confederate vessels.1 2
These diplomatic difficulties in the Bahamas continued throughout the war as
Americans were prevented from using British territory as a staging ground for combat,
even with their own material. When two schooners bearing coal from Philadelphia
arrived at Nassau in December 10, 1861, the British authorities prohibited the vessels
from discharging their cargo to any American ship during the remainder of war. A
frustrated Consul Whiting tested the limits of this order the following day, when an
American screw steamer, the Flambeau, arrived in port. Though the ship did not need
coal herself, Whiting requested of the colonial government that she be permitted to load
coal from one of the coal ships, the rapidly leaking Caleb Stetson. As he noted in his
report to Washington, "The request was courteously refused.""13
The Flambeau's commander, Lieutenant William Greenville Temple, protested to
the colony's Lieutenant-Governor, observing that technological constraints interfered
" "Samuel Whiting to J.P. Mckinstry, 9/14/1862," in ORUCN (Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894), "C.R. Nesbitt to Samuel
Whiting, 9/15/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894), "Samuel Whiting to Governor Bayley, 9/15/1862," in
ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
12 "Samuel Whiting to Charles Wilkes, 10/7/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
13 "Samuel Whiting to Gideon Welles, 12/16/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
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with the developed body of international law on neutrality and contraband, about which
lawyers contested the categorization of coal. "I would be leave to suggest for your
Excellency's consideration the fact that the motive power of this vessel is almost
exclusively steam," he wrote, "and since it is impossible to carry a perpetual supply of
coal on board, a prohibition to obtain more would amount to detaining her in port during
the war, and so far from preserving the neutrality enjoined, it would really be affording
aid to the rebels." 4 While demand for Southern cotton contributed to Britain's wavering
sympathy to Confederate blockade runners, Nassau's government explained that coal
itself was besides the point. According to the Acting Colonial Secretary, "the real
question here is not whether coal is or is not contraband of war, but whether the United
States armed vessels are to make this [Nassau] a coaling depot, for the better facilitating
their belligerent operations against vessels of the Confederate States."' 5 The network of
supplying coal, and its geographic and political implications, mattered far more than the
coal itself.
In Jamaica, Lieutenant David Dixon Porter encountered similar obstacles. "There
is an indisposition on the part of the Government to furnish us with coal," he wrote to
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, "and there is none for sale except at most
exorbitant prices." The only solution, Porter suggested, involved securing access to a
coaling yard from a Jamaican resident and then maintaining there American coal.
14 "William Granville Temple to Lt. Gov. Nesbitt, 12/17/1861," in ORUCN (Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
15 "A. J. Thompson to W.G. Temple, 12/18/1861," in ORUCN (Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894). Temple planned on
remaining in Nassau to keep watch on a Confederate blockade runner, the Gladiator, suspected of carrying
"arms and equipment for 25,000 men," a decision made possible by the Flambeau's coal stores, expected to
last a month if anchored in harbor. A week later, after hearing rumors that the Gladiator would attempt to
steam out of Nassau, Temple left first, hoping to catch the Confederate ship off the Bahamas' banks. The
plan failed, the Flambeau was sighted by several other ships, and Temple abandoned the islands altogether
when depleted coal bunkers forced him to steam to Key West to refuel. "W.G. Temple to Gideon Welles,
12/21/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894), "W.G. Temple to Gideon Welles, 1/1/1862," in ORUCN(Ser.
1, v. 1, 1894), "W.G. Temple to Gideon Welles, 1/7/1861 [1862]," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
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"Without some arrangement of this kind our steamers can not cruise in these waters."
Despite Porter's suggestion, Jamaican authorities would, no doubt, have prevented such
an obvious violation of their neutrality if the fuel was used for anything more than
emergencies. 16
St. Thomas, too, presented obstacles to coaling. The island, although owned by
Denmark, was dominated by British commerce. The Union maintained a coal supply
there, but it was stored far from the docks and inaccessible to Union ships. The dock
owner, an English merchant, himself owned some 2,000 tons of coal, and according to
Commander John DeCamp of the U.S.S. Iroquois, "probably has an eye to a small profit,
say 500 or 600 per cent." The dock owner anticipated war between Britain and the
United States and shrank from selling Americans coal, a prospect that frightened
DeCamp. "All hands here think that we are in for a war with J[ohn] B[ull], and at this
coal yard every obstacle is thrown in our way," he wrote to Washington. With the
prospect of a larger war looming, DeCamp observed that rumors in St. Thomas suggested
that Britain would grab the Danish West Indies from Denmark as a base of operations,
"and if they should do so our chance in the West Indies would be but small." If British
coaling stations closed entirely, only unfortified harbors on Santo Domingo, Cuba, and
Puerto Rico would remain available to the Union.1 7
Difficulties coaling in British territories existed outside of the Caribbean as well.
On St. Helena in the South Atlantic, Union Commander C.H. Baldwin learned from the
island's governor that he could coal upon his arrival on August 18 t , 1863, but the
following day found that his ship, the Vanderbilt, had to leave the port with no more than
16 "David D. Porter to Gideon Welles, 8/23/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).17 "John Decamp to G.V. Fox, 1/8/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
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500 tons by 5:00 PM on the 2 0 th. The ship's officers and crew coaled throughout the day
and night, and still only managed to load 400 tons, the remainder of which Baldwin
feared "might still be supplied to our enemies." 18
The negotiation of neutrality laws hindered the Confederate Navy as well. On
August 19, 1864, Richard G. MacDonnell, the colonial Lieutenant-Governor of Halifax,
Nova Scotia, received a report that the Confederate cruiser, the Tallahassee had remained
in his port longer than the twenty-four hours he had proscribed for coaling under
international law. Observers sympathetic to the Union asserted that the ship had loaded
more than 180 tons of coal, far more than that required for her to steam to the nearest
Confederate port. MacDonnell was angry, for the Tallahassee was no ordinary ship. She
was unusually fast, and in the sixteen days since she had steamed from Wilmington, she
had allegedly "destroyed or bonded" some thirty-two Union ships. MacDonnell
appreciated the sensitivity of the situation. "As I was aware that the Tallahassee had
been committing extensive havoc among the shipping of the United States," he wrote to
London, "and had caused thereby much excitement and alarm," he had insisted that she
remain in port to coal no longer than twenty-four hours. 19
Learning that she had violated this agreement threatened to create a diplomatic
crisis. "In the peculiar case of the Tallahassee even 5 tons of coal in excess of the
amount strictly allowed might be regarded as insuring a heavy loss to Federal shipping,"
MacDonnell observed. He therefore directed her to leave the port immediately, and
further that she relinquish all coal loaded after the permitted twenty-four hours. "You
must, however," he wrote to her commander, "be well aware that you were only entitled
'8 "C.H. Baldwin to Gideon Welles, 8/20/1863," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 2, 1895).
'9 "Richard Graves Macdonnell to E. Cardwell, 8/23/1864," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 3, 1896).
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to sufficient coal to take you to the nearest confederate port, and any inconvenience
which you may suffer is caused by your own act." Only a few hours later MacDonnell
learned that the rumor of excessive coaling was false, and he quickly rescinded his
order.20
If coaling introduced a constraint to one party at war, however, knowledge that
one's opponent operated under a similar constraint could be used to great advantage. No
episode of the war illustrates the way coal shaped the conflict than the extraordinary
career of the Confederate steamer Sumter. During most of 1861, the Sumter and her
Commander, Raphael Semmes, steamed throughout the Caribbean, evading Union
vessels and capturing, and sometimes burning, prize ships. Yet even as the Union Navy
struggled for coal, the Confederacy fought at an even greater disadvantage. The Sumter
sought refuge to coal in Cuaragao in July 1861. After the island's government decided to
admit the belligerent ship, she loaded 115 tons of coal. On shore, the ship's officers
boasted that they had already captured seven Union vessels, unloaded the captured crews
to the consul at Cienfuegos de Cuba, and sold the ships and their cargoes. Yet the new
supply of coal would only last a short period, and the Union consul in Curagao hoped that
broadcasting the ship's likely return to his government would permit the Union Navy to
intercept the Sumter precisely when she returned for fuel.2'
The Sumter would prove a major irritant to the Union Navy as it consistently
evaded capture until it was blockaded in Gibraltar in January 1862, by which point it had
20 After expressing his relief that the rumor was false, MacDonnell consented to the Tallahassee remaining
in port an additional twelve hours to obtain a new mainmast. The ship, however, left the harbor before
doing so, and a Union gunship arrived in port about twelve hours later. Ibid, "Richard Graves Macdonnell
to J. Taylor Wood, 8/19/1864," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 3, 1896).
21 The consul, Moses Jesurun, wrote the State Department as well as fellow consuls in St. Thomas and
Havana with this information. "Moses Jesurun to J.T. Edgar, 7/18/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894),
"R. Semmes to S.R. Mallory, 11/9/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
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captured 18 vessels, seven of which it had burned.22 Coal alternated as the elusive ship's
hindrance and its advantage. In August 1861 it was spotted "without money, credit, or
coal," but managed to recover all three.23 David Dixon Porter heard that she grabbed a
coal ship and obtained sufficient fuel in Trinidad for a run to Pernambuco, Brazil and
"will do an immense amount of damage."24 This rumor proved mostly correct. The
Sumter had arrived in Maranham, Brazil on September 6, where its commander, Raphael
Semmes, discovered that coal cost a steep $17.50 per ton. "It behooved me, therefore,"
he wrote to Confederate Navy Secretary Stephen R. Mallory in Richmond, "to arrange
my cruising so that I should not coal too often."25
In Martinique, when Semmes found that the colonial governor had reneged on an
agreement to allow the ship to coal, the Confederate Commander protested that colonial
governments in Cuba, Curagao, Trinidad, Suriname, and Brazil had all permitted his ship
to refuel. Semmes, himself a lawyer, pressed the legal aspect of wartime coaling. "It is a
well-settled rule of international law that belligerent cruisers have the right to enter freely
into neutral ports for the purpose of replenishing their stores of provisions, or replacing a
lost mast or spar, and why should not they be equally permitted to receive on board
coal?" 26 The argument proved persuasive, and the ship was permitted to refuel.
Almost a month later, Porter attributed the Sumter's effective evasion of his much
larger ship to its nimble ability to take on fuel. "With a smaller vessel I would have
22 United States. Naval War Records Office. and United States. Office of Naval Records and Library.,
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, vol. Ser. 1, v. 1-27; ser.
2, v. 1-3., Office Memoranda / United States Naval War Records Office (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1894),
744-5.
23 "G.H. Scott to Gideon Welles, 8/26/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
24 Union vessels in search of the Sumter, meanwhile could coal themselves in St. Thomas, Grenada,
Trinidad, Barbados, Pernambuco, or other Brazilian ports. "David D. Porter to Gideon Welles, 8/30/1861,"
in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
25 "R. Semmes to S.R. Mallory, 11/9/1861."
26 "R. Semmes to M. Maussion De Cand6, 11/12/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
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caught the Sumter ten days ago," he protested, "for while I have to take in 700 tons of
coal, she only takes 100, and makes about the same speed this ship does."27 Commander
Jason S. Palmer of the U.S.S. Iroquois also hunted for the Sumter, and like Porter, was
dismayed by the ability of the Confederate ship to find coal. Palmer understood that the
Sumter's success resulted from the application of British and French neutrality in the
American conflict. "The French, it is said, would refuse coal to either, and the English
grant to both."28
The pursuit and the evasion continued for six months. The Sumter found coal in
unlikely places, aided by sympathetic, or commercially minded, governments and
merchants. Every stop in port, however, provided another signal to the Union, though
their ships repeatedly missed finding the blockade runner. Eventually, the Sumter
literally ran out of steam. In February 1862, she arrived in Gibraltar, but local merchants
would not sell her coal and the British government there forbid her to take coal from their
stocks. 29 The ship remained in port through the fall-with Semmes and most of his crew
having fled-and after the remaining second officer murdered the commanding officer,
the ship was eventually sold to a British merchant.3 o
The Union found that a coaling depot in the hands of another power was often worse than
no depot existing at all, for the merchants or governments who maintained coal supplies
might sell to Confederate ships. Charles W. Dabney, the American consul in the Azores,
27 "David D. Porter to Gideon Welles, 9/24/1861," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
28 "Jason S. Palmer to Gideon Welles, 9/23/1861," in ORUCN (Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
29 "Horatio J. Sprague to Gideon Welles, 2/12/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
30 "Horatio J. Sprague to Charles F. Adams, 10/17/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894), "A. Bryson to
Gideon Welles, 12/21/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
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owned the only commercial coaling depot there, and he refused to coal Confederate
ships. He realized, however that other parties in the islands, possibly connected with the
Confederate trade with England, maintained their own, private coal supplies for the
South. From these stores, Southern steamers refueled and attacked and burned American
whaling and merchant ships.31
Secretary of State Seward was particularly interested in the geographical
problems created by coal. Where Gideon Welles and the leadership of the Navy worried
particularly about the practical questions of locating, providing, and shipping coal,
Seward thought broadly about the geography of coaling stations. In February 1863, for
example, he observed that British ships were likely carrying coal to various islands in the
Azores in order to supply Confederate steamers running the Union blockade. Although
Charles Dabney would not sell them coal himself, the Confederate ships engaged in more
clandestine tactics. Seward suggested that American steamers might better police the
neighborhood of the islands.32 Perhaps more than any other public figure, Seward would
carry the geographic importance of coaling stations with him after the war and try to turn
it into new American acquisitions.
Seward's interest in the geography of coaling stations was shared, however, by
some senior officers in the Navy. George Henry Preble, Commander of the U.S. Sloop of
War St. Louis appreciated the utility of Madeira, the island off the Portuguese and North
African coasts in the Atlantic Ocean. Preble observed that "[f]rom its central position
this island is likely to be the frequent resort of our steamers for a supply of coal." He
suggested that the government establish a depot there and thus avoid the coal monopoly
31 "Charles W. Dabney to D.P. Upton, U.S.N., 9/15/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).32 "William H. Seward to Gideon Welles, 2/11/1863," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 2, 1895).
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then held by two English merchants. An American coaling station also had political
dimensions from which the Union might receive tangible benefit beyond serving its fuel
needs in the Atlantic. "The establishment of a coal depot," Preble wrote to Welles, "by
the employment it would necessarily give to poor people, must tend to increase the good
and friendly feeling already existing toward a country that has on more than one occasion
relieved them from starvation." 33
Rear-Admiral Charles Wilkes made similar observations in the Caribbean. His
years of difficulty obtaining coal around the Windward Islands compelled him to
establish a depot of his own on Guadeloupe. His expansive view of geography, both of
supplying Union vessels and in routing Confederate, led him to suggest the establishment
of additional coaling depots at Curaqao, St. Thomas, San Juan, Cape Haitien, Santiago de
Cuba, Havana, and Key West.34 As most of these ports remained the colonial
possessions of European powers, however, merely storing American coal there did not
solve the fundamental obstacle of a secure Union fuel supply.
Mere supplies of fuel and a suitable harbor for loading it aboard ship were
themselves insufficient guarantors of a successful energy network. There remained the
question of disease. Otherwise available harbors became toxic following reports,
confirmed or not, of the outbreak of an epidemic. Rear-Admiral Wilkes, commanding
the West India Squadron in 1862, explained these difficulties after a strategic Cuban port
fell under quarantine. "Coal is one of the first considerations which forces itself upon
me," wrote Wilkes to Navy Secretary Welles, "in looking to the wants of the squadron,
and the danger of having communication with The Havannah to coal during the existence
33 "George Henry Preble to Gideon Welles, 2/28/1864," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 2, 1895).
34 "Charles Wilkes to Gideon Welles, 3/18/1863," in ORUCN (Ser. 1, v. 2, 1895).
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of the yellow fever." With Havana a dangerous port in which to refuel, Wilkes instead
requested Welles to dispatch several schooners, each loaded with some 1,000 or 1,200
tons of coal, to Florida's Turtle Harbor, a location nestled away from the Gulf of Mexico
along Florida's panhandle and with water deep enough for coaling. Unlike Havana,
Turtle Harbor was free of disease.35
The Union and Confederate struggles to fuel their naval war persisted throughout
the conflict. Both governments faced a spectrum of difficulties: legal, diplomatic,
material, and geographic. After the war, some key figures took this experience and
attempted to devise a new approach to projecting American power-political, economic,
and strategic-around the world. If steam was to remain an important element of
national strength, they argued, the problem of fuel must be solved first.
Post-War
Secretary of State William Henry Seward embarked on a tour of Caribbean islands in
January 1866. He had personal reasons for seeking a vacation-both he and his son, the
Assistant Secretary of State, Frederick W. Seward, had narrowly escaped an assassination
attempt the same night President Lincoln was shot in April 1865. Moreover, the lurching
executive transition from Lincoln to Andrew Johnson had been exhausting, politically
and personally. Seward, however, had other motives in mind as well. His itinerary
included the Danish West Indies island of St. Thomas, the Republic of Dominica, its
neighbor Haiti, and finally Cuba. In at least the first three, the Secretary sought to
negotiate the sale or lease of territory for use as American coaling stations. The Navy's
35 "Charles Wilkes to Gideon Welles, 9/21/1862," in ORUCN(Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894). Welles responded
affirmatively, instructing the Navy's agent in New York to gather the necessary vessels and send 2,000 tons
of coal to Turtle Harbor. "Gideon Welles to Charles Wilkes, 9/25/1862," in ORUCN (Ser. 1, v. 1, 1894).
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difficulties coaling during the war suggested to Seward the immense importance of these
stations, and he added his own flair for dramatic politics, his desire for a tangible legacy,
and presidential ambitions. 36
These stations interested the Navy as well. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles
observed in his diary that "the Navy Department in our war, feeling the want of a station
in the West Indies, has favored the subject." Welles himself desired a coaling station on
either Martinique or Guadeloupe. Nevertheless, he disapproved of Seward's theatrics in
attempting to acquire such a station. "I am amused and yet half-disgusted with Seward's
nonsense," he wrote of Seward's upcoming voyage to the Caribbean, frustrated that his
cabinet rival's very public actions were likely to raise the cost of the islands and lower
the United States' chances of obtaining them.7
Maritime geography influenced Seward's attraction to St. Thomas. The island lay
at the intersection of major sea routes: from England to Central America, Spain to Cuba
and Mexico, and the U.S. to Brazil. It was one of the most convenient ports to serve the
trade of both the Windward and Leeward islands to its south. Seward's son, Frederick,
who accompanied his father on the cruise, observed that "St. Thomas has come to be a
place where steam lines converge," and recalled the expression that the island is "the
place which is on the way to every other place." Trade was only one advantage of St.
Thomas. It also offered unique strategic advantages to the nation that controlled it.
Graced with a commodious harbor and a narrow and easily defended entrance, the island
possessed what appeared to be an ideal location for a coaling station. "It would have
36 Gideon Welles and Edgar Thaddeus Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under
Lincoln and Johnson, vol. 2 (Boston, New York,: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 283, Olive Risley
Seward, "A Diplomatic Episode," Scribner's Magazine II, no. 5 (1887): 588.
37 Welles and Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 393, 406.
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been of great value to the United States," observed the younger Seward, "had they owned
it during the civil war."38
The Sewards' interest in St. Thomas was the first manifestation of American
efforts to locate and acquire coaling stations after the Civil War.39 These diplomatic
endeavors were halting, affected by the predilections of individual Presidential
administrations, the interests of Secretaries of State and the Navy and senior naval
officers, and the political and economic conditions where the coaling stations were
sought. These projects continued the American interest in coal that began in the 1840s
and 1850s, but with increasing frequency and urgency, proposals emerged for the U.S. to
assume sovereignty over extra-continental territory-a condition rarely considered in the
earlier plans. Examining a few of these post-bellum projects suggests the interest that
Americans brought to acquiring coaling stations, and the reasons why so many of these
efforts ultimately failed before 1898.
On their 1866 cruise, the Sewards stopped first in St. Thomas, traveling successively to
the Republic of Dominica (San Domingo), Haiti, and Cuba. Conversations about coal,
coaling stations, and the imperatives of the American steam navy recurred regularly.
During one conversation in Haiti, for example, Seward and his hosts discussed the
various harbors of the Caribbean, and someone observed that while both states on the
island possessed extraordinary harbors-Samana Bay in Dominica and the M6le St.
38 William Henry Seward and Frederick William Seward, William H. Seward; an Autobiography from 1801
to 1834. With a Memoir of His Life, and Selections from His Letters, [New ] ed. (New York,: Derby and
Miller, 1891), 307-8.
39 For the diplomatic origins of the idea, see Halvdan Koht, "The Origin of Seward's Plan to Purchase the
Danish West Indies," American Historical Review 50, no. 4 (1945).
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Nicholas in Haiti-neither state made use of them. The Dominicans instead used the
outlet of the Ozama River as their principal harbor and the Haitians Port-au-Prince. Both
met the needs of commerce, but Seward looked to the imperatives of modern naval
warfare and found both harbors lacking.40 The United States, he believed, could benefit
from its Caribbean neighbors. "Like every other structure of large proportions," he
observed of his nation while speaking to the President of San Domingo, "it requires
outward buttresses. Those buttresses will arise in the development of civilization in this
hemisphere." If stable states in the Caribbean provided a political buttress for the United
States, Seward appreciated how the islands' harbors themselves could provide a
geographic one.4 1
Within months of Seward's voyage, rumors spread in the Navy and the American
press that the Secretary of State sought to acquire St. Thomas as a coaling station for
American ships. The ease with which British blockade-runners during the war refueled
in ports like Nassau in the Bahamas suggested the usefulness of naval bases in that sea.
Americans usually identified St. Thomas, possessing the largest and deepest harbor of the
three main islands comprising the Danish West Indies, as a prime candidate for an
American base. "In the event of a foreign war," wrote one American citizen visiting St.
Thomas in 1866, "the possession of it as a coaling station and general entrepot for our
own ships would be of incalculable value to the United States." This common-sense
appeal for Caribbean naval bases was present as early as the close of the Civil War.42
40 Seward and Seward, William H. Seward; an Autobiography from 1801 to 1834. With a Memoir of His
Life, and Selections from His Letters, 316.
41 Ibid., 311.
42 "The Cruise of the 'Monadnock.' No. 1.," Overland Monthly and Out West Magazine 3, no. 1 (1869): 18.
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While Seward also pursued the annexation of the San Domingo (in large part for
its harbor of Samana Bay), his plan to acquire the Danish West Indies for a coaling
station came closest to fruition. Upon returning to the United States after his cruise, the
Secretary set negotiations in motion. He pushed Johnson's cabinet to approve the
purchase of the islands, and he led the United States to announce its first formal offer to
Denmark in July 1866. Seward initially offered $5 million for St. Thomas, St. John, and
St. Croix. A new government in Denmark replied, however, asking for $15 million for
all three islands, or $10 million for St. Thomas and St. John, and in either case, requiring
a plebiscite from the islands' residents approving the transfer.43 After months of
negotiation, the Americans and Danes signed the treaty ceding the islands in October
1867. Upon learning of the deal, the New York Times applauded, noting that "[t]he
necessity of our possessing a naval station somewhere in the West Indies has long been
apparent," and referring the reader to the difficulties experienced by the Confederate
steamer the Alabama, "which traversed the world in search of her fuel.""44
This celebration proved premature, however, when Nature suddenly roared louder
than either the press or Secretary Seward. In the fall of 1867 a series of catastrophes
engulfed the islands and soured the prospects for completing the purchase. First, on
October 2 9th, St. Thomas was pummeled by a vicious hurricane, stronger than any to
reach the islands in decades. Just a few weeks later, on November 18 t, as representatives
of the United States and Denmark met in St. Croix's town of Christiansted, the island
suffered the additional devastation of a series of 89 earthquakes in a twelve hour period.
43 Denmark sought the additional money as a result of its recent defeat in war with the German
Confederation. Seward and Seward, William H. Seward; an Autobiography from 1801 to 1834. With a
Memoir of His Life, and Selections from His Letters, 588-90.
44 "Our New Possessions," New York Times, November 5 1867.
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The aftershocks lasted for weeks, and the largest earthquakes triggered destructive
tsunamis. One massive wave handily wrecked the 2,000 ton U.S.S. Monongahela,
anchored at St. Croix to support the American delegation. According to an account in
Harper's Weekly, the ship "was washed out of the ocean, over the warehouses of the
town of St. Croix to the market-place, and again carried back over the same warehouses,
and landed high and dry on a coral bank on the edge of the town." Four men of the crew
died.45
The disasters had immediate repercussions on the near-consummated purchase.
Popular support in the United States, always ambivalent at best, turned negative,
beginning with some of the nation's best known authors. The popular middle-brow poet
and writer Bret Harte penned "St. Thomas, A Geographic Survey" in 1868, in which the
outwardly edenic island in fact concealed a jealous Nature, fearful of the industrial
pretensions of the United States. The poem's Secretary of State, however, saw only
opportunities:
Then said William Henry Seward,
As he cast his eye to leeward,
"Quite important to our commerce
Is this island of St. Thomas."
But Nature revolted. St. Thomas's mountains feared Americans "Digging, blasting, with
dynamit // Mocking all our thunders! Damn it!" The Sea similarly balked at allowing
technology to tame her elemental might:
"Shall I let this scheming mortal
Shut with stone my shining portal,
45 Roy A. Watlington and Shirley H. Lincoln, eds., Disaster and Disruption in 1867: Hurricane,
Earthquake, and Tsunami in the Danish West Indies : A Collection ofAccounts and Reports ([St. Thomas,
V.I.]: Eastern Caribbean Center University of the Virgin Islands, 1997), 5-10, 37. On the Monongahela, see
"The Late Earthquake at St. Thomas," Harper's Weekly XII, no. 578 (1868). reprinted in Watlington and
Lincoln, eds., Disaster and Disruption in 1867: Hurricane, Earthquake, and Tsunami in the Danish West
Indies : A Collection ofAccounts and Reports, 31.
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Curb my tide and check my play,
Fence with wharves my shining bay?"
The "black-browed Hurricane" worried that ingenious Americans would use science to
reduce its awesome power by eliminating its most devastating feature, its
unpredictability, leading to its "... secret paths made clear // Published o'er the
hemisphere." These three forces of Nature then united to unleash their fury, wrecking the
island and Seward's hopes not only for expansion but also for construction. Harte's
poem underscored a deep ambivalence about the industrial growth of the United States
and its consequences on the natural world.46
Mark Twain ridiculed the plan as well. In "Information Wanted," written in
December 1867, Twain described an uncle who "wishes to settle down, and be quiet and
unostentatious" and who choses St. Thomas as his new home. A series of misfortunes
ensues. His money is stolen, along with the United States treasure used to purchase the
islands. He is afflicted with all seven of the island's tropical fevers. But the worst was
still to come. His farm is destroyed by a storm that "washed the most of it over to
Gibralter [sic]," an investment in mountain land collapses in an earthquake, a brick
factory crumbles into the maw of a hidden volcano, and a surveying expedition to find
some remaining place of solitude ends when a "tidal wave" washes his uncle's ship far
inland.47 While capitalizing on the island's misfortune, Twain's mocking essay errs in its
premise that Seward sought St. Thomas for its solitude and salubrity. Caribbean tourism
came a century later; the Secretary thought instead in terms of geography, strategy, and
steam power.
46 Bret Harte, "St. Thomas (a Geographical Survey, 1868)," in Poems and Two Men of Sandy Bar, a Drama
(Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1896).
47 Mark Twain, "Information Wanted (Washington, December 10, 1867)," in Mark Twain's Sketches, New
and Old. (Hartford, CT and Chicago, IL: The American Publishing Company, 1875).
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This popular ridicule, along with quiet Senate opposition to Seward's
expansionism, allowed the treaty to die without ratification. Seward, however, remained
confident in the value of the islands. "Nations are prone to postpone provisions for
distant contingencies," he sighed when he realized public support for the St. Thomas
purchase had waned.48
American interest in St. Thomas as a coaling station, however, continued
throughout the 19th century. A Minnesota attorney interested in American trade
exclaimed in 1892 that "[a] coaling station is now as necessary for a navy as a woodyard
and water tank for a railway." The issue was so important, he insisted, that it transcended
petty politics. "No party should vote against the means of protecting the American flag
and American people in foreign lands."49 Such opinions were widely disseminated and
the public reminded of the vital importance of coal to modern trade and security. "If a
coaling-station was urgently needed then for the avoidance of the restrictions of neutral
ports," wrote New York Tribune journalist Isaac N. Ford in 1893 in reference to the Civil
War, "it will be required in any future war in which the United States may engage. St.
Thomas, by virtue of its central position among the European possessions in America,
and its strategic relations with the Isthmus and Nicaragua Canal routes, and the courses of
trade with Brazil, would be an ideal coaling-station." 50
Nevertheless, the memory of hurricane and earthquakes tempered the opinion of
many naval officers. Prominent senior figures supported acquiring the islands in the
early 1890s, but with caveats. "But for the reputation St. Thomas has for earthquakes
48 Seward and Seward, William H. Seward; an Autobiography from 1801 to 1834. With a Memoir ofHis
Life, and Selections from His Letters, 370.
49 Patrick Cudmore, Buchanan's Conspiracy, the Nicaragua Canal, and Reciprocity (New York,: P.J.
Kenedy, 1892), 93-4.
50 Isaac Nelson Ford, Tropical America (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1893), 7.
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that would be my first choice," explained Captain N.H. Farquhar in 1891, "as it has more
natural advantages which make it impregnable to attack than any other harbor in that
section, and would therefore be less expensive to fortify." Commander A.S. Barker
similarly acknowledged how natural events doomed negotiations for the island: "[b]ut for
that unfortunate earthquake some years ago the important island of St. Thomas would
now be in our possession. It is just as valuable to us now as it was then." "It is a small
Gibraltar in itself," observed Commander C.M. Thomas, praising its suitability for
constructing dry docks and a coaling plant. "We ought to be quick to grab the chance for
securing this valuable site." Yet no officer desired the islands more, or had a higher
public profile, than the Navy's senior officer, Admiral of the Navy David Dixon Porter.
"Every provision is made for the coaling of large steamers," he said of the island, "and in
no other port of the West Indies can a vessel be coaled so rapidly as St. Thomas."51
How ships coaled at St. Thomas demonstrates how advanced steam technology
still depended on traditional sources of labor. Coaling at St. Thomas, like anywhere, was
a social process, facilitated by an abundance of cheap labor. This labor worked along
gendered lines. The retired Rear-Admiral Samuel R. Franklin recalled coaling frequently
in St. Thomas during the Civil War. "The ships were coaled by women," he observed,
"who formed a procession from the coal-pike, each on carrying a basket on her head. In
this way a ship was rapidly coaled."5 2 Island resident and booster Charles Edwin Taylor
encouraged his readers to watch the ships coal at midnight, where one might "watch the
dusky figures of hundreds of women, each with a basket of coal on her head, swarming
up the steamer's side busy as bees, and running back again with them empty, to be
5 All quotes from "St. Thomas Island for Our Naval Station," New York Herald, September 24 1891.
52 S.R. Franklin, Memories of a Rear-Admiral (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers,
1898), 178.
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refilled." Taylor lauded the women's industriousness and lauded their singing, "in a
quaint minor key.""53 If he could only express the women's labor in the language of the
picturesque, however, Taylor expressed the insight that a prosperous coaling port
depended upon storage facilities, a functioning harbor, and, of course, a supply of labor.
The value of a place included more than its location. At St. Thomas, the newest form of
energy remained bound entirely to the oldest.
Just as Seward simultaneously sought Caribbean naval stations in St. Thomas and
on San Domingo in the late 1860s, another Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, would
revive interest in those coaling stations in the late 1880s and early 1890s. By then,
American interest in acquiring a Caribbean coaling station had become more muscular.
Nevertheless, here too negotiations collapsed. This time, resistance came from the
people of island, not from within the United States.
Becoming Master of the Land and Sea
53 Charles Edwin Taylor, St. Thomas, as a Naval and Coaling Station (St. Thomas, D.W.I.: Printed by J.N.
Lightbourn, 1891), 12-3. Elsewhere, Taylor used the example of the coaling women to disprove common
stereotypes of Caribbean people. Meaningful labor produced purpose in life: "All this movement may
seem incredible to those who have been accustomed to associate life in the tropics with laziness and a
disinclination to exertion," he wrote, "especially when the negroes are concerned; give them work, and pay
them properly for it, and they will do it quite as promptly, and far more good-naturedly, than their white
brother in a like station of life, who, the slave perhaps of some trade union, is far worse off to-day than the
negro ever was at the time of slavery." Charles Edwin Taylor, Isaac B. Rich, and Rogers Memorial
Collection., An Island of the Sea : Descriptive of the Past and Present ofSt. Thomas, Danish West Indies :
With a Few Short Stories About Bluebeard's and Blackbeard's Castles (St. Thomas, D.W.I.: Published by
the Author at Taylor's Book-store, 1895), 34.
St. Thomas visitor Maturin M. Ballou also observed the coaling women. "A hundred women and
girls, wearing one scant garment reaching to the knees, are in line, and commence at once to trot on board
in single file, each one bearing a bushel basket of coal upon her head, weighing, say sixty pounds. Another
gang fill empty baskets where the coal is stored, so that there is a continuous line of negresses trotting into
the ship at one port and, after dumping their loads into the coal bunkers, out at the other, hastening back to
the source of supply for more." Ballou also noted their song, and evidently observed the women engaged
in "a firefly dance" after completing their night's labor. Maturin M. Ballou, Equatorial America:
Descriptive of a Visit to St. Thomas, Martinique, Barbadoes, and the Principal Capitals of South America
(Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1892), 29-31.
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Frederick Douglass believed that unbreakable bonds linked Haiti to the United States,
bonds strengthened by modem technology. "Measuring distance by time, improved
naval architecture and improved steam navigation," he explained to an audience in 1891,
"Haiti will one day be only three days from New York and thirty-six hours from Florida;
in fact, our next door neighbor." And a next door neighbor, according to Douglass,
demanded the development of political friendship between the two nations.54
This friendship, he explained, would benefit the citizens of both Haiti and the
United States. The existing demands of steam navigation and the eventual completion of
an isthmian canal, in particular, heralded mutual benefit. Haiti could profit from
increased trade and international importance, while the United States could acquire
access to the island's particular strategic advantages. Douglass looked particularly to the
M61e St. Nicholas. This harbor, tucked into the extreme northwest peninsula of
Hispaniola and facing Cuba to the west, offered a unique and strategically located harbor
for an American coaling station in the Caribbean. Douglass lauded Haiti's M1le, French
for "breakwater," with the now familiar appellation, "the Gibraltar of that country" for its
strategic position overlooking the Windward Passage and standing as "the natural
gateway of the commerce both of the new and the old world." The eventual completion
of an isthmian canal through Nicaragua would make the Mole more important still. "It is
seen" Douglass observed, "that the nation that can get it and hold it will be master of the
land and sea in its neighborhood."55
Elsewhere, Douglass described his support for the annexation of the entire island
of Santo Domingo, of which Haiti only occupied the western third, by observing that
54 "Lecture on Haiti," in Box 27, reel 17, Haiti folder 8 of 14, Frederick Douglass Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 2.
"5 Ibid., 5.
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"small nations are going out of fashion." In the place of petty nationalisms, he argued,
have stepped "[o]rganization, progress, [and] unification." But Douglass did not view
annexation only from the parochial perspective of Santo Domingo. Acquiring the island
offered advantages to the United States as well, the same advantages held by Britain in
India and Jamaica and Spain in Cuba. "Almost every great maratime [sic] nation in the
world, but our own," he wrote, "has some footing and foothold in the Caribbean sea."
Writing of expansion as bringing "freedom, knowledge and progress," the progress he
described remained inextricably tied to the politics and commerce of the sea.56
The United States, however, did not annex Haiti or acquire its M61e St. Nicholas
as a coaling station. This failed negotiation has suggested that the plan was insignificant,
but understood in the context of its time, it is clear this was not the case. Frederick
Douglass's role in these failed negotiations reveals the importance attached to acquiring
the M1le, and the continuing 19h century efforts of the United States to compensate for
its relative naval weakness in the Caribbean.
The American interest in the MOle St. Nicholas as a coaling station began as early
as 1868, when rumors reached the United States that the new Haitian government of
Major Sylvain Salnave had ceded the harbor to the U.S. The New York Times remained
skeptical that such a deal had been consummated or would ever come to pass. Although
the frequent turnovers of power in Haiti and neighboring Dominica tempted new
administrations to seek funds by disbursing their land to other nations, the Times noted
that "of the many sales and leases thus attempted, not one has ever been carried out, as no
56 Frederick Douglass, "Santo Domingo," in Box 28, reel 18, Santo Domingo folder 4 of 5, Frederick
Douglass Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (n.d.), 33-6.
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party remains in power long enough to accomplish its designs."57 These limitations did
not prevent various American administrations from approaching the Haitian government
for access to the M81e as a coaling station over the next several decades.
In 1870, the U.S. Senate was still considering the acquisition of a coaling station
on St. Thomas from Denmark or in Samana Bay or the M61e on Santo Domingo.
Residents of St. Thomas had recently voted some ten to one in favor of joining the United
States, while public sentiment in Dominica was largely against the proposal. The
consequences of acquiring harbors on either island, or acquiring the islands altogether,
remained unclear. The New York Times noted "that annexation of an island willing to
come is economy, but annexation of an unwilling island is bad economy in the end,
whatever the first or contract cost." The Times observed that while residents of some
urban areas of Santo Domingo approved of ceding a harbor to the United States, a
powerful nationalism prompted people in rural areas to oppose such suggestions
vehemently. On Santo Domingo, at least, the issue's prominence within the political
discourse of some insurgent groups suggested that pursuing the coaling station would
arouse overwhelming public opposition.5 8
Americans favoring naval expansion refused to let the issue go away, however,
and they renewed the question in earnest during the first presidential administration of
Grover Cleveland. Attention to the M81e had returned after the deposition of Haiti's long
serving President, Lycius Salomon in August 1888. As rival factions led by Generals
Francois L6gitime and Florvil Hyppolite struggled for political ascension, both looked
abroad for vital foreign aid to arm and support their activities. L6gitime turned to Haiti's
57 "West India Purchase," New York Times, August 18 1868.
ss "St. Thomas and San Domingo," New York Times, February 15 1870.
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traditional sponsor, France, which was quietly supported by Great Britain. The United
States, meanwhile, backed Hyppolite. This decision was both strategic and defensive. A
L6gitime victory might mean Haiti's cession of the Mole to France in return for the
nation's support, a possibility perceived as a potential threat to American aspirations for
hegemony in the Caribbean. Since the M6le was located along the shipping route from
the Atlantic to the proposed Nicaraguan canal, losing the Mole to France seemed
particularly worrisome. While obtaining a coaling station in the Caribbean would
support the U.S. Navy, the threat of France acquiring a station there motivated the
Americans more than any positive aspirations for a station for its own sake.5 9
Americans supported Hyppolite clandestinely. Firms in Boston and New York
supplied the Haitian General with arms, run through Legitime's naval blockade. When
Legitime's forces captured the Boston based blockade-runner Haytian Republic,
Cleveland's Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard sent American naval vessels to guard
"innocent merchantmen." By skirting American neutrality laws, Cleveland's government
managed to scuttle the French advantage in acquiring the M81e.60
This policy continued under the Republican administration of Benjamin Harrison.
In 1889, Harrison's Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Tracy, and Secretary of State,
James G. Blaine, together began presiding over a substantial building program within the
Navy. As fall approached, the Harrison administration embarked on a series of what the
New York Times called "small schemes of annexation." It would continue to press for the
M81e St. Nicholas and Samana Bay, as well as revive official interest in St. Thomas and
59 Myra Himelhoch, "Frederick Douglass and Haiti's Mole St. Nicolas," The Journal of Negro History LVI,
no. 3 (1971): 161-2.
60 Ibid.: 162.
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also Hawaii, all for use as naval coaling stations.61 The Washington Post attributed the
Secretaries' interest in Haitian ports to the growing naval construction. "Now that cruiser
after cruiser is being built ... the question of securing coaling stations becomes one of the
utmost importance." With the proximity of MOle St. Nicholas to British and French
interests in the Caribbean and its location near the path towards the prospective
Nicaraguan Canal, the Post asserted the wisdom of negotiating for use of the Mole-
leasing, if not ceding-for the United States.62 Rumors also spread around the U.S. that
the Harrison administration was secretly aiding Hyppolite in return for the cession of the
M1le.63
This interest in a Haitian coaling station ultimately drew the United States into the
island's domestic politics. In August 1889, Legitime was finally dislodged from office,
and in October, Hyppolite installed as Haiti's new President. Shortly thereafter, the
Americans returned to make good on the promise of a coaling station in return for their
support during the revolution.64
In the beginning of December 1889, Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi's
squadron--comprised of the Kearsarge, the Dolphin, and his flagship, the Galena-left
for a winter cruise in the West Indies. The Navy scheduled the M61e St. Nicholas as the
ships' primary destination, and sought the opening of negotiations with Hyppolite's new
government for an American coaling station there.65 Gherardi arrived at Port au Prince
61 "A New Harrison Policy: Various Small Schemes of Annexation Planned: Not Only the Mole St.
Nicholas, but the Island of St. Thomas Wanted--Possibility of Reviving the Treaty with Hawaii," New York
Times, September 23 1891.
62 "Out Interests in Hayti," Washington Post, July 20 1889.
63 "The Haytian Question: Are France and the United States Tangled up in It?," Washington Post, August
22 1889.
64 David Healy, James G. Blaine and Latin America (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press,
2001), 183-6.
65 "Admiral Gherardi's Cruise," New York Times, November 30 1889.
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on December 18, and sent the Dolphin ahead of the other ships to the examine the M81e.
Over the next several days, Gherardi met with the new President. When the Dolphin
returned from its reconnaissance, Gherardi boarded it and himself sailed to the M61e.
The meaning of the naval visit was clear to the residents of Port au Prince, and the
prospect of ceding the Mrle provoked considerable anxiety; when Gherardi arrived, the
discount rate of the country's paper currency increased from 14 percent to 30.66 When
Gherardi's negotiations with Hyppolite's government broke down in January 1890, the
New York Times decried that "all hope must now be abandoned of ever securing the Mole
St. Nicholas for a coaling station for the American Government" and placed the weight of
the blame on the newly accredited American Minister to Haiti, Frederick Douglass.67
Douglass had not sought an appointment to the diplomatic service. In return for
his campaigning for Harrison in 1888, he had desired, and on at least two occasions,
officially requested, a reappointment to his old position as Recorder of Deeds in
Washington, D.C. Harrison, however, wanted him for a foreign post. Douglass
suggested the exotic Cairo. Harrison replied with an offer to represent the United States
in Haiti. Douglass accepted the appointment, even amid the very ambiguous reaction it
received in both the white and black presses. Some praised Douglass for his past
accomplishments, others objected to sending a black man to represent the United States at
all, still others considered the minor post beneath him.68
When Gherardi began negotiations with Hyppolite's new government for the
M61e, Douglass actually had little involvement in the matter. Despite his keen interest in
American expansion and the acquisition of a coaling station in Haiti, during his first year
66 "Out Interests in Hayti."
67 "Mole St. Nicholas Is Lost to Us," New York Times, January 31 1890.68 Himelhoch, "Frederick Douglass and Haiti's Mole St. Nicolas," 164-5.
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at Port au Prince, Douglass had never received instructions to open negotiations for
harbor. All the more reason the diplomat was surprised by the arrival of the U.S.S.
Philadelphia on January 25 t , 1891 and bearing Admiral Gherardi and orders from
Washington to negotiate for the M81e.69
After Gherardi's arrival, Douglass found himself in a compromised position. The
Admiral had effectively usurped Douglass's position as the chief American representative
in Haiti. Not only did Gherardi announce his charge from Secretary of State Blaine to
negotiate for a coaling station at the MOle, but all that Douglass could determine of his
own instructions came indirectly through the Admiral as well. Nevertheless, Douglass
played the hand dealt him. He immediately arranged a meeting the following morning
with Antenor Firmin, Haiti's Minister of Foreign Affairs, and President Hyppolite to
discuss the coaling station matter.
Douglass entered the meeting as a junior partner to Gherardi. The Admiral took
charge of the discussion, and although neither American spoke French, only the
Admiral's translator was invited to attend, giving Gherardi an additional advantage over
the diplomat. At the meeting, Gherardi explained the desire of the United States to lease
the MOle St. Nicholas, alluding to the support, both political and material, that the U.S.
had leant to what became the new Haitian government during the recent revolution, and,
according to Douglass, "of certain promises made by the Haitian Provisional
Government, which now it was the desire of the Government at Washington to have
fulfilled." In his report to Secretary of State Blaine, Douglass praised Gherardi for his
69 "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 123 Confidential Diplomatic, 1/29/1891," in A Black Diplomat
in Haiti : The Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S. Minister Frederick Douglass from Haiti, 1889-1891, ed.
Norma Brown (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1977).
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"masterly manner" of diplomacy and noted that "[h]is presentation was marked by skill
and ability." 70
Cracks in the diplomatic solidarity emerged, however, even in this first meeting as
Gherardi laid the American claims on the table. While Gherardi insisted that Hyppolite's
government was "morally bound" to honor ambiguous promises for land in return for the
U.S.'s support of their revolution, Douglass reminded him that pressing this claim would
put the United States in the position of having purchased a coaling station for the price of
"plac[ing] our Government in an indefensible attitude before mankind as, in fact,
violently interfering by its navy with the affairs of a neighboring country and assisting
one faction against another." 7' As Firmin and Douglass were quicker to realize than
Gherardi, staking a claim on the M6le based on the very real material aid provided to
Hyppolite's revolution by the United States simultaneously acknowledged the unseemly,
and possibly illegal American interference in Haitian politics. Instead, Douglass asserted
that a concession of the M81e "was in the line of good neighborhood and advanced
civilization," building trust between the two countries and strengthening, not weakening,
the island. Douglass maintained "that national isolation was a policy of the past" and a
concession would allow the country "to touch the world at all points that make for
civilization and commerce." 72 Haiti's persistent resistance to leasing territory to foreign
powers "grew out of conditions which had long since ceased to exist," Douglass insisted,
70 Ibid.
7' Frederick Douglass, "[Essay]," in Box 31, reel 19, M61e St. Nicholas folder 1 of 4, Frederick Douglass
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 27.
72 Frederick Douglass, "Haiti and the United States. Inside History of the Negotiations for the M61e St.
Nicolas [Part I]," The North American Review CLIII, no. CCCCXVIII (1891): 343-4.
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adding that this "policy of Exclusion, once a source of safety, was now, under altered
conditions, a source of danger." 73
Firmin responded by inquiring into the basis for the American request. Did the
Americans believe leasing the M81e was it "an obligation" incurred from "promises
made" during Hyppolite's provisional term as president, as Gherardi seemed to claim?
Or was it Douglass's version, "a simple application from one friendly power to another
for a special accommodation"? Firmin denied that leasing the M61e could be an
obligation, and while he expressed his support for the lease "as an individual," his
opinion as a representative of the new administration complicated the matter. As the
conversation concluded, the Americans received a promise that the Hyppolite
government would support the lease as soon as the Haitian legislature permitted it.74
Two weeks later, the Americans received an unexpected reply from the Haitian
government. On the 16th of February, Minister Firmin suddenly cut off negotiations with
Gherardi for the M81e, insisting that no additional progress could be made unless the
Admiral presented a letter from the United States officially appointing him "a Special
Commissioner of the United States." Though Douglass, Gherardi's secretary and
translator Harry Huse, and most of all, Gherardi himself believed he already had such
authority, Douglass counseled him to seek a formal letter from the government to speed
the negotiations along. The Americans suspected Firmin was only trying to buy
additional time. Gherardi protested to the Minister, who replied that without such an
official appointment, any negotiation might bind the government of Haiti without
similarly binding the government of the United States, which might claim that any
73 "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 123 Confidential Diplomatic, 1/29/1891."
74 Ibid.
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promises made by the Admiral were not, in fact, in an official capacity representing the
United States. Only, according to Firmin, a letter from President Harrison to President
Hyppolite investing Gherardi with full diplomatic credentials would do.75
The American press asserted the rightness of their country's position. "The
reputation of the United States for fair dealing and our well-known reluctance to resort to
the bullying methods of other countries has shorn the situation of all that moral influence
that would otherwise be derived from the stay of our ships of war in Haitian ports," wrote
the New York Times as three American gun boats floated at anchor in the harbor of Port
au Prince during a lull in the negotiations for the M61e. 76 The Times was more than
willing to forgive Gherardi for the possible failure of the M6le negotiations, noting that
"elements that have been arrayed against him have made his task one of great difficulty,"
with the subtext that the most difficult of these "elements" was the presence of Douglass
himself.77 The Times suggested that the U.S. diplomats in Haiti instruct President
Hyppolite "that the vast interests of the United States demand that the harbor of the Mole
should be in our hands; let him appreciate, in short," the newspaper continued, "that the
United States is here to stay." 78 Further, it advocated granting Gherardi the full
75 "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 132 Special and Confidential Diplomatic, 2/18/1891," in A
Black Diplomat in Haiti : The Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S. Minister Frederick Douglass from Haiti,
1889-1891, ed. Norma Brown (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1977).
76 "In West Indian Waters: The Vessels of Our Squadron Now Scattered," New York Times, March 26 1891.
77 Ibid. Douglass himself suspected that the author of these anonymous Times dispatches was Gherardi
himself, or someone writing with the Admiral's personal approval. Although the Times by-lines suggested
a correspondent writing from Port au Prince, Douglass observed that the author only filed reports when
Gherardi's squadron was at anchor. See Douglass, "[Essay]," 3-6. This essay appears to be an early, and
more forceful and accusatory, draft of the version Douglass ultimately published in The North American
Review, supra.
78 "In West Indian Waters: The Vessels of Our Squadron Now Scattered."
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diplomatic credentials requested by Minister Firmin with the expected result that "the
Mole will be at our feet in twenty-four hours." 79
During the spring of 1891, relations between Douglass and Gherardi continued to
strain. Douglass learned that Gherardi had written a letter to Secretary Blaine claiming
that Douglass, in his official role, had "recommended and advised the seizure by the
United States of the M81e for the purpose of making of it a naval coaling station."
Douglass dismissed the accusation as "amazingly inaccurate," claiming that it "is
calculated to do me marked and startling injustice." Douglass admitted, however, to
stating "that if the United States should take the MOle for a coaling station, the
Government of Haiti would thus be relieved from assuming a responsibility which, in
view of the well known sentiments of the Haitian people on the subject, that Government
might deem it unwise to assume." Douglass flatly denied that this statement implied that
he desired taking the Mole by force.80
Gherardi and Douglass waited in Haiti for the arrival of the Admiral's official
credentials from Washington for two months, and during part of that time, Gherardi left
the capital. Douglass observed that the long period of waiting coupled with Gherardi's
leaving the city stimulated the spread of many pernicious rumors about the intentions of
the United States. "It was said that Admiral Gherardi had left Port au Prince in anger,"
Douglass recalled, "and had gone to take possession of the M61e without further parley;
that the American flag was already floating over our new naval station; that the United
States wanted the M81e as an entering wedge to obtaining possession of the whole island"
79 Ibid.
80 "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 152 Diplomatic, 4/20/1891," in A Black Diplomat in Haiti:
The Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S. Minister Frederick Douglass from Haiti, 1889-1891, ed. Norma
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158
and so on.81 The Admiral was not, however, content to wait around Port au Prince.
Aboard the Philadelphia, he had been cruising around the island, stopping at Gonaives
and the M81e, as well as nearby Kingston, Jamaica. Despite his earnest intention on
pressuring the Haitians for the M81e, Gherardi remained oblivious to the consequences
his actions were having on the ever important public opinion.8 2
The seriousness, or desperation, of the United States became clear as the
negotiations for the M61e descended into gunboat diplomacy. On April 18 h, the warships
Boston, Atlanta, Yorktown, and Chicago--the latter carrying Rear Admiral John G.
Walker--arrived in Port au Prince where they joined Gherardi's Philadelphia. The
Kearsarge and Enterprise were expected to join them imminently. Walker's "White
Squadron" made the American naval presence in Port au Prince, in the words of the New
York Times, "the most formidable American fleet that has assembled in any one harbor
since the [Civil] war."83 Walker gave neither Douglass nor the Haitian government an
explanation for his visit, but rumors spread quickly through the city. The "secret"
negotiations had evidently become known, if only in a general way. Douglass reported
the arrival of the ships as fomenting "a feeling of apprehension, anxiety and even of
alarm, beyond anything of the kind that I have ever before personally known to exist
here." As Douglas read the country, popular sentiment felt uncomfortably squeezed
between two equally unpleasant options: if the M61e were to be ceded, the government
that permitted it would "fall under the crush of popular condemnation," while if the
government resisted, they feared that the naval warships would simply take the M61e on
81 Douglass, "Haiti and the United States. Inside History of the Negotiations for the M61e St. Nicolas [Part
I]," 452.
82 Ibid.: 452-4.
83 "Home Again from Haiti: Arrival of Rear Admiral Gherardi and His Flagship," New York Times, May 17
1891.
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their own anyway. As Douglas noted in his official dispatch, "in either case internal
disorders, violence and revolutionary uprisings will follow." By now, Douglass began to
insist that his government think through the potential consequences of its actions.84
The newly arrived American warships also brought Gherardi's updated
commission from New York with President Harrison's certification to negotiate with the
Haitian government for the M61e. Significantly, the new orders differed from the old.
Gherardi's original charge had required that Haiti agree not to lease any portion of their
territory or provide any special privileges to any power besides the United States so long
as the U.S. maintained a naval coaling station at the M61e. In contrast, the new one
focused on acquiring only the naval station there without the restrictive terms originally
imposed. It also charged both the Admiral and the Minister with negotiating for the
harbor. Douglass insisted that the new, conditions-free instruction superseded the old,
restrictive ones, but Gherardi disagreed and insisted on pressing for the original terms.
Douglass would later attribute part of the failure of the negotiations to this decision.85
On April 21st, the Americans met with Firmin, who acknowledged Gherardi's
new appointment, but insisted that he could only negotiate further after receiving word
from President Hyppolite. 6 Two days later, word was received, though not the word the
Americans had hoped for. In a hurried telegram, Douglass notified Secretary Blaine in
84 "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 154 Diplomatic, 4/21/1891," in A Black Diplomat in Haiti :
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85 Douglass, "Haiti and the United States. Inside History of the Negotiations for the M61e St. Nicolas [Part
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Washington that "Hayti has declined lease of M1le." 87 Firmin explained in his official
letter that the Haitian government could not accept the American terms on the lease of the
M81e St. Nicholas, in particular the demand that while the United States lease the M81e,
Haiti refrain from leasing any other "port, harbor or other territory in its dominions or
grant any special privilege or rights of use to any other Power, State or Government,"
precisely the original terms Gherardi had insisted on pursuing. Furthermore, Firmin
acknowledged the domestic political difficulties created by the arrival of the American
warships. Firmin insisted that his government had to avoid the suggestion that it buckled
under threat of force. If, as Douglass would later imply, acquiring the M61e was
impossible from the outset, Gherardi's bluster provided Hyppolite's government with
plausible-and diplomatic-reasons for declining the American offer.88
In early May, Douglass reported to Washington that Haitian newspapers had
taken up the M81e St. Nicholas issue with a passion, "practically calling upon the people
to be prepared to resort to the most extreme measures to prevent the least occupation,
under any pretext whatever, of Haitian territory by a foreign power." Meanwhile, the
Haitian newspaper Le Peuple began attacking the United States, in Douglass's words, "on
account of the prejudice there existing against persons of African origin." To quell
discontent, the Hyppolite government, through Minister Firmin, officially declared that
no portion of Haitian territory would be granted to another nation. Announcing the
government statement in Le Moniteur, the Haitian administration assured its people that
87 "Frederick Douglass to Secretary of State, Telegram, 4/23/1891," in A Black Diplomat in Haiti: The
Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S. Minister Frederick Douglass from Haiti, 1889-1891, ed. Norma Brown
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all negotiations with the United States were friendly, that only policy and constitutional
restrictions limited the continuation of negotiations, and that ultimately, only the
legislature could approve such a deal in any event.89
Even after the Haitian rejection of the coaling station plan, Douglass pursued it.
On April 24 th, Douglass met with Firmin to inquire whether the removal of American
warships and the elimination of the clause restricting the island nation from leasing ports
to other powers would allow the reopening of negotiations. Although he reported Firmin
as considering these new circumstances, the minister unequivocally declined to begin
further talks and called the matter "closed." 90
In public as well, the Haitian government sealed their decision. On May 3,
President Hyppolite held his monthly "audience" with Haitian elites. He assured them
that any accusation that his government sanctioned the leasing of Haitian territory was
wildly incorrect, and specifically that any intimation that his government had earlier
assured the United States that it would lease the M61e was false. Calling rumors to the
contrary "propagandism" and promising to print all official correspondence on the matter
in the government organ, Hyppolite insisted on his solidarity with the Haitian people. "I
am not white," he said, according to a witness reporting the speech to Douglass, "I belong
to the same race as you do; the day when there should be a question of such an act, I
should prefer to see this country disappear like Gomorrah." Distorting the nature of the
89 "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 159 Diplomatic, 5/2/1891 and Enclosure No. 2," in A Black
Diplomat in Haiti : The Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S. Minister Frederick Douglass from Haiti, 1889-
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negotiations to his benefit, Hyppolite demonstrated how domestic politics had clearly and
predictably taken charge of foreign policy. 91
Private frustrations at the failure of negotiations for the M81e quickly became
rumors of Douglass' inadequacy, and rumors just as quickly were reported as facts. The
Washington Post reprinted a piece from the New York Recorder, claiming that the
collapse of negotiations would soon lead to "the probable recall of Minister Douglass,
whom the Haytians regard very unfavorably, desiring a white minister from the United
States." This account was wildly inaccurate, echoing old claims that Haiti was unhappy
with Douglass on account of his race, but the article claimed that "[n]egotiations failed
because of this state of affairs." 92
An already ambivalent American press turned on Douglass after the failure to
acquire the Haitian coaling station. Douglass recounted how his old friend and ally, the
New York Tribune, began writing that it "regrets that I have been 'blurting out' state
secrets."93 Douglass rejected the scorn heaped upon him by the press and their
accusations that he compromised the negotiations for the United States. The hand of the
United States was not revealed by him, he protested, but by the press at every moment
during the delicate negotiations. If the Tribune, or any other paper genuinely intended to
protect that national interest, their calls to discretion were directed at the wrong corner
and came too late. "It should have come when the white squadron was yet in the waters
of Haiti," Douglass fumed. "It should have come when Rear Admiral Gherardi was sent
91 "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 164 Diplomatic, 5/7/1891," in A Black Diplomat in Haiti : The
Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S. Minister Frederick Douglass from Haiti, 1889-1891, ed. Norma Brown
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as Commissioner to Haiti. It should have come when the salt water writers were wielding
their pens against me in the leading papers of the country. It should have come when the
public mind was being poisoned by lengthy editorials and anonymous defamers." And
on he railed at a press determined to make him "a cowardly scapegoat." 94
In September 1891, Douglass lashed out at his critics in a scathing two part essay
in The North American Review detailing his role in the M81e negotiations. He wrote "not
only as a personal vindication from undeserved censure, but as due to the truth of
history.""95 Douglass attacked those who accused him of squandering his first year in
Haiti, so jeopardizing an American hold on the harbor that Rear Admiral Gherardi was
dispatched from Washington to salvage the negotiations. He balked at the idea that his
supposed failure was attributable to his race, mocking his critics who suggested "it
monstrous to compel black Haiti to receive a minister as black as herself.""96 If Douglass
had done anything wrong, it was in allowing himself to see the national perspectives of
both the United States and Haiti together. "Is the weakness of a nation a reason for our
robbing it?" Douglass asked. "Are we to take advantage, not only of its weakness, but of
its fears? Are we to wring from it by dread of our power what we cannot obtain by
appeals to its justice and reason?'"97
Douglass insisted that the heart of matter rested in nationalism, and the
overpowering reluctance of Hyppolite's government to risk the ire of the Haitian people
and thus risk yet another revolution. Moreover, Douglass insisted that the proud boasts
of New York's large newspapers that "once in possession of the M1le, the United States
94 Ibid., 2.
95 Douglass, "Haiti and the United States. Inside History of the Negotiations for the M81e St. Nicolas [Part
I]," 337.
96 Ibid.: 337-8.
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would control the destiny of Haiti," coupled with threatening gunboat diplomacy
similarly did more to doom negotiations than advance them.98
To the accusation that he could not possibly comprehend the significance of the
M81e to the United States, Douglass caustically replied that he had advocated the U.S.
acquisition of a naval station in the Caribbean "when some of these writers were in their
petticoats." The rest of the world possessed naval stations in the Caribbean, he observed,
and he believed the United States ought to have one too. Douglass's annexationist
impulse had been leashed while the nation maintained slavery, "[b]ut since its abolition"
he wrote, "I have gone with him who goes farthest for such extension." 99 As to his
neglect of the matter during the first year of his appointment, he asserted that he had
never been charged with such a project, and "[w]here no duty was imposed no duty
neglected."' 10
Regarding the Haitian nationalism that overpowered negotiations for the M61e,
Douglass concluded that his expectations of Haitian willingness to concede the harbor
were mistaken, and that neither peacefully nor by violence would a Haitian government
permit the M61le to fall into the hands of another country. "It could not be done by any
government without costing the country revolution and bloodshed."1'' Douglass rejected
the histrionics of the press as "neither reasonable nor creditable." The island was under
no obligation to lease the harbor, and had every right as a sovereign state to refuse.' 02
Importantly, both Douglass and his critics in the press agreed that the naval and coaling
98 Ibid., no. CCCCXIX: 452-4. "Frederick Douglass to James Blaine, No. 155 Diplomatic, 4/21/1891."
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station at the M6le was in the national interest; they disagreed on how to approach the
issue and on why negotiations had failed.
Admiral Gherardi and the Philadelphia had a difficult time returning to the United States.
During its formal steam trials, the ship had reached speeds of 20 knots per hour for four
hours straight. While returning from Haiti, the maximum speed was 14 knots per hour,
and an average of 12Y2. At one point, an exasperated and impatient Gherardi, according
to the New York Times, "threatened to place the Chief Engineer under arrest for
disobedience of orders." Although barnacles growing upon the hulls of ships often
contributed to reducing speeds, an examination of the ship upon docking in New York
revealed no significant marine growth. Instead, the ship seemed to be hindered by two
other obstacles, both related to the constraints of steam power. First, the ship's original
steam trials had a single, specially selected fireman tending each of the thirty-two
furnaces. Upon returning from Haiti, only twenty-four firemen were available, and they
were divided into three shifts, leaving only eight per shift and forcing each man to tend
four furnaces. This labor, for a crew already exhausted from four months straight aboard
the ship in a tropical heat, contributed to the slow steaming.
Second, and at least as significantly, the Philadelphia burned an inferior grade of
coal. This coal, a variety of Cardiff coal from Wales, purchased in St. Thomas and
Kingston, Jamaica, according to the Times, "was mere refuse." Most of it was at least
two years old and much degraded from exposure to the weather. "when put aboard the
cruiser it was little else than sand," recorded the Times. "Once on the fire, it would sizzle
and flash, produce little or no heat, and consequently no steam. With such coal to handle,
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the Philadelphia's firemen were compelled to shovel incessantly. They broke down,
unable to stand the strain. Men were sent down from the deck to assist them, but being
unskilled in the fireroom were of little or no use."' ' 3 The voyage was a palpable
reminder of the limits of steam technology and the constraints placed upon ocean travel
by coal, precisely the limitations Americans hoped a major Caribbean coaling station
would overcome.
After returning to the United States, Gherardi was asked by a reporter if the
United States might still acquire a Haitian coaling station. According to the press
account, "he smiled and suggested that the inquiry be directed to some on in that land."
He suggested that a future revolution might well reverse the American opportunities for
strategic expansion.104
On July 30, 1891, the State Department announced it had accepted Douglass's
resignation, a fact the now former Minister learned from a Washington Post reporter
visiting him at his home in Anacostia. The reporter recorded the interview. A startled
Douglass insisted that until he learned from the State Department his resignation was
official, his comments must remain circumspect. "You must have noticed, however,"
Douglass continued, "that I have been most vigorously assaulted by a number of
newspapers, who have charged me with incapacity, slothfulness, and want of interest in
the Mole St. Nicholas matter. Other papers and persons have asserted that a white man
103 "Only Fourteen Knots an Hour: Why the Philadelphia Was So Long Coming from Haiti," New York
Times, June 26 1891.
104 "Home Again from Haiti: Arrival of Rear Admiral Gherardi and His Flagship."
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could accomplish more than a black man. All these things probably had their effect upon
this government."
"What foundation did these charges have?" asked the reporter.
"Absolutely none," came the reply. "I do not believe I am incapacitated. I know
that I worked diligently, and as for want of interest, why, I have been advocating the
acquisition of the Mole St. Nicholas for twenty years. Since the abolition of slavery I
have always contended that the United States should secure a freehold in islands of the
Caribbean Sea or in that vicinity. I split with my dear friend, Charles Sumner, on that
question. Great Britain, France, Holland, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain are already
there, and we should have a supply depot near at hand. After working as hard as I did to
secure the accession of the mole it was very exasperating not to succeed."
Douglass denied his race impacted his ability to negotiate, and recounted the
series of diplomatic successes he enjoyed. "But why did you not succeed with the
negotiations for the mole?" continued the reporter.
"For several reasons," answered Douglass. After recounting the opposition Haiti
faced as the first republic of freed slaves, he noted that "as a dog will scratch his neck
after his collar has been removed, Haiti observes a superstition that has no further
significance. It is very hard to make the Haitians believe that the United States are not
trying to take advantage of them." Moreover, he asserted that "conspirators" in both the
U.S. and Jamaica were prepared to foment a further revolution in Haiti, and merely
awaited an opportune moment to attack the Hyppolite government. Selling, leasing, or
otherwise alienating Haitian territory might provide the perfect cover for such a claim, a
fact well known to both Minister Firmin and Hyppolite himself. And while Douglass
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claimed he "argued with the Haitians that if the mole was not peacefully ceded to us, it
might fall into our hands in some other way," he could not get them to concede. 10 5
National pride proved too powerful an obstacle to acquiring the M1le in 1891.
But the episode demonstrates the seriousness, if also the clumsiness, with which the
United States sought a Caribbean coaling station in the early 1890s. By the end of the
decade and after a war, that interest in strategically located depots for coal would lead
Americans to another natural harbor across the Windward Passage at Cuba's
Guantainamo Bay.
Chemistry, Steam Engines, and Coal Mines
Negotiating for Caribbean and Pacific coaling stations were not the only way Americans
attempted to solve the Navy's persistent problems locating fuel outside the United States
in the late 19th century. Alongside diplomatic efforts, Americans employed science and
technology to alleviate the strain of diplomacy while still maintaining the activities of the
fleet. These technical efforts may be grouped into three approaches: practical chemical
analysis, engineering developments, and geological exploration. The 19th century search
for coaling stations must be understood in this broader context. Few expansionists sought
islands in the Caribbean or Pacific for the sake of expansion alone. For naval officers,
their civilian leadership, and their supporters in Congress, the broader question involved
matching American Navy capabilities with the possibilities afforded by steam technology
in the context of other maritime powers.
105 "Fred Douglass Resigns: His Successor to Haiti Will Probably Be a White Man," Washington Post,
August 11 1891.
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Practical chemistry provided one approach to improving the operation of naval
steam engines, and throughout the middle and late 19th century, Americans working for
the Navy explored which coals were most suited for raising steam in marine engines. It
was well known that every coal burned differently, giving off different amounts of heat
and leaving characteristic residues. In the 1840s, the Navy sought to determine which
American coals best suited steaming. This research began with an exhaustive 1844 study
by the Harvard trained chemist Walter R. Johnson. His massive, 600 page report
announced the performance of coals from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and
elsewhere. Johnson observed that his "primary object" was "that of increasing the
efficiency of the navy" and noted how advancing "public defence" [sic] would stimulate
other American industries that depended on coal for fuel. For Johnson, the Navy served
as the agent that stimulated national economic growth. Not only did coal provide the
power for naval steam engines themselves, he believed, but it was needed for the larger
industry of producing engines and for building iron hulled ships as well. Those
commercial vessels would carry manufactured goods similarly produced with coal fired
steam power as well, providing an additional application of his research. So thoroughly
did the maritime consumption of coal reverberate through the American economy that
Johnson asserted "that few subjects of a practical nature are more deeply and
immediately interesting to the public." 10 6
Johnson's research into coal for naval use in the 1840s was widely celebrated by
American politicians and industrialists as a propitious foundation for modem economic
growth. At least one coal producer published a promotional brochure based on Johnson's
106 Walter R. Johnson, A Report to the Navy Department of the United States, on American Coals
Applicable to Steam Navigation, and to Other Purposes, Senate Doc. No. 386, 28th Cong., 1st. sess.
(1844).
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results, advertising the consistently high performance of its product.'0 7 Consumers of
coal similarly saw the value of his research. After the chemist exhausted his research
funds, over sixty prominent citizens of Massachusetts, including numerous railroad and
manufacturing executives, petitioned Congress in 1850 to renew its support of Johnson's
coal investigations, citing newly uncovered coal fields, the proliferation of railroads and
steamships, and burgeoning industry-all amounting to a doubling of American coal
consumption in just seven years. 10 8
The year 1850 also saw Johnson himself publishing a second volume of coal
research, this one privately funded and not targeted solely at maritime consumption. The
federal government quickly acknowledged its significance. The Senate's Committee on
Public Lands requested that the government purchase 15,000 copies to distribute
throughout the nation. Americans in every state would benefit from information about
American coal, argued the committee. "The salt of their daily food is manufactured; their
iron, zinc, and copper are smelted; their locomotives, steamboats, and manufactories are
propelled; their food is prepared, by its aid, and their dwellings made habitable by its
genial influence."' 0 9 Before the mid-19th century, Johnson noted, only the residents of
regions denuded of alternate sources of fuel or subject to bitter, cold weather took an
interest in coal. Industrialization began to broaden this interest. For Johnson, three areas
stood out: the role of coal in metallurgy, its combustion in steam engines, and steam
navigation, for "especially since the practicability of navigating the ocean by steam was
107 Abstract of Professor Johnson's Report to the Secretary of the Navy, of the United States, Respecting
Forest Improvement Coal, (New York: George F. Nesbitt, 1845).108 Memorial of Citizens of Massachusetts, Praying That Provision Be Made for Continuing the
Experiments on American Coal Commenced by Professor Johnson in 1843, Senate Misc. No. 117, 31st.
Cong., 1st. sess. (1850).
109 Solon Borland, Report: The Committee on Public Lands, to Whom Was Referred the Following
Resolution... Report, Sen. Rep. Com. No. 51, 31st. Cong., 1st. sess. (1850).
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discovered-COAL has assumed for all nations, in all climates, an importance which, a
century ago, had not entered into the conceptions of men."'10 By analyzing different
varieties of coal for their chemical composition and behavior in steam engines-and
publicizing his results widely-Johnson hoped to educate his contemporaries on how to
make the best use of new technology. Based on his research, the Navy began burning
high carbon anthracite coal almost exclusively aboard its ships, a policy that fit Johnson's
research but complicated naval transportation; by a geographic and geological quirk, the
world's greatest abundance of anthracite coal was found in eastern Pennsylvania, and in
few other places of commercial value anywhere else in the world. Until the mid- 1880s,
distributing this anthracite proved the greatest obstacle for commercial and naval
American vessels.
Discovering which varieties of American coal burned best in naval steam engines
was only the beginning, however, for the question remained whether the steam engines
themselves could be designed to maximize the characteristics of particular coals. Naval
engineers sought more efficient engines. Engines that burned coal more efficiently could
steam farther on the same quantity of coal and thus require fewer stops-and fewer
coaling stations. Nearly ten years after Johnson concluded his experiments, in 1859,
Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, a Chief Engineer in the Navy, initiated a series of
experiments on American coal that quickly led him to re-design naval steam engines.
Isherwood's research began when Pennsylvania's Trevorton Coal Company petitioned
the Navy to investigate the quality of its semi-anthracite coal, hoping to bring it into
competition with coal the Navy was already purchasing. The task of evaluating the coal
110 Johnson, The Coal Trade ofBritish America, with Researches on the Characters and Practical Values of
American and Foreign Coals, 5.
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fell to Isherwood, who began a series of experiments at New York's Navy Yard in which
he investigated the relative efficiencies of three types of coal: the two already supplied to
the Yard under contract, Pennsylvania's Blackheath Anthracite and Maryland's
Cumberland semi-bituminous, as well as Trevorton's semi-anthracite. "The importance
of these experiments can scarcely be exaggerated" observed Isherwood, "when the
immense amount of these coals consumed in generating steam is considered." By
measuring the heat-generation of these coals on an actual steam boiler (of the Yard's
blacksmith shop), Isherwood sought to understand the characteristics of coal in actual
conditions rather than laboratory experiments, which were more common."11
Isherwood compared the coals in six categories he considered most relevant for
maritime use. These categories included how quickly the coals ignited, how well they
maintained their shape amid the jostling ever-present in coal transportation and handling,
how little smoke they exuded (little smoke both reduced the fouling of ships and
prevented revealing a warship to enemies at a distance), how little waste they produced
upon combustion, how efficiently they raised steam, and finally, how densely they could
be stored within the limited space available on ships. Isherwood did not endorse one coal
over the others as the conclusively best fuel; each had different advantages in the six
categories he analyzed. Nevertheless, Isherwood preferred anthracite coal abovd all.' 12
These coal experiments warmed Isherwood up to a much more important, and
ultimately contentious set of experiments. "The second paper is a sequel to the first," he
wrote of another experiment of 1859. Rather than investigate coal, this time he looked at
1" B. F. Isherwood, Engineering Precedents for Steam Machinery; Embracing the Performances of
Steamships, Experiments with Propelling Instruments, Condensers, Boilers, Etc., Accompanied by Analyses
ofthe Same (New York,: H. Bailli6re;, 1859), V. 2, vii.
2 Ibid., 29-35.
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the engines that consumed it. Isherwood's problem involved how to burn coal
efficiently. A typical steam engine burned coal to boil water. The boiled water-
steam--expanded, and the force generated by this expansion pushed a piston in a cylinder
in the steam engine. The steam was then cooled and condensed and the piston returned to
its original position. The movement of the piston, up and down, provided the utility of
the engine: by attaching the piston to different devices, its linear motion could be turned
into the rotation of a ship's paddle wheel, a railroad's wheels, the motion of machines in
a textile factory, or just about any other mechanical motion." 3
Steam power, however, depended on a supply of coal, and aboard ships, space
was always at a premium. Engineers sought any technical innovation that could extract
additional power from the same amount of coal. Since James Watt in the late 18th
century, steam engineers had investigated whether fuel might be saved by applying the
principles of physics. These engineers used the term "working steam expansively," and
called the device that accomplished it a "cut-off," for it arrested the flow of steam into the
engine's cylinder before the piston was entirely raised. In principal, the momentum of
the smaller quantity of expanding steam would still propel the piston, but with gradually
decreasing pressure. Using less steam to raise the piston meant conserving valuable coal
and engine manufacturers made extravagant claims for these devices. 114 Isherwood
observed that in the U.S., "certificates abound upon certificates of savings of fuel of from
25 to 50 per centum" through the use of cut-offs. According to Isherwood, these claims
113 For an influential description of steam engine design in the 19t century, see William John Macquorn
Rankine, A Manual of the Steam Engine and Other Prime Movers, 5th, revised ed. (London: Charles
Griffin and Company, 1870).
114 For descriptions of the principal of working steam expansively, see John Bourne, Handbook of the
Steam-Engine (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1865), 183-5, Robert Wallace, The History of the
Steam-Engine, from the Second Century before the Christian Era to the Time of the Great Exhibition
(London: John Cassell, 1852), 68-70, Paul R. Hodge, Analytical Principles and Practical Application of the
Expansive Steam Engine (London: John Williams & Co., 1849).
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offered "the most exaggerated nonsense" served "by interested sellers and believed in by
duped buyers," increasing both the price and complexity of marine engines without, he
insisted, actually saving any fuel. His experiments determined that the coal savings of
working steam expansively was far lower than usually claimed. Real savings, he
believed, would come from a practical understanding of steam engines and how they
consumed coal.' 15
These experiments proved contentious. Isherwood was attacked both during and
after the Civil War by civilian critics and line officers in the Navy who assailed him for
his novel naval engine designs. A lawyer and would-be engine designer named Edward
N. Dickerson, for example, blasted Isherwood for suggesting that working steam
expansively with cut-offs failed to improve engine efficiencies as claimed. Dickerson
preferred the older designs that included cut-offs, like the engine of the sloop of war
Iroquois, to Isherwood's engines. "Such as the Iroquois," he wrote, "weigh less, take less
room, and cost vastly less money than these abortions do, to produce the same power; so
that it is economy of money, space, and weight, to alter them-to say nothing of coal."" 16
As Isherwood and others continued to push for newer steam engines, older
officers seemed to wish for a simpler time without the complexities of steam. Then
Vice-Admiral David Dixon Porter, for example, famously issued orders in 1869 requiring
that all naval vessels be capable of sail power and insisting that sail be used as the
primary mode of locomotion. Any use of steam was to be thoroughly explained to the
115 Isherwood, Engineering Precedents for Steam Machinery; Embracing the Performances of Steamships,
Experiments with Propelling Instruments, Condensers, Boilers, Etc., Accompanied by Analyses of the
Same, vii-viii.
116 Edward N. Dickerson, The Navy of the United States. An Exposure oflts Condition, and the Causes of
Its Failure, Contained in a Speech Delivered to a Jury in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
before Chief-Justice Carter (New York: John Gray & Green, 1864), 5.
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department. The rising status of engineers, and the waning authority of officers who
grew up in an age of sail, certainly contributed to this conflict. 17 Nevertheless, the
supposed conservatism of older naval officers misunderstands the larger geopolitical
context in which officers like Porter operated. Far from rejecting steam, the Admiral
spent decades after the Civil War supporting the acquisition of coaling stations around
the world. His orders to use sail reflected not innate conservatism but his concern about
the limited availability and high cost of coal.
Some Americans turned the U.S. lack of coaling stations from a liability into an
asset. If conventional naval authorities believed that a modern navy required coaling
stations, and if European colonial powers either had them or had little ideological
difficulty in pursuing them, some navalists in the United States looked for an alternate
path. Instead of foreign bases, some Americans turned to the genius of invention. If the
United States lacked coaling stations or the political will to acquire them, reasoned some,
what was to stop the invention of engines and refueling systems to eliminate the need for
them? That is, could technology be developed to erase the constraints of geography and
international politics?
After the Civil War, Isherwood would continue championing technological ways
to conserve valuable coal. In 1881, Isherwood described to the Secretary of the Navy a
peculiar new invention by John Gamgee, a member of a scientifically prolific English
family and who was then visiting the United States to consult on a variety of public
117 See, for instance, Edward William Sloan, Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, Naval Engineer; the Years as
Engineer in Chief 1861-1869 (Annapolis,: United States Naval Institute, 1966), Lance C. Buhl, "Mariners
and Machines: Resistance to Technological Change in the American Navy, 1865-1869," Journal of
American History 61, no. 3 (1974): especially 705.
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health matters.' 118 Gamgee had proposed what he called the "zeromotor," a device that
produced mechanical motion not by the combustion of conventional fuels like coal, but
by employing the heat latent in ordinary water at room temperature to boil pressurized
ammonia. As Isherwood noted in his report, the consequences of such a machine were
enormous, especially to the U.S. Navy. An engine that ran without coal "would produce
an industrial and consequently social and political revolution equal to what was effected
by the introduction of the steam engine."' 19 The zeromotor would, specifically, free the
Navy from pursuing coaling stations abroad: straightforward technology, not messy
politics or ideology, would shape the future, according to the hopeful Isherwood. No
longer would the United States operate with the handicap of lacking coaling stations, and
no longer would European navies maintain a strategic superiority over the U.S. fleet. "If
coal ... can be dispensed with," Isherwood noted, "we are at once placed on an equality
in this respect, and our cruisers enabled to penetrate the remotest seas as easily as those
belonging to countries having possessions there." His description was vague, but
enthusiastic, asking that the Navy offer Gamgee the use of the Washington Navy Yard
for his research. 120
Isherwood maintained that the zeromotor was "far from chimerical." Still, other
inventions of the 1890s and 1910s to facilitate coaling at sea appear more conventional
118 Ruth D'Arcy Thompson, The Remarkable Gamgees : A Story ofAchievement (Edinburgh: Ramsay Head
Press, 1974), 157-72, especially 66. For Gamgee's original patent, see alsoJohn Gamgee, "Thermo-
Dynamic Engine," in Google Patents, ed. United States Patent Office (U.S.A.: 1881).
119 B.F. Isherwood, "The Gamgee Perpetual Motion," Scientific American XLIV, no. 21 (1881).
120 Ibid. For more on Isherwood's contentious career in the Navy, see Brendan Patrick Foley, "Fighting
Engineers: The U.S. Navy and Mechanical Engineering, 1840-1905" (Ph.D. Thesis, M.I.T., 2003), 134-45,
Sloan, Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, Naval Engineer; the Years as Engineer in Chief 1861-1869. Just a
year later, the Secretary of the Navy would explain the importance of coaling stations by noting that "[i]t is
far better, and much more economical, that our vessels should be supplied with coal at coaling stations
owned and controlled by the Navy Department, than to be compelled to pay the prices often exacted from
them in foreign ports, where they are frequently imposed upon by extortionate monopolists." Better, still,
though, to dispense with needing such stations at all. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,
H.exdoc.1/9, 47th Cong., 2nd. sess. (1882).
177
by comparison.121 The North Atlantic flagship San Francisco and the steamer Kearsarge
tested one such device in 1893. It involved connecting the vessels with a cable and
sending two hundred pound sacks of coal from one ship to the other. Under the carefully
designed circumstances of the experiment-a calm sea and a short distance between the
vessels-the delivery proceeded slowly, but it still offered hope for a similar
technological solution in the future. "Any one who will devise a method of rapidly and
safely coaling our cruisers at sea will add to the navy's efficiency and, no doubt," noted
Scientific American, "will receive an abundant reward in dollars from the
government."122
The San Francisco and Kearsarge experiment was part of a larger trend in
engineering experimentation. In the late 19th and early 2 0 th centuries, American inventors
filed nearly fifty patents with the U.S. Patent Office for devices to facilitate coaling at
sea. The devices were typically systems for connecting two ships together with ropes or
wires and transferring bundles of coal from one to the other. Though some of these
systems were adopted, the Navy found that they could be used effectively only in still
water, ideally that of a harbor, thus reviving the very problem the inventions sought to
avoid. The striking feature of so many of these proposals is that their inventors justify
them with the geopolitical fact of the lack of American coaling stations abroad.123
Finally, Americans continued geological expeditions for coal around the world.
In the second half of the 19 th century, in fact, geology served as an essential buttress to
121 Isherwood, "The Gamgee Perpetual Motion."
122 "Coaling Cruisers at Sea," Scientific American LXIX, no. 19 (1893). Even if coaling at sea remained
impractical, the Navy could, and did, develop vessels like the battleship Indiana in 1895, a ship smaller
than its British counterparts but capable nevertheless of firing larger and more devastating rounds. By
building the Indiana to hew close to the U.S. coast, it required less fuel and ammunition. "The Battle Ship
Indiana," Scientific American LXXIII, no. 17 (1895).
123 Search performed at http://www.google.com/patents, site accessed May 1, 2007.
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American economic and political power, and in particular, the United States maintained
its interest in locating steaming coal in Asia. These expeditions did not always begin
with the U.S. government, but it often remained aware of them and granted its approval.
One such expedition began in China in the early 1860s, and it reveals the complex
interactions between British, American, and Chinese interests in the 19th century. The
Chinese government wished to address the persistent irritation of smugglers and pirates
along their coast. Interested in increasing their naval force to surveil coastal waters, the
government directed the British Inspector-General of Maritime Customs, Horatio Nelson
Lay, to acquire a fleet of gunboats under British command. 124 Like other steamships in
eastern Asia, these gunboats were limited to consuming coal imported by sea from
Britain, Australia, or the United States at substantial cost-between eight and twelve taels
per ton. Aware that China itself possessed substantial coal reserves, the government
sought to survey fields in China's province of Chili that might offer adequate steaming
coal. The head of the British legation in China, Sir Frederick Bruce, suggested
employing the distinguished American geologist Raphael Pumpelly, then visiting China.
Pumpelly, who had connected with Bruce through Anson Burlingame, the head of the
American Legation there, promptly accepted the project. 125
Pumpelly recalled with puzzlement the attitude of his Chinese hosts towards coal
mining. While officials from the Board of Foreign Affairs explained to him their
conviction that new deposits of coal surely grew in the interstices of older mines, they
124 After the Opium Wars (1842-3), the British established the Maritime Customs Service to facilitate
foreign trade with China and British interests there specifically. For more detail on the institution, see
Donna Brunero, Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China: The Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 1854-
1949 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).
125 "Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, Diplomatic Note #61, 1/4/1864," in Message of the President of the
United States and Accompanying Documents, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the
Second Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, Part III, H. Rep. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 38th Cong., 2nd. sess.
(1865), Raphael Pumpelly, My Reminiscences (New York: H. Holt, 1918), V. 1,411.
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simultaneously resisted large mining operations, "on the ground that it would exhaust the
store on which future generations would be dependent," Pumpelly recalled, "an
inconsistency in reasoning which they got over by saying that the rate of growth of new
coal is not known."' 26 The American Pumpelly brought a very different attitude towards
coal, one that sought to extract as much as possible to lower prices and stimulate trade.
Pumpelly examined ten coal mines in Chili, the entire survey totaling three weeks.
Two objectives guided the mission. First, to locate a coal supply suitable for supplying
steamships in Chinese waters, and second, to determine what "improvements," according
to Pumpelly, were needed to facilitate coal production and delivery. To characterize the
coal according to their steaming qualities, the geologist cited the categories employed by
Walter Johnson twenty years before, most importantly "raising steam quickly" and
"raising it abundantly for the quantity consumed."' 27 He concluded that China, in fact,
possessed enormous reserves of both bituminous and anthracite coal, "of a quality equal
to the best and superior to much that is imported." Nevertheless, the maintenance of
Chinese mining methods prevented the large-scale exploitation of these reserves
necessary for decreasing the price of steaming coal in China and leading to its use in
steamships. If the Chinese government or a foreign company introduced western mining
methods, Pumpelly thought, the price of coal in Chinese ports might decrease from the
126 Pumpelly, My Reminiscences, V. 1,411.
127 Raphael Pumpelly, "Report of the Chinese Government on a Preliminary Examination of the Coal
Districts of the Si Shan, in the Province of Chili [December 1, 1863]," in Message of the President of the
United States and Accompanying Documents, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the
Second Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, Part III, H. Rep. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 38th Cong., 2nd. sess.
(1 865).For details of the geology there, see Raphael Pumpelly, Geological Researches in China, Mongolia,
and Japan During the Years 1862 to 1865, vol. 15, Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge.
(Washington,: Smithsonian institution, 1867).
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present eight to twelve taels per to ton to a mere two or three. 128 The American diplomat
Burlingame immediately forwarded Pumpelly's report to Secretary of State Seward,
whose interest in expanding American steam communication around the world led to a
hearty approval of his Department's representative in China.' 129
Such an interest in Asian coal geology continued later in the 19th century, when an
American naval engineer undertook an expedition to the coal mines of Korea in
November 1891. The engineer, H.N. Stevenson, had traveled ashore to Ping Yang City
(Pyongyang) from the U.S.S. Alliance on an "official visit" with the American minister,
Augustine Heard. While there, Stevenson found a chance to search for coal near the city.
He was led to a substantial outcropping, which he described, photographed, and collected
samples of to send to Washington. European steamers did not burn this coal, for reasons
Stevenson could not understand, preferring instead to steam to Japan for what the
engineer believed to be a vastly inferior grade. Stevenson concluded his report by
observing that "if Corea can supply a better coal than Japan, and the indications are that
she can do so, and place it in these markets as cheaply, there will be an immediate market
for it in all the Eastern countries."' 30
None of these technical approaches were taken in isolation. In addition to
diplomatic arrangements to provide coaling stations in the 19th century, the U.S. Navy
pursued a three part strategy to address the needs of industrial power: analyze coal,
develop more efficient steam engines, and, support geological expeditions to uncover and
128 Pumpelly, "Report of the Chinese Government on a Preliminary Examination of the Coal Districts of the
Si Shan, in the Province of Chili [December 1, 1863]."
129 "Mr. Seward to Mr. Burlingame, Note #52, 2/29/1864," in Message of the President of the United States
and Accompanying Documents, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second
Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, Part III (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. [38-2 H.Rep. Ex. Doc. No. 1],
1865).
130 H.N. Stevenson, "Report of a Visit to the Coal Seam near Ping Yang City; West Coast of Corea,
November 15th 1891," in Folder 4, Box 707, XF 1871-1910, RG 45, NAI.
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make accessible deposits of coal in strategic locations around the world. By employing
science and engineering, American sought to overcome the political and geographic
limitations placed on them by coal.
Conclusion
The American drive for coaling stations in the late 19t century could also generate scorn
and sarcasm. For the historian W.D. McCrackan, the growing Navy would lead quite
naturally to coaling stations. "The have become indispensable to the conduct of modem
naval warfare," he wrote in 1893. McCracken, however, warned of the potential
consequences of acquiring these bases, in particular in Haiti and Hawaii. After coaling
stations, he wrote, "[a]nnexation is the next step, and an era of conquest must inevitably
follow in its wake. Another ten or twenty years of this much-vaunted building up of the
navy," he continued," and we shall have a train of mean little wars to our credit. The
United States will figure as the bully of the western hemisphere."' 31
McCracken's cynical analysis proved in part correct in the years after the
American war with Spain in 1898 and the territorial growth that accompanied them. The
Navy began building coaling stations in San Juan, Puerto Rico; Honolulu, Hawaii; Guam;
Cavite, the Philippines; and on its existing territory on Tutuila, Samoa. Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba would likewise serve as a coaling station. According to the Navy's Bureau of
Equipment that supervised naval coaling, while the war provided the opportunity for
expansion, coaling provided the reason. "The Bureau has reason to believe that the great
utility of Honolulu as a coal depot during the Spanish War largely influenced Congress in
its decision to annex the Hawaiian Islands," wrote Bureau Chief Royal B. Bradford in
'31 W.D. McCrackan, "Our Foreign Policy," The Arena, no. XLIV (1893): 147.
182
1902. "The retention of Guam as an American possession after its capture..." he added,
"was for the express purpose of establishing a naval coal depot."' 32 This expansion,
however, took place in a context of decades of interest and struggle within the Navy to
harmonize the challenge to geography presented by steam technology.
132 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1902, H. Doc. 3, 57th. Cong., 2nd. sess. (1902).
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Chapter 4: Inventing Logistics
"If one looks at a fleet of war-ships on the sea," wrote the Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske
in 1916, "he will be impressed consciously or unconsciously with the idea of power. If
he is impressed consciously, he will see that the fleet represents power in the broadest
sense--power active and power passive; power to do and power to endure; power to exert
force and power to resist it." For Fiske, a prolific inventor as well as a distinguished
commander, this power was more than mere metaphor. Power had a material foundation.
Look closely at the modern Navy, he advised, and discover that "it is not merely a mental
suggestion, but a realization of the actual existence of tremendous mechanical power,
under complete direction and control."'
The concept of "sea-power" dominated the discourse of naval strategy in the
decades around the turn of the 2 0th century. In the hands of an Alfred Thayer Mahan in
the United States, or Alfred von Tirpitz in Germany, sea-power evoked sentiments of
nationalism, maritime prowess, and boundless commercial opportunities. Sea-power
assured economic growth and political security. For Bradley Fiske, power meant the
power of machines themselves. Naval power meant harnessing this mechanical power to
advance national policies. And as Fiske knew well, mechanical power was the
expression of a certain amount of energy expended over time. Since "energy is energy,
no matter to what purpose it is applied," Fiske knew that naval planners needed to pay
careful attention to the Navy's vast appetite for fuel.2
1 Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), 49.
2 Ibid.
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Environmental historians have typically looked to philosophers, artists, and
scientists to trace changing ideas about Nature and the human place in it.3 And for good
reason; writers and scientists have frequently and explicitly taken the natural world as
their subject. In the 20th century, however, few forces have shaped the natural world
more-directly or indirectly-than the world's militaries.4 How naval thinkers have
addressed the natural world, and the technological systems for manipulating it, has
remained largely unanalyzed.
The views of Nature expressed by American naval officers might lack the nuance,
beauty, and romanticism characteristic of a Thoreau, Muir, or Aldo Leopold; their
thought might appear instrumental, calculated, and desiccated-but before most
Americans, they recognized how the material world provided the connective tissue
between what was desired and what was possible, how a battle in Manila might turn on
the availability of coal dug in Maryland, corn grown in Iowa, or on the training of an
officer. During the first three decades of the 20th century, instructors at the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island developed a new science to manage the natural world
during wartime and peace. In these years, these officers developed an autochthonous,
American science of logistics. In part, they rediscovered, refined the work of 19th century
3 On ideas of Nature in the West, see Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore : Nature and
Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1990), Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 4th ed., Yale Nota Bene
(New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2001), Donald Worster, Nature's Economy : A History of
Ecological Ideas, 2nd ed., Studies in Environment and History (Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
4 Rauno Lahtinen and Timo Vuorisalo, "'It's War and Everyone Can Do as They Please!' an Environmental
History of a Finnish City in Wartime," Environmental History 9, no. 4 (2004), McNeill, "Woods and
Warfare in World History.", Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from
World War I to Silent Spring, William M. Tsutsui, "Landscapes in the Dark Valley: Toward an
Environmental History of Wartime Japan," Environmental History 8, no. 2 (2003), West, "Forests and
National Security: British and American Forestry Policy in the Wake of World War I.", Peter A. Shulman,
"'Science Can Never Demobilize': The United States Navy and Petroleum Geology, 1898-1924," History
and Technology 19 (2003).
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European war strategists. Their work, however, contained much that was new and
unfamiliar to the Navy. Above all, American naval logistics grew from the peculiarly
American problems of fueling the Navy, or, of turning abstract notions of "sea-power"
into the vast mechanical war machine envisioned by people like Bradley Fiske.5
From Art to Science
Historians who have analyzed how questions of supply, provisions, and resources have
impacted warfare have typically done so by examining past campaigns-their
organization, flows of materiel, bureaucratic management, and so on.6 But logistics itself
has a history. Its importance or significance was not universally recognized before the
nineteenth century, and even then, it was not until the turn of the twentieth that logistics
began to receive extensive analysis by planner of war, at least in the United States. By
then, logistical thinking depended on shifts in thinking about both Nature and how
modem industry moved people and materials in ways analogous to natural processes.
Logistics introduced a science of resource flows and mechanical processes into thinking
about war.
Writers on war in the nineteenth century disagreed on the both the etymology and
the scope of the term. The influential Swiss strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini wrote of
s Historians of science have looked increasingly at the the role of education in creating both intellectual
fields and also their practitioners. For the best of this work, see David Kaiser, Pedagogy and the Practice
ofScience: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Inside Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2005), David Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion ofFeynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), Andrew Warwick, Masters of Theory: Cambridge and the
Rise dfMathematical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
6 The pioneering work of this sort is Martin L. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to
Patton (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). In his introduction, Van Creveld
assumes Jomini's definition of logistics, "the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied"
and proceeds to study historical campaigns between 1805 and 1944 with it. See also the essays in John A.
Lynn, Feeding Mars : Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, History and
Warfare (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).
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"logistique," a term which he explained derived from the office of the Major General des
Logis, the officer responsible for directing, housing, and feeding troops on the march.
"Logis" itself is linked etymologically to the modem English "lodge," through which its
connection to the literal "lodging" of troops is obvious. According to Jomini, the French
position corresponded with the German Quartiermeister and from there to the familiar
English and American Quartermaster. 7
Jomini had competition in explaining logistics, however. In his Military
Encyclopedia, former West Point instructor Edward S. Farrow derived the term from the
Latin "Logista," meaning "the Administrator or Intendant of the Roman armies." Under
the purview of the Logista fell "all details for moving and supplying armies," from
ordnance to medicine, provisions to pay.8 General Rudolph von Caemmerer, in contrast,
offered in The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century yet another
derivation, this time from the Greek word for "calculation," "because calculations form
an important part of the labors of a General Staff."9 While all these writers agreed that
logistics involved the material aspects of war in some form, they disagreed on what
duties devolved to the logistician and on how much interest strategic planning itself
should pay to logistic problems, whatever they were.
Despite the importance these writers attached to logistics, its study was slow to
attract interest in the United States in the nineteenth century. As late as the 1890s, and
for figures as influential as Naval War College founder Stephen Luce or the College's
7 Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War, A new , ed., The West Point Military Library (Westport, Conn.,:
Greenwood Press, 1971), 252.
8 Edward S. Farrow, Farrow's Military Encyclopedia : A Dictionary of Military Knowledge, 3 vols., vol. 2
(New York: Published by the author, 1885), 230.
9 von Caemmerer, The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century, trans. Karl von Donat
(London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1905), 44. von Caemmerer does not in this text, however, record the word
himself, Aoytcrcrtcs.
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star professor, Alfred Thayer Mahan, logistics remained subordinate to problems of
strategy. Strategy announced a navy's vision of what it believed possible and it remained
the job of logisticians to make that vision a reality. Luce, in an 1890 article in the
Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute entitled "Naval Training," wrote that "[t]he
underlying principle is that logistics should conform to strategy, not strategy to
logistics. '"' His audience hardly needed much convincing; within the U.S. Navy in the
1890s, logistics was rarely studied by officers. Their unfamiliarity with the subject might
have been for responsible for Luce's defining the term in a footnote (as "the branch of the
military art which has to do with the details of moving and supplying armies or fleets")-
and this to an audience of professional naval officers. Luce's one notable example of the
importance of logistics remained coal, a substance "of the very first importance" and
which "[u]nder certain conditions coal may rank above ammunition in the scale of
military values."' '
Mahan himself recognized the enormity of the task of logistics, but like Luce
considered it of lesser importance than the more familiar strategy and tactics. While he
observed that "determining the places of rendezvous for coal and other supplies, the
protection of the routes, the whole question of keeping the holds and coal-bunkers full,
and the several ships in best steaming condition, is a big administrative calculation and
coordination," Mahan remained attached to the idea that logistics belonged more properly
as the domain of junior officers. According to Mahan, "while as vital to military success
as daily food is to daily work," logistics, "like food... is not the work."'12 For Mahan, the
10 Stephen B. Luce, "Naval Training," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 16 (1890): 383.
'" Ibid.
12 A.T. Mahan, "The Naval War College," The North American Review 196, no. 680 (1912): 74-5.
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creativity of strategy and tactics represented "the work," not the mechanical calculations
of logistics.
By the early twentieth century, the naval study of logistics was changing. Rear-
Admiral Bradley Fiske, whose observations about machines and sea-power opened this
chapter, was inclined to eschew the superiority of one branch of naval warfare to another.
By 1916, Fiske preferred to consider strategy and logistics as mutually important
foundations of naval thought. Strategic planners who failed to collaborate with logistics
officers, Fiske wrote, "would result in making demands that logistics could not supply;
or, through an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining from demanding
as much as could be supplied." 13 Only by working together could strategic visions be
balanced by the tedious calculations of logistics.
More generally, the study of logistics within the early twentieth century U.S.
Navy suggested a subtle shift in the study of war itself. Where Jomini had written of an
"art," logistics offered a science. A Napoleon or an Alexander, traditional subjects of
military analysis, might indeed have embodied genius, but the modem naval officer
required diligence. With the size, scale, and mechanization of modern war, explained
War College President Austin M. Knight, "an officer in this position [required to outfit 'a
great over-sea expedition'] needs more than instinct to see him thro." 14 Put another way,
with its emphasis on facilitating naval strategy, logistics became connected with the idea
of efficiency. According to one officer, logistics was "'scientific management' applied to
the Navy.""' And in the view of Naval War College instructor Commander Carl T.
13 Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine, 278.
14 T.J. Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," in NWC, RG 8, Box 89, Folder 5 (Newport, RI), 10.
5s H.P. Huse, "Logistics - Its Influence Upon the Conduct of War and Its Bearing Upon the Formulation of
War Plans. Submitted by Captain H.P. Huse, U.S.N. (Sept. 15, 1916)," in NWC, RG 4, Box 8, Folder 313.
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Vogelgesang, through logistics "we deal with facts and not fancies. Here the demands of
the Art are calculable and solvable by rule and method, and cause and effect are only
separated in many cases by a problem in simple arithmetic." 16 What more could a
bureaucrat desire?
Even genius itself was constrained by logistics. No officer at the War College
long remained unaware of the explanations for Napoleon's catastrophic defeat during his
1812 march on Russia. As historians subsequently concluded, this greatest military
thinker neglected to plan for adequate supplies, intending instead to rely on the territories
his armies marched through for provisions. "Genius," concluded Cowie,
"unaccompanied by logistics, invites defeat."' 7
To what do we owe this shift in emphasis from logistics as an element of strategy
to logistics as strategy' coequal, or even to logistics as a broader category that itself
contained strategy? In large part, the answer lies in practical problems of supply that
emerged following the American annexation of the Philippines after 1898. The Navy
was committed to both defeating the rebellion from within the islands and defending
them from without, and none of these goals were possible without a steady supply of fuel
from home. In response, coaling and the problems associated with it comprised an
increasingly important element of study at the War College. College President Knight
related that in moving the Pacific Fleet from the American coast to the Philippines for
even a month would create a demand for some 500,000 tons of coal. To defend the
Some twenty-five years earlier, Huse had served, incidentally, as Rear-Admiral Bancroft Gherardi's aid
and translator on his mission to obtain the M61le St. Nicholas as a coaling station from Haiti. His career
thus bridges the Navy's ad-hoc and scientific approaches to coaling.
16 C.T. Vogelgesang, "Logistics - Its Bearing Upon the Art of War," in NWC, RG 14, Box 2, Folder 26
(Newport, RI), 4.
17 Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," 32. For more nuanced views of Napoleonic logistics, see
Martin L. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK ;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially 40-74.
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colony, this coal had to be available at any time, some with the westward steaming fleet,
some deposited previously at designated coaling depots, "all arrangements must be so
coordinated that there shall be no chance of failure." With the very mobility of the Navy
and the success of U.S. defense and foreign policy at the mercy of the logistics of coal,
Knight concluded of its inclusion at the College, "there is no more important subject
studied there or elsewhere." 18
Without a science of logistics, developing an efficient use of coal came slowly and on an
ad hoc basis. Plagued was wildly uneven rates of coal consumption between ships
performing the same activities in the late 19t century, the Navy began seeking
engineering efficiency. For years, the Navy had pleaded with its officers to conserve
fuel. In 1887, for example, the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting faced drastic cuts in
its congressional appropriation. The Bureau, responsible for, among other things,
supplying coal, directed the department's Acting Secretary to issue a blanket order to
conserve fuel. "As coal is the largest item of expense to the Bureau," he noted,
"Commanding Officers of squadrons and of vessels acting singly will exercise the
greatest economy of its use." Most steam powered naval vessels in the 1880s maintained
masts and rigging for sailing as well, and the order instructed ships to rely on sail
whenever possible. Coal "use will be limited to occasions when dispatch is absolutely
required, or to emergencies, but steam will never be used under the ordinary
circumstances of cruising." Moreover, when officers did use coal, they were to alert
Washington immediately.19
18 Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," 11.
19 D.B. Harmony, Navy Department Circular No. 36, (1887).
191
In 1891, Navy Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy issued a more detailed order.
Requesting naval officers "to practice the utmost economy in the use of coal," Tracy
reaffirmed the instructions for vessels with sail to use them whenever possible and to
report unusual circumstances to the department. He added that officers should begin
steaming experiments to determine the most efficient circumstances for combustion. He
requested lengthy steaming reports that included "the consumption of coal per hour at
varying rates of speed from 5 to 11 knots, the kind and quality of coal used, the condition
of the bottom [of the ship], as far as known, and such remarks in reference to the most
economical rate of steaming of the vessel as the experience of the Commanding Officer
may suggest." 20 Similar entreaties to conserve coal continued through the early 20 th
century.2 1
Approaching coaling from the perspective of engineering economy also
developed from the individual initiative of officers at sea. On December 11, 1899,
Captain C.F. Goodrich, commanding the U.S.S. Iowa took on coal in San Francisco. The
dirty, exhausting, familiar procedure presented Goodrich with what he described as "a
somewhat unusual and exceedingly satisfactory experience." The Iowa already held the
department's "blue ribbon" by virtue of its speedy coaling. Coaling in San Francisco,
however, was something new. The 1,004 tons took eleven hours and 25 minutes to haul
aboard from. According to Goodrich, "[t]he rapid coaling of a battleship is the most
important general evolution (except actual battle in which she can engage." 22 Goodrich
had systematically broken down the coaling process into discrete phases, systematically
ticking off the structural elements facilitating taking on coal and enumerating the precise
20 B.F. Tracy, Navy Department General Order No. 390, (1891).
21 Truman H. Newberry, Navy Department Special Order No. 8, (1906).22 F.W. Hackett, Navy Department General Order No. 547, (1900).
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actions and location of the entire crew who participated in the activity. Here was
scientific management at work. Impressed with the results from the Iowa, the department
announced in April 1900 a coaling competition for all vessels that year. When the
department's Acting Secretary F.W. Hackett announced the results of the coaling drill the
following year, Goodrich's Iowa had only ranked third, behind the steam yacht Scorpion
and the Michigan.23
As the Navy increasingly built vessels without sails, it continued investigating
alternative methods for increasing the efficiency of coal. The most important approach
was the steaming competition. The program, in which ships squared off against one
another over the most efficient consumption of coal, began in 1908 during the cruise of
the Great White Fleet. The program began when the commanding officer of the Atlantic
Fleet issued an order while passing through Rio de Janeiro that alerted his ships that they
were now in competition for "steaming and machinery efficiency." The crews responded
with zeal. Between Rio and Mexico's Pacific port of Magdalena Bay, the ships
conserved nearly 1,500 tons of coal from what had been the expected consumption.
Later, as the fleet steamed from Honolulu to Auckland, they saved an additional 2,000
tons above the standard they had just set en route from Rio. These results impressed
Navy bureaucrats in Washington, who considered "this order... one of the most
important and far-reaching that has been issued since the creation of the present gunnery
system" several years before, and anticipated extending it throughout the Navy.24
Extend it they did. In June 1909, George von L. Meyer, President Taft's Navy
Secretary, announced a new, department-wide policy. "In view of the fact that the
23 F.W. Hackett, Navy Department General Order No. 25, (1901).24 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1908, H. Doc. 1045, 60th. Cong., 2nd. sess.
(1908).
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efficiency of any vessel is based to a very large extent upon the performance of her
engines and their appurtenances," Meyer explained, "and that her value as a strategical
unit is directly dependent upon the economical use of such amount of coal, oil, and other
similar supplies as is possible for her to carry," different classes of naval vessels were to
engage in a yearly steaming contest. Meyer established the ground rules. Battleships
competed with battleships, armored cruisers with armored cruisers, and so on. Struggling
ships could appeal to the department to upgrade their equipment. Denying coal needed
for the basic operation of the ship was "strictly forbidden." Perhaps most importantly,
officers were to report their actions to increase efficiency so these practices might be
shared with the whole fleet. While the Atlantic fleet's competitions the year before
offered only pride as incentive, Congress now authorized $5,000 to distribute to the
engineering officers of the winning ships (on a graduated scale according to rank). The
ships themselves received trophies etched with name of the ship. 25
The department responded to the challenge immediately. "The inauguration of
the steaming competitions awakened a lively interest in engineering matters throughout
the service," observed Secretary Meyer in his annual report following the first running of
the competition. Overall, the horsepower exerted was up (sixteen percent) as were ships'
average cruising speeds (fifteen percent). Nevertheless, the department saved more than
$2,000,000 in coal purchases compared with the year before. In addition, Meyer noted,
although ships steamed more in the second half of the year, naval vessels actually
consumed less coal.26 The Washington Post was less sanguine; it acknowledged the
advantages of the steaming competitions, but pointed out that in the first year of the
25 G. v. L. Meyer, Navy Department General Order No. 26, (1909).26 G. v. L. Meyer, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1910, H. Doe. 1005, 61st. Cong.,
3rd. sess. (1910).
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contest, the Navy's battleships alone steamed roughly a fifth the distances they had only
the year before, so savings in fuel and dollars were not entirely due to improvements in
engine efficiency. 27
One consequence of this practical obsession with economy was the Navy's
amassing a substantial record of coal consumption aboard individual ships, at varying
speeds and weather conditions, and for different types of coal. Navy Secretary Meyer
evidently had this outcome in mind early on, commenting in an annual report that "[f]rom
the reports rendered necessary by these competitions, strategical as well as technical
information of great value has been and will be obtained." 28 Instructors at the War
College in Newport collected this information, and in the first three decades of the 2 0th
century, they began using it to fulfill War College President Knight's vision of the
supremely important subject of logistics.
Newport
The subtle difficulties associated with naval warfare tended to escape the attention of
Americans not directly involved in the details of war planning. During his tenure as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Teddy Roosevelt is a case in point. In May of 1897,
Caspar Goodrich, President of the Naval War College, asked Navy Secretary John Long
to propose a war game for his students and instructors. Long forwarded the letter to his
assistant, Roosevelt, who immediately replied to Goodrich with a "Special Confidential
Problem for War College." Roosevelt asked Goodrich to analyze a conflict in the Pacific
between the United States and Japan. The problem as Roosevelt framed it involved
27 "Army and Navy Gossip," Washington Post 1911.
28 G. v. L. Meyer, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navyfor the Year 1911, H. Doc. 119, 62nd. Cong,
2nd. sess. (1911).
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Japan placing "demands on Hawaiian Islands" and incurring a naval retribution from the
United States. Roosevelt sought to know "[w]hat force will be necessary to uphold the
intervention, and how shall it be employed?" 29 In his own musings on the subject, the
young Assistant Secretary brashly asserted "that the determining factor in any war with
Japan would be the control of the sea," and insisted that the United States "smash the
Japanese Navy." 30
Goodrich was a more careful student of the demands of naval warfare than the
naval enthusiast and civilian to whom he reported. "That you are right as to the
desirability of smashing the Japanese fleet is a matter of course," Goodrich noted to
Roosevelt, diplomatically adding "but with the qualification, which was doubtless in your
mind, although unexpressed, that the fleet should enter upon the proposed theatre of
operations."3 1 But getting to this theatre was a tricky business. The size and armaments
of the two fleets needed to be carefully compared, as did the geographic constraints of the
Pacific. To make his point stick, Goodrich sent Roosevelt a memorandum on coal
supplies. Defeating Japan, whether in Hawaiian waters or Japanese, would depend on
maintaining a steady fuel supply for American vessels. Studying the coaling problem,
according to Goodrich, "emphasizes the difficulties attending a crossing of the Pacific."
Goodrich concluded his letter with "regrets that facts seem to forbid a rapid, vigorous,
aggressive war."32 Counting, measuring, preparing-these were the skills required for a
successful naval campaign, not merely the enthusiasm to defeat the enemy.
29 T.R. to Caspar Frederick Goodrich, 5/28/1897, in Theodore Roosevelt, Letters, vol. 1 (Cambridge,:
Harvard University Press, 1951), 617-8.30 T.R. to Caspar Frederick Goodrich, 6/16/1897, in Ibid., 626.
31 "Captain C.F. Goodrich; Letter to Assistant Secretary of the Navy [T. Roosevelt] on War with Japan.
Strategic Features of the Pacific, Comparison of Numbers of United States and Japanese Vessels, Coal
Supply. June 23, 1897," in NWC, RG 8, Box 104, Folder 6, 1.32 Ibid., 7.
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The counting problems of which Goodrich wrote largely involved supplying coal.
American ships in the Pacific in the Spring of 1897 required 11,000 tons of coal to refuel.
These ships, Goodrich insisted, could not base naval operations against Japan out of
Hawaii unless three times as many tons of coal could be provided there. While plenty of
coal existed within the United States, an adequate number of American freight steamers
or colliers plying the Pacific and capable of moving the coal from the west coast to
Hawaii did not. Only if the Navy did not need commercial passenger steamers to
transport personnel (which it did) would an adequate tonnage for fuel exist in the ocean.
Moreover, should the United States press on past Hawaii to Japan, far more coal-some
50,000 tons in Goodrich's estimation-would have to travel with the fleet. Since no
Pacific coast coals, whether in the United States, Canada, or Australia matched the
character of the "smokeless" semi-bituminous coals of Appalachia, the Navy needed to
secure this tonnage in the east, and ship it (by transcontinental railroad, according to
Goodrich) to the Pacific. Only certain Pacific ports suited naval coaling in the Pacific,
and even after a temporary naval base could be established in the ocean, "a constant
stream of steam colliers, with provision transports" would then have to be kept up until
the conflict ended.33 Goodrich clearly disagreed with Mahan, who thought logistics must
be developed to support strategy. A strategy that ignored logistics, as he tactfully
explained to Roosevelt, was doomed to failure.
This epistlatory exchange took place in May 1897, nearly a year before the war
with Spain. Goodrich's attention to coal represented an early interest in fuel and logistics
at Newport's Naval War College. The interest grew, unsteadily, over time. Between the
turn of the twentieth century and the early 1920s, logistics instruction at the College
33 Ibid., appended document entitled, "Coal Supply".
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assumed a variety of forms. Lectures introduced the systematic study of fuel and
resources to naval officers. These officers helped develop logistics tables (described
below), principally for determining fuel consumption for individual ships and various
speeds, as well as for quantities of ammunition. Students employed these tables in
solving war simulations like Roosevelt's problem sending an American fleet across the
Pacific. These problems emphasized questions of supply, not actual combat per se, and
activities "which," according to one instructor, "might even result in the Fleet becoming
impotent if the convoy failed."34
How logistics was taught at the College in the early twentieth century depended
on the interests of the institution's leadership and the predilections of individual faculty.
For a while, the College required its students to produce a logistics thesis. These essays,
much like a term paper, analyzed one particular logistics problem, drawing on the theory
presented in lectures and on statistics of engine fuel consumptions, sea routes, and war-
making capabilities on file--and sometimes in secret files-at the College. Once
submitted, drafts were kept in the College library for future study. This essay
requirement was later merged with a thesis in strategy, though both were discontinued in
[1925] when the College adopted a new curriculum based on "the study of the strategy,
logistics and tactics of actual battles and campaigns," a program which consequently led
to the diminution of emphasis on the gritty calculations necessary for actual logistics
problems. The following year, however, the College established a formal Logistics
Department for specialized instruction in the problems of supply and organization.35
34 R.E. Bakenhus, "Lecture as to the Course in Logistics: 1 December, 1926," in NWC, RG 4, Box 29,
Folder 1204 (Newport, RI), 2.
3s Ibid., 2-3.
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Logistics instructors at the College faced a peculiar pedagogical challenge.
Students there did not arrive at Newport unfamiliar with the concept of logistics-they
were mid-career officers who might well have possessed substantial experience in the
daily problems of supply, provisions, and even war itself. How were these students to be
educated? One instructors asked his students "to get away from the confining
experiences which he himself may have had in his own limited assignments." Logistics,
in this view, offered more than a series of practical examples, perhaps similar to
knowledge already earned not in classrooms but aboard ship. It provided instead a
broader, theoretical approach of which lived experience was but a special case.36
Throughout the first quarter of the twentieth century, the faculty of the College
assigned to teach this theoretical approach to logistics emphasized the importance of the
subject while complaining of the absence of attention to it by leading naval thinkers. As
late as 1915, logistics-and in particular, naval logistics-was a barely studied field. The
head of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Paymaster T.J. Cowie, delivered an
important lecture on logistics in 1915, and attributed the lack of study on the subject to a
"paucity of the literature." The absence of literature came from the perception of
logistics' low importance relative to tactics and strategy. This perception that logistics
wasn't as important came, in part, from the lack of literature and sustained study-and so
on. While preparing his 1915 lecture on the subject, Cowie had inquired to the
Congressional Library in Washington for all works on naval logistics and found only a
single, slender volume.3
36 Ibid., 4.
37 Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," 5.
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This volume, in fact, was the text of a lecture delivered in 1913 by Commander
J.S. McKean, an officer not enchanted with his subject. The study of logistics, McKean
found, with its interminable charts, calculations, and hypotheticals could even dull the
minds of officers who appreciated its centrality to modem warfare. "Logistics is one of
the least interesting, least studied (therefore least understood), but at the same time one of
the most important subjects of study in training for war," McKean explained. A
halfhearted endorsement, at best.38 Paymaster Cowie disagreed. If so important," he
asked, "how can it possibly be the least interesting?"3 9
The relative lack of logistics study continued to frustrate officers into the 1920s.
One professor of a reading course on strategy and logistics in 1921 apologized to his
students for the paucity of texts on logistics beyond the few listed on the syllabus.
Beyond the five general references on the subject and about a dozen works that touched
upon it in practical ways, "[t]here are no other such books available," he wrote.
Interested students were advised to "rely on the deductions they may make from their
readings," as well as theses written by previous students at the College and accounts of
historical campaigns. 40
Despite these challenges, some officers at the College attempted to bring logistics
to the center of naval science. One early lecturer on the subject was Carl T.
Vogelgesang, who first taught logistics at the College in 1911. Vogelgesang referred to
logistics as "one of the too often neglected branches of study in the Art of War," and
38 The lecture was not published until two years later. J.S. McKean, Naval Logistics: Lecture Delivered by
Commander J.S. McKean, United States Navy, a the Naval War College Extension, Washington, D.C.,
March 10, 1913 (Washington, D.C.: 1915), 3.
39 Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," 5.
40 
"Strategy and Logistics: Reading Course. (Syllabus, 22 January, 1921)," in NWC, RG 4, Box 3, Folder
121 (Newport, RI), 4.
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spoke of "awakening our minds to its controlling importance." He acknowledged that
interest in war planning seldom interested the broader American public, whom he called
"the masses of a peace loving and peace professing nation," but the officer had a
responsibility to plan for the undesirable. Like Bradley Fiske would note a few years
later, Vogelgesang also emphasized the reciprocity between logistics and strategy. "The
strategic conception may be that of a genius, but if it be not based on a solid foundation
of logistic facts, it can have no force and will be of no effect; unless, indeed, it leads
directly to disaster." Vogelgesang, too, invoked the example of Napoleon at Moscow.
There, "[1]ogistics was strained beyond the limits of reason, calculation could not support
the demands of the strategic conception."' 1 Even strategic genius, the lecturer implied,
could be undone by faulty logistics.
For the Navy, the logistics questions that predominated involved coal and coaling.
There were questions of quantity--how much coal was needed-but there was also the
question of quality. "The areas of production of good steaming coal ... are very
restricted;" Vogelgesang noted, "and while depots may and do exist all over the world
where such coal is kept on hand the supply is in limited quantities in any one of them and
is usually covered by government contract that will not permit of its release to an outside
purchaser." The Navy demanded the best coal possible for combat, introducing an
additional constraint on the provision of supplies. "Here enters into the calculation,
therefore, a vastly different proposition in logistics than we would have if we had the coal
fields of the world to draw upon. '"42 There may have been abundant and nearby coal
fields in the Pacific, for example, but since a reorientation of naval coal sources in the
41 Vogelgesang, "Logistics - Its Bearing Upon the Art of War," 1, 5-7.42 Ibid., 9-10.
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mid-1880s, only certain semi-bituminous coals from Appalachia, and possibly from
Alaska, suited newly designed naval boilers.
This constraint had been the case through most of the nineteenth century as well.
Even so, abundant production of Pocahontas, George's Creek, New River, and Eureka
coal from the Appalachian bituminous belt running from Virginia and West Virginia
through Western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania ensured ample stocks of even
these specialized fuels. The supplies were there--the logistics problem was moving the
coal from the eastern seaboard to the Pacific for war. The principal coaling ports of the
mid-Atlantic received steady shipments of steaming coals; in a given month in 1915,
Philadelphia could receive 150,000 tons of Eureka coal; Baltimore 350,000 tons of
George's Creek; Sewall's Point and Lambert Point 200,000 tons apiece of Pocahontas;
and Newport News 250,000 of New River. All told, the Navy had some 1,250,000 tons
of coal per month available in some of its most visited and well protected ports.43
As the study of logistics at the War College relied so much on America's insular
acquisitions in the Pacific like Samoa, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, some officers
began to invert the causality of empire building. While officers like David Dixon Porter
had once argued that obtaining islands as coaling stations justified building an empire of
naval bases, Vogelgesang argued that having possession of those islands justified the
rational analysis of logistics and the fortification that analysis dictated. He noted that
"Providence has so guided our destiny in the Pacific that we find ourselves the sole
possessors of stepping stones that lead across that ocean." These stepping stones,
Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, and Kiska in Alaska, suggested to Vogelgesang how logistics
preparations in peacetime could be simplified. All that was needed, he claimed, was the
43 Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," 35.
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fortification of these islands with naval bases and coaling stations. "By properly grasping
and faithfully solving the logistic problems of the Pacific," he concluded, "we will
properly link up our outposts in the Pacific with the home country by fortifying,
garrisoning, and storing those positions." Logistics, in short, would "supply that present
day expression of moral force that alone can ensure and guarantee peace.""44 Thus the
American insular empire slipped from being a consequence of naval buildup in the past to
a cause of naval buildup in the future.
A second influential voice on coaling and logistics at the War College came in
1915 from Paymaster T.J. Cowie. As head of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the
Admiral had years of experience provisioning and fueling the fleet. Although an
inexperienced teacher, he tried to bring his practical knowledge to the officers studying in
Newport. Cowie believed that the science of logistics had never received the kind of
interest commensurate with the subject's importance from American officers, or even
from military scholars in any nation. Referencing Jomini and others, Cowie asserted that
"instead of being merely one of the branches of the art of war, to which writers and
lecturers have assigned it, it is in reality the main artery through which is provided the
life and force by which the other branches may be made effective in action, and upon it
largely depends the character of the war to be waged, as well as victory or defeat in case
of war."45 Only twenty-five years before, Mahan and Luce were proclaiming the
inferiority of logistics to strategy; for Cowie the relationship was precisely the opposite.
Like Vogelgesang who lectured before him, Cowie acknowledged the role of
peacetime preparation for combat, and the ideological conflicts engendered by professing
44 Vogelgesang, "Logistics - Its Bearing Upon the Art of War," 14-6.
45 Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," 3.
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peace while anticipating war. Despite the major wars and simmering conflicts that
punctuated American history, Anti-militarism ran deep in the American political culture.
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 seemed to confirm for many Americans that
military buildup itself increased the likelihood of conflict. Even Paymaster Cowie
conceded that "[a] consistent, complete and full preparation for war savors too strongly of
militarism, is wrong and harmful, is liable to cause distrust and antagonize other nations."
Nevertheless, a failure to plan for combat altogether risked limiting the very ability of the
military to carry out even elementary defense. For Cowie, studying logistics offered a
third way, a middle path between mobilization and pacifism. Cowie concluded that "true
logistics, is both right and beneficial, and instead of arousing the ire. ... it commands the
respect of the rest of the world, lessens its chances of war, and will do much towards its
quicker termination."" 6 Cowie thus extended the cool rationality embedded in logistics to
the political realm, arguing that a patient, scientific approach to war would avoid the
temptation of putting these calculations to use. The warring European nations, in this
analysis, had not heeded the scientific logic of logistics as a deterrent.
For whatever purpose they would be used, calculations of the scale recommended
by Cowie required a bureaucratic apparatus that did not exist in the U.S. Navy in 1915.
In January of that year, President Wilson's Navy Secretary, the South Carolinian
newspaper editor Josephus Daniels, composed a memorandum for Tennessee Democrat
Lemuel P. Padgett, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee explaining the
portfolio for a position he hoped to create. Called the "Chief of Operations," the position
included responsibility for a "logistics section." The section's staff were tentatively
assigned all the tasks necessary for engaging in warfare: determining expected demand
46 Ibid., 50.
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for supplies; identifying their sources and availability; planning for transportation, supply
vessels, and the conversion of merchant vessels for the needs of combat; and the crafting
of plans and orders to carry out these activities. As Cowie added in his review of the
proposal, "[p]lans for the conduct of war would be of little use if they only embraced the
distribution, maneuvers, and employment of the fighting forces: they must also include
arrangements for supplying that force with all the requirements necessary for carrying on
the war." In modem war, success or failure in battle might well depend less on soldiers,
sailors, or salvos, but upon the calculations and preparations of war planners months or
even years before combat. And among those preparations, Cowie noted, "[t]he necessary
fuel supply for our fleet in case of war will be the largest proposition we will have to
handle." 47
Even with the responsibility for supervising fueling, this new position would do
little good without a corps of naval officers who shared the knowledge and appreciation
of logistics. Logistics had to be taught, and knowledgeable officers had to be made. Just
as the Navy contemplated creating a Chief of Naval Operations, he Naval War College
began instructing its student classes of mid-level officers in logistics exercises designed
to teach the fundamental obstacles and advantages of fueling war through "scientific
management."
War Planning and Logistics Problems
"War exists between Orange and Blue." This statement introduced the War College
students of July 1915 to Problem VIII for the class "Strategic 49." "Orange," in the not-
so-secret language of naval discourse, referred to Japan, "Blue" to the United States. The
47 Ibid., 8, 34.
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origins of the terms are opaque. Perhaps they were intended to indicate that the situations
they described were only hypothetical, wars fought only in the subjunctive.48 Problem
VIII was one of many assignments of the 1910s designed to teach the College's student-
officers the tools of war planning. With its emphasis on the logistics of coaling, the
problem provides a unique window on the assumptions and expectations of War College
lecturers and on the skills they sought their students to develop. What were the meanings
associated with logistics problems? What were their assumptions? What knowledge did
they take for granted, and how did focus students' attentions on certain aspects of war
planning and not on others? Examining student assignments offers a clue on what was
involved in creating a successful naval officer in the early twentieth century.
Problem VIII continued by sketching out the following scenario, one whose broad
outlines occupied naval thought for more than four decades. It began with a souring of
diplomacy between Orange and Blue, after which Orange declared war and invaded the
Philippine island of Luzon. The Orange Navy, meanwhile, remained in Orange waters,
but maintained a base in the Pescadores, the island archipelago off the western coast of
Taiwan. As the Blue hold on the Philippines slipped away, Blue's fleet and transport
vessels were stationed at Panama. The problem asserted that Pearl Harbor and Guam
remained in solidly Blue hands, with both Oahu and Guam "considered secure from
attack." A convenient assumption.
48 Other colors in common use included Black for Germany, Red for Great Britain, and Green for Mexico,
more exotic ones included Citron for Brazil and Indigo for Iceland. For more on the color system, see
"Appendix I: The Colors of the Rainbow" in Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: Naval War College and the
American Mission, 1919-1941, 1st ed., U.S. Naval War College Historical Monograph Series ; No. 4
(Newport, R.I. and Washington, D.C.: Naval War College Press, 1980). For an examination of the
development of U.S. war plans against Japan, see also Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S.
Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991).
206
The problem asked its readers to fuel the coming war. Specifically, War College
students were asked to send the Blue fleet from Panama to the Philippine port of Polillo,
passing through Pearl Harbor and Guam. Eschewing abstractions, the problem clarified
what it meant by the fleet: it began with the flagship and embraced "Squadrons One,
Two, Three, Four, Five, Seven, Nine; Division Fourteen; Destroyer Divisions One to
Eight inclusive; Submarine Sections 30 to 33 inclusive; Train and fifteen 5,000 ton
transports."49 War College instructors meant the whole Pacific fleet. On Guam the
students were build a temporary base and ensure it a steady fuel supply from home. All
the while, the entire Pacific fleet had to be provided with fuel-mostly coal, but some oil
too-while accumulating emergency stocks at bases on Pearl Harbor and Guam.so The
fleet was to sail on January 1.
The assignment required students to calculate (there appeared von Caemmerer's
etymology) several elements of the Blue fleet's logistics plan. These elements included
the path for the ships to take (the "line of operations"), the locations of appropriate bases
to call upon for fuel and supplies, where fuel was to come from, the location and nature
of "lines of communication" between the fleet and Blue's home territory and along which
flowed the fuel itself, the nature of the transportation of the fuel, and where ships to move
it would come from.51
The fundamental tool used by the students to solve this problem was the table. At
various intervals, faculty detailed to the College requested reports on the fuel
consumption of naval vessels. This material they compiled into large tables quantifying
49 "Strategic 49. Class of July, 1915. Problem VIII. Situation, Solution and Critique," in NWC, RG 4, Box
12, Folder 478, 1-2.
50 Ibid., 1.
51 Ibid., 1-2.
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and organizing the data the planners believed most salient to war preparations. 52 But if
Vogelgesang supposed that tabulation translated into "simple arithmetic," Paymaster
Cowie asked his students to "imagine for a moment the mass of figures and the number
of computations necessary to ascertain the requirements for fitting out a fleet with
ordnance alone; and then consider the magnitude and intricacy of the task when it
involves not only ordnance but fuel, food, clothing, tentage, camp equipment, supplies,
hospital equipment and supplies, additional armament and equipment for repairs, and a
multiplicity of details, all requisite to put that fleet in complete preparedness to engage in
war in home waters." 53 Tables offered to organize this vast amount of information, but
there was nothing simple about the mathematics involved in understanding it.
The table offered the logistician several advantages over simply hoping for
military genius. Most importantly, the table could be prepared at any time in advance of
combat, with calculations based upon it developed for any imaginable contingency. 54
Some logistics tables collated a broad spectrum of potentially useful figures and statistics,
like the one compiled by Paymaster Cowie himself in 1917. For nearly 100 pages, Cowie
composed an economic snapshot of the resources of the nation. From forests to mines,
agriculture to manufacturing, imports to exports, he summarized the growing material
wealth of the nation. His purpose was neither national pride nor interest in business
opportunities, but "[flor the purpose of considering Logistics along broad lines" and
through which "many problems of vital interest to the country ... may be solved."55
52 See, for example, the letters and charts reporting fuel consumption for naval vessels in 1919 in NWC,
RG 8, Box 38, Folders 2-3, and 5 and also Paul Foley, "Notes on the Preparation of the Logistic Sheet.," in
NWC, RG 8, Box 45, Folder 2 (1911).
53 Cowie, "Logistics [Lecture 5 March, 1915]," 9.
54 Ibid.
55 T.J. Cowie, "Logistic Data on Production and Industry of the United States. 1 March, 1917.," in NWC,
RG 4, Box 2, Folder 86 (Newport, RI), 1.
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The constraint placed upon the students-that the Blue fleet needed to pass
through Pearl Harbor and Guam en route to Polillo-was arbitrary, but it forced the
solver to break the problem down into manageable segments. The first segment involved
moving from Panama to Pearl Harbor, a distance of some 4,665 miles. With the ships the
students were instructed to include, this voyage was out of reach in a single trip. In
particular Squadrons Four and Seven and the destroyers (facts the students were
presumed to have looked up), could not steam that far without refueling at least once
along the way. Moreover, all the submarines required towing. Could they be effectively
towed that far? Should the fleet be divided into two halves, with the larger ships
steaming directly for Hawaii and the smaller ones refueling first somewhere in
California? These questions offered the students their first logistical decisions. The
instructors hoped their students would see the value in keeping the fleet together given
the possibility of finding Orange ships somewhere around Hawaii. What followed in the
instructors' solutions was a series of choices and calculations that faced the student: what
harbors lay north of Panama along the Pacific coast? How far were they from the fleet?
Would ships be able to take on coal there? By posing these questions, the War College
faculty expected its students to think broadly about industrial warfare, its geographical
constraints, and the problems posed by limited supplies of energy.
In the problem's solution by War College faculty, the plan made several
significant assumptions, "favorable to us which, unfortunately," noted the authors in their
critique of the solutions, "do not exist."56 These simplifications included the presence of
fortified naval bases on Guam and at Pearl Harbor; the consideration of fuel alone and
with "[n]o thought ... given to provisions, ammunition, reinforcements of personnel,
56 "Strategic 49. Class of July, 1915. Problem VIII. Situation, Solution and Critique," 48.
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return of sick and wounded, clothing, or to general stores"; and finally, that the critical
links in the fleet train, the colliers and oil ships, exist where needed by the Navy and in
whatever numbers necessary. "This is very convenient," noted the instructors, "and
resembles assuming unlimited credit at a bank where you have no money. '"57 In practice,
these ships belonged to private companies, and their availability to the Navy depended
upon their existence at all, the possibility their owners would sell or lease them (itself
dependent upon "the lavish use of money" by the Navy), and that they could be brought
quickly from their present location to the scene of war.58 As complex as Problem VIII
was (its model solution comprised over 40 typeset pages), an actual naval operation
involved much more.
Of all the elements the War College faculty wanted students to address most
about coaling, the most critical involved calculating the quantity of merchant vessels the
Navy would need to acquire to support a Pacific operation. For the College's Class of
July, 1915, answers from the twenty students ranged from 140 to 211 ships with an
average of 172.59
Subsequent problems in later years varied Problem VIII's details, but maintained
the overall scenario. The problems assigned after World War I differ most markedly
from their predecessors in their emphasis on the simplified nature of the coaling logistics
problems compared with wartime reality. To a degree, and as noted above, all the earlier
logistics problems had acknowledged their assumptions and simplifications, but after the
war, even these admissions appeared inadequate. "It must be remembered that this
57 "Strategic 49. Class of July, 1915. Problem VIII: Situation, Solution and Critique," in NWC RG 4, Box
12, Folder 478 (1915), 48.
58 Ibid., 49.
59 "Strategic 49. Class of July, 1915. Problem VIII. Situation, Solution and Critique," 53.
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problem covers but a part of the task in the solution of what will be the Logistic problem
should we have to carry on a war in the Far East," observed the problem's authors. More
than coal needed to move across the ocean: also food, and munitions, and troops. As the
war revealed, some essential articles could not be relied upon from the U.S. alone, either.
"We will still be dependent on Brazil and Cuba for Manganese," they noted, "on Chile
for Nitrates and on various tropical countries for Rubber, none of these can be dispensed
with." 60 War had broadened the perspectives of War College instructors, and even if
their specific assignments did not yet reflect it, their message to their students was
unambiguous: coaling was a difficult project, but real war was vastly more complicated
to orchestrate.6' Nevertheless, coal and coaling provided the template for understanding
the essential process of logistics. Even in an over-simplified form, coal provided the
model upon which the logistics of warfare was imagined and taught. By focusing on
coal, the War College ensured that its students would gain experience with the kinds of
challenges facing the modern officer and the modem nation at war.
Logistics simulations alone, however, were insufficient to teach the full range of
skills officers needed to approach coaling in wartime. An additional complication,
immediately obvious during wartime was the subject of international law. The legal
status of neutral and belligerent nations shaped how coal and other materiel might
60 "Strategic 49. Modification 3. Class of June, 1919. Problem VII. (Logistic) Statement of Problem,
Discussion, Critique of Solutions, and Solution by War College Staff," in NWC, RG 4, Box 12, Folder 471,
1.
61 According to two of these exams, "No one who was in a position to see, during the World War, how
carefully each ton of coal, iron and other raw materials were allocated to various purposes; how each ship
was carefully considered as she came of [sic] the stocks as to whether she should be put in this or that
service, and how there never seemed enought [sic] transportation, either water or rail to go round, could be
greatly impressed by the magnitude of the task of drawing up the logistic plan for a war." See "Strategic 49.
Modification 4. Class of December, 1919. Problem IV. Statement of Problem, Discussion, Critique of
Solutions, and War College Staff Solution," in NWC, RG 4, Box 14, Folder 524, 3-4. The previous exam
referred to "the tremendous task of those responsible for the logistic plan of the nation at war." "Strategic
49. Modification 3. Class of June, 1919. Problem VII. (Logistic) Statement of Problem, Discussion,
Critique of Solutions, and Solution by War College Staff," 4.
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become available during war. The logistics of coaling was also approached at the Naval
War College through the study of international law, a constraint on empire-building
almost as substantial as the material availability of coal itself.
International Law Problems
Before the United States declared war on Spain, the U.S. Navy had assembled a coal
supply on the island of St. Thomas in the Danish West Indies. The bulk of the coal was
stored on shore, but some 1,000 tons rested in the hold of a schooner moored in the
harbor. After war broke out, both the Minneapolis and the Montgomery coaled from the
schooner while returning to the United States. In July, the Danish government protested
that supplying coal to American warships in the Indies-even with American coal stored
aboard an American ship-violated Denmark's neutrality. 62 Even before war had broken
out in early April, the Haitian government had likewise declared off limits its coal supply
at Mole St. Nicholas, a harbor between Hispaniola and Cuba. According to the New York
Times, the Haitian announcement was but "one of a number of similar notices from
foreign Governments whose coalings stations [sic] have been used by our ships in the
West Indies, the Lesser Antilles, and along the coasts of South and Central America. '"3
The most important neutral supplier of coal in the Caribbean was, of course, Great
Britain, who announced in mid-April that should the United States and Spain tumble into
war, the British government would consider coal contraband. Under these circumstances,
neither the United States nor Spain could make use of British naval stations in the
62 "Cannot Take Our Own Coal. Danish Authorities at St. Thomas Apply Neutrality Laws," New York
Times, July 3 1898.
63 "Mole St. Nicholas Closed. Haiti to Preserve Neutrality at the Coaling Station in the Event of War," New
York Times, April 6 1898.
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Americas except in emergencies. As in the American Civil War, when British neutrality
rules applied equally to both the North and South, one side tended to benefit more than
the other. During the Civil War, British neutrality favored the Confederacy over the
Union, though mainly because the South had more to gain by British aid. In 1898, this
policy favored the United States over Spain. Close to secure home ports and an abundant
coal supply, the U.S. benefited from Britain's refusal on legal grounds to aid Spain with
coal.64 This subject suggests the way coaling networks involved more than an assembly
of supplies, ships, and ports, but also a framework of international maritime law.
Naval officers attending the War College in the early 2 0 th century devoted
substantial time to illuminating this legal framework. In 1901, John Bassett Moore, a
Professor of International Law at Columbia University and an Assistant Secretary of
State during the war with Spain, arrived at the College to lead a seminar on the legal
dimensions of warfare. The seminar presented students with a series of cases for
analysis. The College collected student responses and published what would become the
first volume of almost 60 to deal with the international legal dimensions of modern war.
According to War College President C.S. Sperry, these dimensions included "those
difficult and urgent situations in which naval officers have been, or are likely to be,
involved." 65 When Moore left Newport, he advised the faculty to replace him with
another prominent figure in the study of international law, George Grafton Wilson. One
of the first Americans to define this subject, Wilson had begun teaching international law
to undergraduates at Brown University in 1891. In 1900 he began his association with
the War College with lectures on one of his academic specialties, the laws governing
64 "Coal Contraband of War. Great Britain's Decision Will Be Entirely to the Interest of the United States,"
New York Times, April 17 1898.
65 International Law Situations, with Solutions and Notes. 1904, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1905), 3.
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insurgency.66 Wilson assumed the editorship of the "blue book" series of international
law volumes begun by Moore and which were written to guide naval officers in their
activities around the world.
Questions about coaling, belligerents, and neutrality formed an important element
in the early blue books. Most situations were simply described, and asked students to
apply international law to solving them. Problem IV of 1904's series of situations is
illustrative of the general approach. The problem supposes war between the United
States and another nation known as State X. An American naval vessel steams into a
harbor of State Y, a state that had declared neutrality. In the harbor is anchored a U.S.
supply ship. "The war ship is about to take on coal, oil, etc., from the supply ship" the
problem asserts, "when the authorities of State Y protest against the action as a violation
of neutrality and forbid the use of the port for such purposes, claiming that it would be
equivalent to allowing the port to be used for the fitting out of an hostile expedition."
The problem then asks a series of questions: is State Y's claim legitimate? How should
the commander of the American warship respond? Might the legal claim be different if
the situation involved not one warship and one supply vessel but instead a whole fleet of
warships and their attending supply ships? 67
Another problem complicated this scenario by presuming that instead of coaling
in a neutral harbor, a warring nation's vessel coaled from a collier less than three miles
66 John B. Hattendorf et al., Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984), 55-6. On Moore, see "John Bassett Moore," Political
Science Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1948).
67 The solution to the problem notes that "[t]he protest of State Y is valid," though to the final question,
whether a whole fleet of warships and supply ships might alter the answer, the problem's authors observe
that while the answer is no, "[t]he presence of a fleet of war vessels with supply ships would make it
necessary for State Y to use greater care to see that there should be no violation of neutrality." We might
presume that the power of State Y to enforce its neutrality varies inversely with the number of foreign
warships in its waters. International Law Situations, with Solutions and Notes. 1904, 63.
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from a neutral nation's coast. A month later, the warship steamed into the neutral
nation's harbor and petitioned for "a reasonable supply of coal." The neutral nation
replied that since the warship had coaled from within its waters within the past three
months, international law required that it turn away the warship to preserve its
neutrality.68
An even more complicated legal situation arose when private citizens were
involved. This situation, presented in 1912, presumed war between States X and Y,
others being neutral. Under one permutation, a coal merchant from the neutral State Z is
selling high grade steaming coal to State Y. In open ocean, a cruiser of the belligerent
State X encounters a cruiser of the neutral State Z, the latter escorting a collier laden with
coal and bound for a neutral port in Z. The captain of X's cruiser knows that unchecked,
this coal is intended to be sold to its rival, State Y. Can it legally force the protecting
cruiser of Z to abandon the collier on the grounds that it is carrying contraband? What if
the coal merchant in Z sells steaming coal both to Y and merchant colliers? Can X insist
that sales to both be discontinued? What about the merchant's sales to neutral colliers of
Z that intend on steaming to Y to sell their coal? The scenarios were endless, and all
depended on the interpretation of a diverse body of legal thought, from U.S. case law to
international treaties to Presidential proclamations to examples from past conflicts. 69
International law must adapt to the world it purports to govern. The declaration
of Paris, a clarification of maritime law from 1856, established some fundamental
concepts regarding neutrality and contraband, but the new, industrial technologies of the
mid- 19th century left wide spaces for uncertainty. "Gradually circumstances," observed
68 International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes. 1908, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1909), 79.
69 International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes. 1912, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1912).
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the authors of the solution to one of these coaling problems, "particularly the introduction
of steam vessels, forced neutral states to make regulations in regard to the use of their
ports by belligerent vessels. Neutral states had come to recognize that they had the right
of control over belligerent vessels in their ports, and if they had the right they were
beginning to realize that it carried a corresponding obligation." 70 As noted in chapter 2, it
was during the American Civil War that neutral nations, especially Great Britain, invoked
a twenty-four hour rule limiting the time belligerent vessels could remain in neutral
British ports. Ulysses Grant announced the American policy on the question in 1870
during the Franco-Prussian War, in detail describing how a neutral United States would
treat French, German, or any other warring nation's ships.
The position of the United States was clarified just two years later during the
path-breaking 1872 Geneva Arbitration, when Great Britain submitted to an international
tribunal to judge the assertions of the United States that Britain had violated the
principles of neutrality during the Civil War. As shown in Chapter 3, coal formed a
major point of conflict between Britain and the United States. According to Charles
Francis Adams, the American representative to the arbitration board, "[t]his question of
coals was little considered by writers on the law of nations and by sovereign powers until
the present century. It has become one of the first importance, now that the motive power
of all vessels is so greatly enhanced by it." And further, that "[t]he effect of this
application of steam power has changed the character of war on the ocean, and invested
with a greatly preponderant force those nations which possess most largely the best
material for it within their own territories and the greatest number of maritime places
70 International Law Topics and Discussions. 1906, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1907), 67.
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over the globe where deposits may be conveniently provided for their use."71 If the
contours of this changed character were emerging in the 1860s and 1890s, the full impact
of industrial power in wartime emerged during World War I. This conflict propelled
logistics to a whole new level of importance, for the lines of supply studied and planned
for at Newport during the preceding two decades now reached deep into the American
industrial economy. As the scope of logistics expanded, so did the perception of its
centrality to modem warfare.
Naval Logistics in Newport after World War I
According to one officer, C.S. Baker, from the war experience "there has arisen a modem
aspect of logistics, far broader than that of the past." Mobilization ceased to be a
province of strictly military planning, let alone an academic exercise. Its scope had
expanded, too, for after the war, writers and lecturers at the War College went beyond the
narrow conception of logistics as enabling naval strategy and announced instead "Its
National Aspect." Logistics became a topic of national importance. The new conception
reflected the war experience, and embraced the mobilization of financial resources
through taxation and borrowing, the alliance with industry to produce war materiel like
ships, munitions, and fuels, and the provision of vast amounts of food, fuel, and other
resources to Americans and their Allies. Baker called the war "[t]he greatest problem in
logistics ever given to a warring power."72
71 Papers Relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. 4: Geneva Arbitration; Report of U.S. Agent, Protocols,
Award, Etc., H. Exdoc. 1/6, 42nd. Cong., 3rd. sess. (1872).
72 C.S. Baker, "Logistics - Its National Aspect. Lecture Delivered 22 September, 1922," in NWC, RG 4,
Box 15, Folder 663 (Newport, RI), 1.
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Baker concluded that future military leaders would require a much wider scope
than their traditional expertise in strategy and tactics. "Success in the future," Baker
declared, "more than ever, will depend on a greater task, that of the mobilization of a
nation's finances, resources, materials and man power and their employment in the most
effective way."73
The scale of preparation required for the war introduced a troubling difficulty to
naval planners that was only dimly considered in the United States before 1917. With the
nation's professed cultural resistance to extensive war preparations during peacetime and
a historic reluctance to develop long term military planning, officers in the Navy found it
difficult to persuade Congress for the very resources they believed were desperately
needed to prepare for future wars. "Politics and its national viewpoint discourage such
national insurance on a big scale," exclaimed Baker. Since the logistics for warfare
dictated that such planning and securing of resources was necessary, officers sought to
instruct "a hard headed Congress" and keep wartime planning boards in a "skeletonized"
state, ready to be activated in a future emergency.74
Instruction on logistics at the College also changed. Unlike many of his
predecessors lecturing on this topic in the previous fifteen years, the new head of the
College's Logistics Section, R.E. Bakenhus emphasized the novelty, not historical
continuity, of logistical problems. Symptomatically, he rejected appeals to dictionaries or
prominent 19th century military thinkers for the proper boundaries of the subject (as
Vogelgesang and Cowie had done just a few years before), insisting instead that to
understand the meaning of logistics "the dictionary writer should come to the War
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73 Ibid., 2.
74 Ibid., 27.
College and not the War College to the dictionary." The World War and industrial
revolution had so transformed the field that "[w]e may suffer if we adopt a dictionary
definition.., or take the viewpoint of some authoritative writer of the past." Moreover, he
explained, "[w]e may not suffer from the limitations of previous thought on the subject
while taking full advantage, at the same time, of all that has been written." In one lecture
in 1926, Bakenhus twice repeated for his students (in case they missed the significance
the first time) a statement found in a document from the College's sibling institution, the
Army War College: "The greatest difficulty in executing all phases of the War operations
lies in logistics." Repeating the quote, the officer emphasized "greatest," "all phases,"
and "logistics." 75
While early logistics study at the College emphasized supplies and provisioning-
and fueling the fleet representing the most studied and most important example-
logistics after the war embraced what Bakenhus called " a broader subject." This
"broader" conception moved beyond the Navy itself to include both the larger industrial
and material activities that made naval warfare possible. In addition, it embraced the
Navy's role in maintaining the economic life of the nation whether at war or at peace.
Post-war logistics thus included not only coal and resources for the Navy alone, but the
broad spectrum of "strategic raw materials" demanded by industry that the United States
did not itself produce domestically. From the broader public, the identity of these
materials was kept secret, and students were advised to consult the College's archives for
access to raw materials analysis.76
75 Bakenhus, "Lecture as to the Course in Logistics: 1 December, 1926," 4-5.
76 Ibid., 7-9.
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The College's earlier research on coal, however, provided the template for how
logistics problems were understood and organized, from the assembly of large tables to
the types of calculations performed in war simulations. As the Navy's logisticians began
connecting the health of the nation's economy to military preparedness, they began
identifying the "national interests" that have since become identified with the American
empire that took shape in the 20th century. While the pursuit of coal and coaling stations
in the 19t century began with an interest in supporting American trade, after World War
I the practitioners of logistics science believed that the very existence of the nation had
come to depend on managing resources, especially energy resources like coal.
Moreover, as the conception of naval logistics broadened to include strategic raw
materials, so too did corresponding naval strategy. "If we must have a detailed
knowledge of our own strategic raw materials and their sources of supply and rates of
trade," Bakenhus lectured, "then we must also have the same information as to the
enemy's strategic raw materials." This subject became one of widespread study in the
1920s, and this sort of thinking in terms of strategic raw materials could also influence
the character of international rivalries. Several students of the logistical aspect of
economic growth concluded that Japan's lack of certain materials in both its home islands
and its colonies in nearby mainland Asia necessarily implied that it could "never become
a first class industrial nation." If this analysis proved conclusive, observed Bakenhus, "it
would have a profound effect on the feeling of security which the United States might
have.""
As naval officers began studying the resources associated with manufacturing and
military supremacy, they often remarked on two observations. First, the United States
77 Ibid., 9-13.
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possessed an unusually bountiful endowment of minerals, forests, and agricultural
products. This observation, of course, traced back to the earliest reports of New World
abundance from European colonists and explorers. The second observation was more
characteristic of the 1920s: that some of these resources were heading towards
exhaustion, in both the United States and the world more generally. "Expert mining
engineers already see the end of our lead and zinc production," Bakenhus lectured. "Tin
appears to be similarly doomed." He continued by placing modem resource use in its
broader historical context, noting "that more minerals have been mined in the world since
1907 than in all the previous history of the world." He was speaking in 1926.78
By the mid-1920s, the NWC's formal course in logistics approached the subject
from both theoretical and practical levels. Basic principles acknowledged the essential
connection between ships and shore. The job of logistics was to understand the
constraints this connection imposed on the fleet and to decide how to work within these
limitations in carrying out naval policy. The constraints included "physical
characteristics" of landscapes and weather, supplies, and finances. Logistics embraced
increasing scales of complexity, from ensuring the mobility of individual warships to the
larger fleet of repair ships, merchant vessels, and other auxiliaries that facilitated the
activities of warships, on to the global network of naval bases, themselves connected to
the vast "natural resources of the nation and its mercantile and industrial facilities."79
The World War, in fact, encouraged the division of the subject into two elements.
Naval logistics embraced the traditional subject of manpower, material resources, and
78 Ibid., 11.
79 "Course in Logistics: I. Basic Principles in Naval Logistics; II. Logistics and the Principles of War; III.
Logistics. Conservation of Effort and Material. Cost. 15 October, 1926," in NWC, RG 4, Box 29, Folder
1207 (Newport, RI), 1.
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"the details necessary to the movement and supply of naval units in naval operations."
National logistics, in contrast, included the wider problem of mobilizing the resources of
the nation to avert or facilitate war.80
Naval logistics began with the analysis of the resources made available by
national logistics. It embraced inducting and training new recruits; designing,
constructing, and supplying ships; and maintaining bases. Destroyers required their own
bases, as did submarines. Advanced bases held supplies far from the continental United
States near territories believed likely to involve naval activity in the future. Dry docks
helped build and repair ships. Supply depots and fuel stations maintained vital war
materiel. There were facilities to manufacture, maintain, and distribute ordnance.
Hospitals, recreation fields, rifle ranges. Channels and anchorages. Radio stations.
Training stations. And industrial warfare also required these facilities be connected, that
supplies reach the fleet through colliers, oil tankers, cargo vessels, and refrigerated
ships.81
National logistics embraced the entire material resources of the United States,
from its population and geography to its agriculture, minerals, and energy resources.
Strategic minerals included antimony, chromium, and manganese. Strategic foods
included coffee and sugar. Other strategic goods ranged from hemp fiber for ropes to
nitrates for munitions and fertilizers to hides, rubber, silk, and wool. Materials questions
also included sources of supply, the trade routes these supplies followed, and the effects
80 "Course in Logistics: Outline of Logistics. November 1926," in NWC, RG 4, Box 29, Folder 1206
(Newport, RI), 2.
81 Ibid., 14-7.
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of possible war upon them. Energy shaped industrial productivity and economic
mobilization; national wealth the economic limits of peace and war.82
***
The invention of modern naval logistics transformed the operations of the Navy.
Through the new science, methods of planning, teaching, and organization changed naval
strategy and tactics in the early 20d century as much as new weapons and
communications technologies. This transformation began with coal, as War College
instructors dusted off, revived, and adapted European thinking on logistics as it had been
developed for early 19 th century land warfare to the needs of 20 th century warfare at sea.
By bringing this study to the Naval War College, logistics-minded officers ensured that
the Navy's brightest young officers would learn the principles of"scientific
management" for the Navy and hopefully, carry that thinking with them to more senior
levels of naval command.
Even after World War I, as the importance of coal began to wane with the
increasing use of energy from oil, the Navy continued its interest in coal and the
geography of its supply. Aided by research at the War College, in the 1910s and 1920s,
the Navy pursued one final attempt to solve the coal problem, this time by turning its
interest to the coal fields of Alaska.
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82 Ibid., 3, 5-7.
Chapter 5: Alaska: Infinite Coal Mine of the Imperial Imagination
In May 1902, the engineer Harrington Emerson surveyed the prospects for American
trade in the Pacific basin, and he nodded approvingly at what he saw. "Commerce and
civilization have passed from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic" he declared, "and
perhaps in turn will pass from the Atlantic to the larger ocean, the Pacific."' One
suspects that Emerson used "perhaps" out of modesty, for he exuded confidence in the
westward march of the children of Europe. At the dawn of the twentieth century, this
march was no longer of homesteaders but of modern industry, and it carried industry's
appetite for resources, most importantly the energy sources supporting regional growth.
"Certainly the Pacific Ocean is assuming importance," Emerson announced, "and modern
commercial importance is founded on coal." 2
Fittingly, the lands surrounding the Pacific were rich in coal. Along the western
North American coast alone, geologists estimated that coal reserves rivaled the massive
fields of central Appalachia. From Australia to Chile to Alaska, Emerson identified coal
fields he believed were destined to elevate American industry, support its international
trade, and secure geopolitical influence in the Pacific. Alaska, in particular, drew his
notice. It was, of course, already an American possession and thus easier for Americans
to exploit than other parts of the Pacific rim. Furthermore, the preceding six years had
brought momentous changes to the territory. Gold discoveries in the Klondike in 1896
followed by additional strikes in Nome three years later brought labor and capital
1 Harrington Emerson, "The Coal Resources of the Pacific," The Engineering Magazine 23, no. 2 (1902):
161.
2 Ibid.: 164.
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investment. The explosive growth of Alaskan salmon fisheries, similarly attracted the
attention of investors. The construction of the territory's first two railroads offered the
prospect of further settlement and industrial development. The United States' acquisition
of Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines stimulated a newfound interest in the nation's older
Pacific domain as well, for Alaska's long coastline and island chains lay along the shorter
northern route across the ocean and offered valuable harbors for refueling en route to
Asia. And, of course, Emerson saw great prospects in the exploitation of Alaska's
potentially massive coal fields.3
Two decades later, Emerson's vision of global commerce and industry shifting to
the Pacific was not quite fulfilled, but the movement for Alaskan development had only
grown stronger and development still meant coal. For no less a visionary of regional
planning than Benton MacKaye, coal would usher Alaska into the twentieth century,
completing what he called a "big three" of extractive resources beginning with fur seals
in the eighteenth century and gold in the nineteenth. If furs first attracted Europeans to
the land and gold offered the prospect of instant wealth, coal, according to MacKaye,
awakened Americans to the prospect of systematically developing Alaska in a permanent
manner.4 MacKaye envisioned opening Alaska to massive colonization and the
sustainable development of its resources while replacing exploitative and temporary
mining camps with permanent mining communities where miners would labor under just
conditions. Developing coal resources would stimulate copper mining, thus supporting
global electrification, and lumbering, for construction in Alaska and as export for paper
3 Ibid.: 165.
4 Benton MacKaye, "Alaska -- an Opportunity to Build a Nation," in Dartmouth College Library; The
Papers of the MacKaye Family; ML-5 (182):22 (1920), 3.
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products. 5 With this prosperous future barely visible on the horizon, MacKaye wrote
optimistically of "a potential nation," "a hinterland to be opened up," and "the chance to
build a nation within a nation.'"
If Alaskan coal tantalized the promoter and planner with prospects of regional
development and fantastic profits, it attracted the U.S. Navy with the possibility of
securing a naval and commercial preponderance in the Pacific Ocean. As shown in
previous chapters, coal and its relation to Pacific geopolitics had long been of immense
interest to the Navy. In the years following 1898, that interest would increasingly involve
Alaska. The acquisition of Hawaii, Guam, and most importantly, the Philippines,
introduced new strategic and logistic challenges to the United States: how could the U.S.
hold these islands in peacetime and in war? How best could the U.S. government
encourage commerce between the Americas and Asia? How could the Navy maintain its
vital fuel supply, especially during wartime when sea lanes became vulnerable to attack?
Alaska's proximity to central Pacific islands and mainland Asia, a geographical curiosity
before 1898, took on a new significance as the Navy extended its technological,
ecological, and strategic coaling network into Alaskan waters.
In naval thought during the quarter century after 1898, Alaska moved from the
periphery to the center of strategic planning. The Pacific Ocean remained a vast space,
but developments in navigation, resource extraction, and labor politics gave Alaska an
increasingly important place in that ocean. Scholars have employed the term "imagined
s For food, MacKaye thought colonists could bring agriculture to "ready-made-farms" prepared by the
government. Collections of these farms would "be linked together into self-governing communities." Ibid.,
8.
6 Ibid., 4, 8. For more on MacKaye's interest in Alaskan development see, Larry Anderson, Benton
Mackaye: Conservationist, Planner, and Creator of the Appalachian Trail, Creating the North American
Landscape (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 62-9, 76-7, 125, 302-3.
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geography" to suggest how the subjective apprehension of spatial relationships has
shaped historical processes. There may be a real world out there, these scholars contend,
but it is known only through constructed, and therefore contingent, spatial relationships.
These geographies, whether formal printed maps or ordinary conceptions of distance,
implicitly privilege particular spatial relationships over others of which we might well
conceive.7 Naval planners viewed Alaska's relationship to the ocean, the U.S., and naval
strategy differently in the 1920s than they had in 1898. They imagined geography
differently.
Emerson and MacKaye were better visionaries than oracles. Alaska never
developed the coal industry both men so ardently prophesied, and the Navy failed to
develop the coaling infrastructure in Alaska that it desired. It misapprehended costs,
minimized engineering challenges, fumbled relations with labor, and misinterpreted the
meaning of geological surveys, but in the quarter century after 1898, their work
transformed Alaska and the way that Americans viewed it. This transformation began at
the cusp of the twentieth century, at the historical moment where coal, commerce, navies,
and navigation intersected.
Imagining Alaska
7 See, for example, a recent sample of such works in Anne Godlewska, "Map, Text and Image: The
Mentality of Enlightened Conquerors: A New Look at the Description De L'egypte," Transactions of the
Institute ofBritish Geographers (New Series) 20, no. 1 (1995), D. Graham Burnett, Masters ofAll They
Surveyed : Exploration, Geography, and a British El Dorado (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2000), Derek Gregory, "Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849-50,"
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers (New Series) 20, no. 1 (1995), Susan Schulten, The
Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), Joan M.
Schwartz, "The Geography Lesson: Photographs and the Construction of Imaginative Geographies,"
Journal of Historical Geography 22, no. 1 (1996), Daniel Lord Smail, Imaginary Cartographies:
Possession and Identity in Late Medieval Marseille (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), Emma Teng,
Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895, Harvard East
Asian Monographs ; 230 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).. The pioneering theoretical
roots of this work may be found in Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 25th anniversary ed. (New York: Vintage
Books, 2003), Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London; New York: Verso, 1991).
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The Great Circle and the Route to Asia
"It is not generally recognized" observed George Washington Littlehales in 1899, "that
science, employing the mathematician and the engineer alike in the problem of
shortening the duration of ocean transit, has accomplished as much by causing ships to
travel fewer miles as by causing them to travel faster."8 Littlehales, an engineer in the
U.S. Hydrographic Office, was commenting on one of the most far reaching
transformations in ocean navigation since the introduction of steam power itself.
Traveling fewer miles by sea had become possible not only because steam power allowed
ships to travel independently of the wind, but because new mathematical techniques
developed in the nineteenth century allowed navigators to calculate the new routes more
directly than ever before. These new techniques facilitated navigation along a great
circle.
A great circle is a mariner's fiction. It describes the imaginary path tracing the
shortest distance along the surface of the earth. Imagine sticking two pins into an
ordinary globe, one pin at San Francisco, California and the other at Yokohama, Japan.
Stretch a thread tightly between the pins. The path traced by the thread describes an arc
of a great circle. Mathematicians dubbed it an orthodromic curve. This path between
San Francisco and Yokohama does not run through the central Pacific as one might
expect, but much farther north, near the Aleutian Islands. If this thread extended beyond
both pins and met again on the other side of the globe, the complete curve would
represent a circumference of the planet, the largest circle on the globe one could measure:
8 G. W. Littlehales, The Development of Great Circle Sailing, 2d ed., Publication - U.S. Hydrographic
Office; No. 90 (Washington: G.P.O., 1899), 9.
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a great circle. 9 The equator traces a unique great circle, everywhere equidistant from the
poles. Meridian lines are great circles as well, reaching from one pole to the other and
back again, crossing the equator at right angles.' 0
Navigators had understood for centuries that great circle routes minimized
distances. Littlehales himself speculated that "knowledge... of the great circle must have
been coeval with the knowledge of the spherical form of the earth."" The earliest
English authors on navigation were certainly aware of them. The Elizabethan navigator
John Davis called great circles "the chiefest" of all possible routes. In the seventeenth
century, Henry Phillippes called them "the most exact way."' 2 Yet knowledge of the
great circle in theory did not translate into their use in practice. Many standard
navigational texts as late as the first half of the nineteenth century barely discussed great
circle sailing, if they mentioned it at all. Characteristic of this neglect was Nathaniel
Bowditch's New American Practical Navigator, "the seaman's bible," well into its 18th
9 This model, of course, assumes a spherical globe. The earth is more approximately, though still not
perfectly, an oblate spheroid, the figure traced by an ellipse rotated about its shorter axis. The earth's
radius at the equator is 21.39 kilometers greater than its radius at the poles. See, for greater detail, C. M. R.
Fowler, The Solid Earth : An Introduction to Global Geophysics (Cambridge [England] ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990). pp 163-6, 452. Great circles have other defining features as well. The
plane containing a great circle always passes through the center of the earth, and thus always divides the
planet into two equal hemispheres.
10 For explanations of great circle routes, see S. T. S. Lecky, "Wrinkles" In Practical Navigation, 14th
revised and enlarg ed. (London, etc.,: 1903), 665-8, Nathaniel Bowditch, George Wood Logan, and United
States. Navy Dept. Bureau of Equipment., The American Practical Navigator, Being an Epitome of
Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, Rev. in 1880, ed., [U.S.] Hydrographic Office. [Publication] No. 9
(Washington,: Govt. print. off., 1906), 11-2, 56-8, Littlehales, The Development of Great Circle Sailing.
Circles on the earth that are not great circles, like parallels of latitude, are called small circles.
I Littlehales, The Development of Great Circle Sailing, 9.
12 John Davis, The Seamans Secrets: Deuided into 2. Partes, Wherein Is Taught the Three Kindes of
Sayling, Horizontall, Paradoxall, and Sayling Vpon a Great Circle... (Imprinted at London: Thomas
Dawson, 1599), 43. The other two sailings were horizontal, by which ships traced courses parallel with the
equator and other lines of latitude, and Mercator, also known as paradoxal or rhumb sailing, by which
ships' courses trace constant angles with meridians and thus appear as straight lines on Mercator charts.
Henry Phillippes, The Geometrical Sea-Man: Or, the Art of Navigation Performed by Geometry, The
second edition much inlarg ed. (London: Printed by Robert and Willia [m Leybourn for] George Hurlock ...
1657), 48.
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edition in 1848 before its editors even added a section on great circle sailing.13 Before
steam power first augmented, and later came to dominate ocean propulsion, great circle
routes could be traversed only when they coincided with favorable winds, which was
rare.
Because sailing ships depended on the wind, they typically required different
routes for each leg of a round trip voyage, one leg frequently much longer in distance and
transit time than the other. Sailing ships between China and the United States
experienced particular challenges. Beginning in China, navigators preparing for this
voyage were advised to follow the great circle, catching the mighty, warm Japan stream
northeast towards the Aleutian Archipelago before veering southward along the North
American coast. 14 The return journey from the United States to Asia was more
circuitous. Ships left from ports like San Francisco or Puget Sound, bearing south
towards Mexico. There, they picked up the northeasterly trade winds between 150 and
20' north (a band of latitude that includes most of the Yucatan Peninsula), avoiding the
quiescent "horse latitudes" to the north. Crossing the Pacific westward, they sailed south
of the Hawaiian Islands (or they might stop there for trade or supplies) then north of the
Marshalls. Seasonal weather determined what came next. Southwest monsoons between
May and October forced ships north of the Caroline Islands and south of the Marianas,
where ships could find respite at the group's southernmost island of Guam. Otherwise,
between October and April, northeast monsoons pushed ships north of the Marianas, past
13 Editors were necessary because Bowditch himself had died a decade earlier. John F. Campbell, History
and Bibliography of the New American Practical Navigator and the American Coast Pilot (Salem, Mass.,:
Peabody Museum, 1964).
14 See, for example, Ferdinand Labrosse, The Navigation of the Pacific Ocean, China Seas, Etc, trans.
Jacob W. Miller, Publications / U.S. Hydrographic Office ; No. 58 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1875), 219-21.
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the volcanic peaks of the Farallones de Pajaros before ships finally entered the Philippine
and East China Seas.1 5
The introduction of steam power did not immediately obviate the popularity of
this central route across the Pacific. In the late nineteenth century, vessels crossing this
ocean continued to navigate sea lanes first traversed by the Spanish during the 16th
century. Tradition, no doubt, played a role preserving the course through Hawaii, as did
milder weather and the developing trade nexus between the American Pacific coast and
Asia at Honolulu. But preference alone did not limit ships and their navigators from the
advantages offered by steam. Instead, authors of navigational texts suggest a more subtle
reason, blaming the general avoidance of great circle routes on the impracticality of
performing the navigational calculations it required. More conventional routes, however
lengthy or roundabout in practice, required only simple determinations of the ship's
course and were easy to chart and straightforward to travel.
Great circles, in contrast, required ponderous, repetitious calculations. Navigators
had to plot frequent course adjustments every one or two hundred miles. "It has been
found impossible to introduce the general use of great circle sailing" lamented one
mathematician, citing the difficulty of "fresh calculations or constructions by no means
simple" when a ship inevitably deviated from an originally plotted course.' 6 John
Towson, the developer of one technique that simplified great circle sailing, explained that
course adjustments needed "so often to be repeated as to preclude its being generally
is Ibid., 117, 57-9.
16 Richard A. Proctor, "Charts for Great Circle Sailing," Scientific American Supplement XX, no. 501
(1885): 7992.
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adopted."" In the Hydrographic Office, Littlehales complained of "tedious operations"
and "the want of concise methods for rendering these benefits readily available."' 8 If the
technology of steam engines liberated ocean transit from the wind, it left more
fundamental mathematical problems of navigation unsolved.
But not for long. Navigation is the quintessential practical science, shaped as
significantly by new techniques as by new theories or technologies. The decades
between 1840 and 1900 witnessed a flurry of mathematical activity to aid the navigator in
the calculation of great circle routes. In fact, German, French, British, and American
navigators devised more than two dozen mathematical techniques to simplify steam
navigation. The British Astronomer Royal, George Biddell Airy, for example, devised a
method for superimposing an approximate great circle track upon an ordinary Mercator
chart using a table he prepared and simple geometry. Gustave Herrle introduced another
technique, employing unusually distorted maps that represented great circles as straight
lines. With these developments, navigators increasingly traveled along great circle
routes.
For navigators willing to traverse it, the trans-Pacific great circle route made great
business. It was the shortest and fastest route possible for passengers, mail, silk, and tea.
The Canadian Pacific Line, the backbone of Canada's network of transcontinental
17 John Thomas Towson, Tables to Facilitate the Practice of Great Circle Sailing, and the Determination
ofAzimuths, 6th ed. (London: Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, 1861), 48.
Littlehales, The Development of Great Circle Sailing, 10. For a similar observation that cumbersome
mathematical technique, not a lack of knowledge of principle, hindered the adoption of great circle
navigation, see "Scientific News in Washington: Recent Developments in Great Circle Sailing," Science 12,
no. 291 (1888). Even with successive improvements in great circle calculation techniques in the latter half
of the nineteenth century, dissatisfaction with their application persisted well into the twentieth. In 1919, a
US Navy Commander repined [growled?] that of the two major approaches then available, one required "a
rather long preliminary study of the method" and the other "require[d] the navigator to burden his memory
with a rarely used formula," both approaches still tending towards error. H. G. S. Wallace, "Great Circle
Sailing -- a Few "Wrinkles" To Save Time," United States Naval Institute -- Proceedings 45, no. 7 (1919).
19 Littlehales, The Development of Great Circle Sailing.
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railroads and steamships and a cornerstone of the British world-wide communication
network, began traveling this northern route for chartered mail delivery in 1891. Its
Empress ofJapan crossed the Pacific in record time that summer, carrying mail from
Yokohama to London two weeks faster than by the competing route through the Suez
canal.20 Throughout the ensuing decade, the Canadian Pacific's Empress lines crossed
the Pacific, in either direction, in barely ten days, maintaining a consistent three day
advantage over the southern Pacific route through Hawaii. 21
The U.S. conquest of the Philippines after 1898 brought a new urgency to great
circle navigation for Americans and a newfound interest by the U.S. Navy in Alaska's
Aleutian island arc. Between Cape Flattery, the northwestern point of Washington State,
and Cape Bojeador, the maritime gateway to Manila, the great circle route passes just
north of the Aleutian Archipelago. The route's vertex crosses the 180 th meridian, which
nearly divides the chain in half. The similar great circle route between San Francisco and
Manila passes a mere 250 miles south of the Aleutians. "These facts show," observed
Admiral of the Navy George Dewey in 1903, "what is not so easily learned from
inspection of a Mercator's chart," that ships steaming to Asia "are diverted from the ideal
shortest track" when they travel through Hawaii instead of the Aleutians. The route from
Puget Sound to Manila by the great circle route measured fully eleven hundred miles less
20 George Musk, Canadian Pacific Afloat, 1883-1968: A Short History and Fleet List, Rev. 1968 ed.
([Warrington,: Canadian Pacific, 1968), 4. The actual length of this voyage is not especially clear. Musk
has the route between Yokohama and Vancouver in August, 1891 as lasting ten days, thirteen hours, and
ten minutes; Frank Bowen clocks the trip at nine days, nineteen hours, and thirty-nine minutes. Compare
George Musk, Canadian Pacific : The Story of the Famous Shipping Line, 2nd ed. (Newton Abbot
[England]: David & Charles, 1989), 151, Frank Charles Bowen, History of the Canadian Pacific Line
(London,: S. Low Marston & Co. [1928]), 111. In one work, Musk cites to total trip to London as lasting
26 days, elsewhere, he says 22; compare Musk, Canadian Pacific Afloat, 1883-1968: A Short History and
Fleet List, Musk, Canadian Pacific : The Story of the Famous Shipping Line. Whatever the precise times,
the point is that the great circle route between Canada and Asia was consistently faster than the competing
route through Suez.
21 George Dewey for General Board to SecNav 11/25/1903, in File, "412, 1903-1911," Box 36, General
Board [Hereafter "GB"] Subject File, RG 80, NAI.
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than the equatorial route passing through Hawaii, Guam, and beyond. To Dewey, the
strategic advantages of great circle sailing were inescapable: valuable time and fuel could
be saved. What was more, were it possible to find a suitable harbor there, Dewey
believed the Aleutian islands provided an ideal location for a major coaling station for
ships crossing the Pacific and a new locus for American power in the region.22 Finding
that harbor, however, proved unexpectedly challenging.
Aleutian Voyages
The Aleutian archipelago, the reticulated tail of Pacific North America, is a chain of more
than three hundred islands stretching roughly 1,200 miles from the Alaska Peninsula in
the east to the remote Attu Island in the west. The islands had long provided an
important home to sealing and fishing industries.23 Once the Philippines became an
American colony in 1898, the commercial importance of the Aleutians was augmented by
a new strategic significance by virtue of its proximity to the great circle route. Before the
war, the Aleutians had never drawn any sustained attention from the Navy, but with new
possessions in Asia to defend-and subdue--naval planners faced logistic questions on a
scale unprecedented in the Pacific. As shown in chapter 3, officers studying at the Naval
War College in Newport during this period practiced regular war games to simulate and
prepare for a naval war to defend the Philippines against an imagined enemy power. A
22 Ibid.
23 The Aleutians had been first extensively explored by Americans in the early 1870s, through a series of
summer expeditions by the U.S. Coast Survey. Under William H. Dall, Coast Survey scientists measured
currents and tides and recorded the meteorology of the chain. In 1873, they surveyed the islands of Attu,
Kiska, the Davidoffs, Amchitka, Adakh, Atkha, Unalaska, and the Shumagin group. Kiska was then of
particular importance; of all the harbors surveyed, it alone provided a harbor adequate to build a relay
station for a proposed telegraphic cable from North America to Japan. Dall described the chain as having a
"mild and uniform" climate, "not so cold as that of Philadelphia," but buffeted by frequent fogs, rain, and
"extreme fluctuations" in barometric pressure William H. Dall, "Explorations in the Aleutian Islands and
Their Vicinity," Journal of the American Geographical Society of New York 5 (1874): 244.
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large coaling station in the Aleutians might aid such a campaign, allowing battleships to
refuel en route to Asia and arrive there ready for combat.
During August 1900, Admiral Dewey and the new naval policy and strategy
consulting body over which he presided, the General Board, actively sought more
information about the Aleutians. The matter had utmost importance: during the Board's
very first meeting that summer, its members considered the selection of just two Pacific
bases to defend their new colony, one in the Philippines itself and the other in the
Aleutians along the great circle route.24 Through October, the Board contacted anyone
with knowledge of the archipelago's weather: naval officers, the Revenue Marine
(renamed the U.S. Coast Guard in 1915), the Army's transport service, the Hydrographic
Office and the Weather Bureau, and merchant captains familiar with the northern Pacific.
From their offices in Washington and Newport, Dewey and the members of the Board
considered this information and concluded that five harbors in the region merited further
investigation. Four of them clustered around the 180th meridian, the vertex of the great
circle route: the Bay of Waterfalls on Adakh Island, Kiska Harbor on Great Kiska Island,
and Nazan Bay and the Bay of Islands on Atkha Island, all pristine, undeveloped harbors.
The fifth, Unalaska's Dutch Harbor, served as a regional trading post, refueling station
for commercial vessels, and port of anchor for fishing vessels. Unlike the other four
sites, private companies based at Dutch Harbor maintained a small commercial coaling
station there that served the local maritime economy. Dutch Harbor was, however, over
400 miles distant from the great circle route.25 During the next survey season in the
24 George Dewey for General Board to SecNav 11/25/1903.
25 "Dutch Harbor (Unalaska), Alaska; Summary of Correspondence, 4/10/1915," in File, "412, 1912-1915,"
Box 37, General Board Subject File, RG 80, NAI, Senior Member Present (General Board) to SecNav
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summer of 1901, the General Board ordered the USS Concord, a veteran of Dewey's
assault on Manila Bay, to survey the Bay of Waterfalls and Kiska Harbor.26
Little came of these surveys, though Dewey later recalled having "urged the
matter upon the Department's attention." During the summer of 1902, the Navy sent the
Revenue Cutter McCulloch to the Bay of Waterfalls (for a second survey) and Atkah
Island's Nazan Bay. A year later, the entire Pacific Squadron steamed to the Aleutians to
survey various islands.2 7 "It is desirable" wrote Secretary of the Navy William Moody to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron, Rear-Admiral Henry Glass, "to find
some harbor near the 18 0th meridian that can be utilized by naval vessels crossing the
Pacific Ocean to take coal from colliers, or possibly for the establishment of a permanent
coal depot protected by fortifications." 28 Moody instructed Glass to survey the Bay of
Islands on Adakh Island and Kiska Harbor on Great Kiska Island; the two islands lay
within about 150 miles of either side of the 180th meridian, where the great circle route
swept closest to the Aleutians.29
The Pacific Squadron's survey illustrated how life on the sea was inseparably
bound to the natural world. Steam transportation had liberated vessels from the
circulation of trade winds, but not from weather. Rear-Admiral Glass began his
8/30/1915, "Coaling Facilities in Alaskan Waters," in NAI RG 80; RG Subject File; Box 37; File, "412,
1912-1915".
26 George Dewey for General Board to SecNav 11/25/1903.
27 Ibid.28 William H. Moody to Comm-in-Chief Pacific Squadron 6/13/1903, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box
36; File, "412, 1903-1911".29 Ibid. Although the great circle route from Puget Sound to Manila actually swung north of some Aleutian
islands, ships following that path typically avoided steaming too far north to avoid passing through the
dangerous straights between individual islands. According to one General Board Report of 1903, "[t]he
violent and irregular currents, frequent fogs, hidden rocks and imperfectly charted shores, have justly
caused these passes to be regarded as difficult of navigation, and have deterred the trans-Pacific steamers
from following the true great circle track to the northward of the islands." "Dutch Harbor (Unalaska),
Alaska; Summary of Correspondence, 4/10/1915."; See also William H. Moody to Comm-in-Chief Pacific
Squadron 6/13/1903.
236
preparations in May. Urging his superiors that the voyage begin no later than July, he
advised against remaining in northern latitudes after the middle of August, after which
"the liability of encountering heavy gales increases."30 Glass also had to plan for coaling,
highlighting the very logistical limitations that prompted his survey in the first place. His
smaller ships could not steam the more-than-4,500-mile round trip from their proposed
departure port of Bremerton, on Puget Sound, to Adakh Island and back without
refueling, and squadrons could only travel as far as the bunkers of their smallest vessels
permitted. Glass proposed either sending a collier with the fleet or coaling from private
shipping lines with stations at Unalaska's port of Dutch Harbor. Secretary of the Navy
William Moody vetoed sending a collier as "impracticable.""3 As for Dutch Harbor, both
the Alaska Commercial Company and the North American Commercial Company
maintained coal depots there, the latter supplied with Comax coal from British Columbia.
Yet their supply was both limited and expensive, and Glass acknowledged that an
expected shipment of additional coal in August was contingent "upon the settlement of
labor troubles at the Comax mines," a further complication.32
Glass and the Pacific Squadron reached the Bay of Islands on June 22, 1903 and
their survey there proved disappointing. With waters exposed to harsh weather and an
anchorage too narrow for more than two ships, "[I] am convinced" he reported to
Washington, "that it is entirely impracticable to establish a coaling station at this place."33
Kiska Harbor was a different story. Glass led the New York, the Marblehead, and
the Fortune to Kiska on June 23, where "[I]t was immediately apparent that this harbor
30 Henry Glass to H.C. Taylor 5/28/1903, in NAI RG 80; RG Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
31 William H. Moody to Comm-in-Chief Pacific Squadron 6/13/1903.32 Henry Glass to H.C. Taylor 5/28/1903.
33 Henry Glass to SecNav 8/13/1903, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
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offered advantages unusual in Alaskan waters." Geographically, it was ideally situated
near the great circle route, a full 600 miles west of the nearest existing coaling station at
Dutch Harbor, but less than 2,000 miles east of Yokohama and a mere 1,600 miles east of
the Japanese port of Hakodate. As the ships surveyed the entrance to the harbor, the crew
found it accessible from both north and south and all navigational hazards were clearly
identifiable. "There is abundant room for a large coaling station," noted Glass in his
report. The water was deep enough to anchor any size ship. The shore provided ample
land for buildings. And the harbor boasted an "abundant" fresh water supply, needed
aboard ship to generate steam. If its resources were rich, however, its labor supply was
not. Kiska, like so many Aleutian Islands, was uninhabited. Glass suggested that
indigenous Aleuts could be induced to move there, suggesting that a naval station on the
island might be incentive enough to attract native and help build a self-sustaining
settlement.3 4
Glass's report proved contentious within the Navy Department. Specifically, the
Bureau of Equipment, whose portfolio included both the Navy's major coal purchases
and the logistics of fueling the fleet, objected to the suggestion that Kiska alone should
become the major coaling station in the Aleutians. Royal B. Bradford, Chief of the
Bureau, observed that if the Navy built only one coal depot in the Aleutians, it should do
so at Dutch Harbor; if it would build two, he insisted that Dutch Harbor should come
first.3 5 Bradford believed that too great an emphasis on strictly naval logistics might lose
sight of the larger commercial and maritime enterprise the Navy ought to support and
protect. Unlike Dutch Harbor, Bradford noted that Kiska lay far from popular trade
34 Ibid.
35 R.B. Bradford endorsing Henry Glass's Aleutian Report (of 8/13/1903) 9/26/1903, in NAI RG 80; GB
Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
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routes, and he considered its lack of population a serious liability. He maintained that "in
establishing fortified coaling stations the needs of the merchant marine should be
considered." 36 Bradford's support of Dutch Harbor over Kiska cut to the heart of a
fundamental tension within the Navy at the turn of the twentieth century: was the Navy
an autonomous institution supporting national defense or a component of a larger national
strategy for both defense and economic growth?
The General Board did not, however, ignore the needs of commerce. Its members
countered that a coaling station at Kiska would in fact encourage steamers to chose the
shorter, northern course and thus contribute to the development of the resources of the
Aleutians themselves.37 With this image of a prosperous, commercial, and above all
American northern Pacific in mind, the Navy ordered yet another detailed study of
Kiska's harbor. This study would far exceed the previous three seasons of exploration.
"An ordinary hydrographic or topographic survey is not sufficient," explained George
Converse, Bradford's successor as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment. Instead, he
imagined a detailed engineering analysis, with a degree of geographical scrutiny that
required engineering expertise and equipment not available aboard ordinary naval
vessels.38 During the summer of 1904, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, joined by officers
of the Navy's Bureau of Engineering, dispatched two vessels to chart the group. 39
The Coast Survey found a chilly humidity clinging to Kiska. Between June and
September, temperatures hovered around 450 Fahrenheit and "numerous mists and light
36 Ibid.
37 George Dewey for General Board to SecNav 11/25/1903.
38 G.A. Converse to General Board 1/28/1904, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-
1911".
39 F.H. Sherman to Chief Bureau of Navigation 10/2/1904, "Weather in Kiska," in NAI RG 80; GB Subject
File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
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drizzling rains" kept the island air damp. Fog occasionally blew in from the south,
carried along by the Japan stream. Although winds were erratic in strength and direction,
Kiska at least remained free of williwaws, the fierce storms that plagued Dutch Harbor.
The surveying was complicated by the discovery that "[t]he islands are nearly all wrongly
charted." 40
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Equipment explored the harbor.41 There too, the team
met difficulties. The exasperated crew "nowhere found a solid foundation," and even
deep in the water "only... an excellent variety of peat."42 These conditions complicated
the creation of a functioning harbor, and increased the expense--even without spongy
terrain, Navy engineers estimated the cost of a major coaling station at Kiska as high as
$1.6 million over several years of construction. The boggy terrain only threatened to
increase this figure.43 Geography, it appeared, was more complicated than merely
position.
While Navy vessels explored Aleutian harbors, the federal government initiated
the legal machinery necessary for naval coaling station construction. President Roosevelt
began this process in June 1902. Since the General Board had at first been enthusiastic
about a station at Dutch Harbor, Roosevelt issued an executive order reserving a parcel of
land for coaling there. Pending reports from surveys of other Aleutian islands, later that
month Roosevelt reserved 900 acres at Kiska and 580 acres along the Bay of Waterfalls
40 Ibid.
41 SecNav to Commanding Officer U.S.S. PETREL [F.H. Sherman] 3/29/1904, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject
File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911"., also see G.A. Converse second endorsement of letter from George B.
Cortelyou (of 2/3/1904) 3/9/1904, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
42 "Memorandum on the State of Progress of the Preliminary Work of Survey for Coaling Station at Kiska
6/18/1904," in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
43 G.A. Converse to General Board 1/28/1904. The Bureau of Equipment had at this time as little as
$140,000 available in its appropriation for "Depots for Coal," thus requiring the Navy to ask Congress for
additional funds.
240
on Adakh Island.44 As the surveys of these harbors arrived in Washington, Dewey and
the General Board eventually reversed their recommendations for constructing a depot at
Dutch Harbor. By the end of 1903, they concluded that "the ordinary commercial
facilities" at Dutch Harbor were adequate for Navy needs, which were modest since the
harbor lay far from the great circle route. They instead called for a massive installation at
Kiska, garrisoned by the War Department and maintaining 100,000 tons of coal.45
President Roosevelt concurred, expanding his earlier reservation on Kiska to include the
entire Kiska island group-Kiska, Little Kiska, nearby islets-all to support future naval
construction and to hedge against "squatters and speculators" looking to profit from
proximity to a new base.46
While considering islands along the great circle route for a coaling station, one
question the Navy did not explicitly address was where the tens or even hundreds of
thousands of tons of coal that would fill it might come from. They did not have to: at the
turn of the twentieth century, no coal known in the Pacific region matched "Navy
Standard" coals of Appalachia in energy content, smokeless combustion, and ease of
handling. The Navy anticipated supplying the proposed Aleutian station the same way it
supplied coal to its other west coast and Pacific stations, by shipping eastern coal around
Cape Horn. In early 1905, however, a new possibility emerged. Writing to the Secretary
of the Navy, the Chief Engineer of the struggling Alaska Central Railway inquired
44 "Dutch Harbor (Unalaska), Alaska; Summary of Correspondence, 4/10/1915.", Theodore Roosevelt,
"Executive Order of June 13, 1902," in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
45 Report of George W. Brown to William C. Edes 10/11/1915, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 37;
File, "412, 1916".
46 Squatters had already caused headaches near naval stations in the Caribbean at Culebra and
Guantanamo. George Dewey for General Board to SecNav 11/25/1903, Theodore Roosevelt, "Executive
Order of December 9, 1903," in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911", Secretary of
the General Board to President Roosevelt 12/8/1903, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412,
1903-1911".
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whether the department was interested in a coaling station around Resurrection Bay, on
mainland Alaska's Kenai Peninsula. Such a station was in the financial interest of the
ailing railway (it would go bankrupt in 1908), but the General Board maintained that
Resurrection Bay was too far removed from the strategic interests of the Navy. It was too
remote, too undeveloped, too impractical for serious consideration. But the railway drew
its coal from the Matanuska Valley, near the camp that would become known as
Anchorage, and whose rich deposits of bituminous, semi-bituminous, and anthracite coal
were of the highest quality anywhere then known in the Pacific region. If the Navy
declined a coaling station in Resurrection Bay, it affirmed its interest in Matanuska coal
to supply the proposed station at Kiska.47
As late as 1910, however, the Kiska coaling station remained more an idea than a
concrete policy. The General Board affirmed the importance of fortified bases en route
to Asia and declared that "[t]he war combinations in Eastern seas held the attention of the
world that summer of 1900 no less than now." But developing the base was hampered by
the geographical and environmental challenges of Aleutian navigation and construction,
the General Board's wariness over defending these islands in an emergency, their
perception that conflict in the central Pacific was more likely than in the north, and the
Navy's already strained budgets. These factors led the Board to advocate focusing on
fortifying bases at Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Manila.48 Ultimately, the surveys around the
Aleutians did little to create a major base along the great circle route to Asia. But the
47 George Dewey to SecNav 3/29/1905, in NAI RG 80; General Board Subject File Box 36; File, "412
1903-1911". See also George Dewey 3/25/1908, "2nd Endorsement to Letter by Arthur R. Boyle, Seward,
Alaska; in Re. Establishment of Naval Station at Resurrection Bay (Feb. 17, 1908)," in NAI RG 80;
General Board Subject File Box 36; File, "412 1903-1911".
48 It should be noted that these stations actually remained unfortified as well. "Dutch Harbor (Unalaska),
Alaska; Summary of Correspondence, 4/10/1915."
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Navy's persistent interest in the region for over a decade brought it a much greater
involvement in and knowledge of Alaskan affairs. At no time before 1898 had the U.S.
Navy been concerned with the Territory of Alaska from a strategic, defensive, or resource
perspective. That was changing. With a greater presence in Pacific waters, with
increased American commerce with Asia, with a greater integration of Alaska into the
trade and defense of the Pacific , and with developing Alaskan coal fields, the Navy had
begun an involvement with Alaska that would grow over the following decade.
Geology Between Mine and Ocean
At Sea
The armored cruiser Maryland arrived at Controller Bay on July 31, 1913. Its mission: to
collect and test a sample of coal from Alaska's Bering River field, miles distant from
known and traveled seaways. The captain, John M. Ellicott, had anticipated this voyage
for more than a decade. His interest in Alaskan waters was sparked when he studied
"ocean highways" during a stint at the Naval War College in Newport, when he
"happened one day to stretch an elastic across a globe from Puget Sound to China and
Japan" and recognized the proximity of the Alaskan coast to the great circle route in the
north Pacific. Unaware of the Navy's interest in this topic, he mused about exploring the
harbors of Alaska for a way station en route to Asia. He later requested, and received, a
commission as Inspector of the Thirteenth Lighthouse District, which held jurisdiction
over the expanse of American coastline between California and the Arctic Ocean.49 With
49 Ellicott was a student at the NWC in 1896 and served on its staff in 1900 and 1901. See the Register of
Officers Book for 1884-1968 at the Naval War College Naval Historical Collection. Within the Navy,
interest in the waters of Alaska was not widespread-Ellicott reported that the detail officer was happy to
assign his this command, explaining that "Nobody ever asked for that district before," and adding that
Ellicott would "find it the most harassing, hazardous, thankless job you ever undertook." Ellicott later
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this command, Ellicott developed a sailor's familiarity with Alaskan waters. When naval
planners sought an officer to scout Alaskan harbors and test samples of coal, they
selected Ellicott as the obvious choice.
Ellicott's instructions to explore Alaska and examine Alaskan coal involved a
number of geological and geographical questions. Most fundamentally, was there coal in
Alaska that matched Appalachian coals in energy content and "smokeless" properties? If
so, how much? Were the coal veins thick and level or folded, faulted, or crushed? Did
the climate permit mining in winter? Was the field accessible--by railroad, if a line
could be built-to harbors from where the coal could be shipped to other ports? How the
Navy answered these questions reflected how it weighed different kinds of scientific
evidence; testing coal in steaming trials aboard naval vessels, for instance, was valued
above geological surveys or chemical analysis. While the Navy did employ field geology
and laboratory chemistry to develop a picture of Bering River coal and the terrain from
which it was mined, above all, they relied upon practical engineering and shipboard
steaming tests. Consequently, geological knowledge was produced not only in the field,
but in the laboratory and in the boilers of battleships. This focus on shipboard testing
minimized the importance of the particular history of the coal they tested, discounting
how it was mined, the techniques of extraction, and the climatic conditions that affected
it. By ignoring these other facts, the Navy met with great difficulty in determining
anything for certain about the quality of Bering River coal.
***e
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affirmed this prediction. John M. Ellicott, "Harbor Hunting in Alaska," United States Naval Institute --
Proceedings 63, no. 413 (1937): 939.
Geologists believed that two coal fields in Alaska contained great quantities of soft, semi-
bituminous steaming coal: The Bering River field, some twenty miles northeast of
Controller Bay where the Maryland anchored, and the Matanuska field, two hundred
miles to the northwest beyond the Chugach Mountains. Alaska's boosters claimed that in
coal rested the development of Alaska, and competing speculators in land, railroads, town
sites, and port facilities favored one field or the other, depending on which might lead to
geographically favorable industrial development and hence substantial profits.
Estimates of the value of the Bering River field varied, and conservative
appraisals were decidedly unusual. Opinions, in fact, ranged widely: one billion dollars
worth of coal? Two? Six? Mining engineers familiar with the region quoted the figure
of 500,000,000 tons worth of coal, a number frequently cited by the national press. This
estimate took into account only the coal lying above the water level. USGS estimates
considered all coal to a depth of 3,000 feet, and were much higher.50 One USGS report
held that both Bering River and Matanuska semi-bituminous coals were "better than
anything that is being mined in the West" and compared them to the Navy Standard coals
from the Pocahontas, New River, and Georges Creek fields. This report also noted that
the Alaskan coals were "eminently adapted for use on warships" by virtue of their
"smokeless" properties. These coals were expected to drive competition, whether from
the eastern coals, or coking coals produced in Washington or Vancouver, straight from
the Pacific market."
50 Alfred H. Brooks, "Alaska Coal and Its Utilization," in Mineral Resources ofAlaska: Report on Progress
oflnvestigations in 1909, ed. Alfred H. Brooks (Washington: GPO, 1910). See also SecNav to General
Board 4/7/1910, in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
51 "Extract from 'Geology and Mineral Resources of the Controller Bay Region, Alaska,' U.S. Geological
Survey, 1908," in NAI RG 80; GB Subject File; Box 36; File, "412, 1903-1911".
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More sober accounts of the Bering River field acknowledged that its geology was
complex, its seams folded and faulted in unpredictable ways, and much of its coal
crushed into a fine, sooty powder that made it difficult to mine, transport, and consume.52
These circumstances made mining laborious and expensive. Alaskan coal nevertheless
impressed even usually dispassionate observers. According to Alfred Brooks, the U.S.
Geological Survey's leading expert in Alaskan geology (and a scientist quick to point out
the exaggerations of others), the development of Alaskan coal was destiny, the instrument
of modernity that would support commerce and industry along the Pacific rim, furthering
the march of civilization ever westward. There were obstacles to overcome first-
transportation, markets, competition with Californian oil-but it was inevitable, he
argued, that Americans would exploit the fuel. "What is the future of Alaskan coal?" he
rhetorically asked members of the American Mining Congress in 1911. "The answer is
simple enough-it will be burned."'5
The Bering River field rose to national prominence in 1909 as the focal point of a
national political spectacle. In that year, Gifford Pinchot, the Chief Forester of the U.S.,
and his allies launched a public broadside against Interior Secretary Richard Ballinger for
allegedly mishandling coal leases in the field first sought by Clarence Cunningham in
1902 and pursued by the Guggenheim-Morgan Alaska Syndicate. Pinchot and Ballinger
had long been at odds over conservation policy, and Pinchot capitalized on accusations
against Ballinger by a Land Office employee that the Secretary had illegally influenced
the passage of public coal lands in the Bering River field into private (understood as
52 See, for example, George F. Kay, "The Bering River Coal Field, Alaska," Popular Science Monthly 79
(1911).
53 Alfred H. Brooks, "The Future of Alaska Coal," Report of the Proceedings of the American Mining
Congress (1911), Alfred H. Brooks, "Geography in the Development of the Alaska Coal Deposits," Annals
of the Association ofAmerican Geographers 1 (1911): 291.
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monopolistic) hands. 54 As investors and politicians wrestled for a share of the Bering
River field's seemingly fabulous profits, an incendiary article in McClure's magazine
hyperbolically called the coal there "the greatest single prize ever played for in this
country. ' 55
In the wake of the Ballinger-Pinchot debacle, Alaskan coal fields remained
effectively closed and this prize appeared forfeited, but not for long. In July 1913,
Washington Senator Miles Poindexter submitted a bill in Congress to open Alaskan coal
fields and construct a regional transportation network. Poindexter based his bill on a
proposal by James MacKaye, brother of Benton, that proposed dividing Alaskan coal
fields into two halves, one half for private companies, the other half for a government
mining agency. The plan gained significant press coverage during the summer of 1913
for its proposal to distribute the anticipated ten percent profit from the government's
fields equally between miners (including managers) and consumers.56 The Seattle Star,
expecting an economic windfall for its city pending the passage of the bill, threw the
weight of the Scripps newspaper chain behind the plan, asking its readers in an front page
editorial: "ARE YOU WITH US ON THIS GREAT PROJECT? IT'S TO HELP
SEATTLE.""57 Other Scripps papers printed supporting articles.58 Supporters of the plan
54 James L. Penick, Progressive Politics and Conservation: The Ballinger-Pinchot Affair (Chicago,:
University of Chicago Press, 1968).
55 John E. Lathrop and George Kibbe Turner, "Billions of Treasure: Shall the Mineral Wealth of Alaska
Enrich the Guggenheim Trust or the United States Treasury?," McClure's 34 (1910): 341. See also,
"Alaska's Contribution to Our Coal Supply," Review of Reviews 41 (1910).
56 A Bill to Authorize the President of the United States to Provide Transportation and Coal-Mine
Development in the Territory of Alaska, and for Other Purposes., 1st, S.2714.
57 "Are You with Us on This Great Project?," The Seattle Star, August 5 1913.
58 See, for instance, Gilson Gardner, "Senator's Plan Would Compel Production and Sale of Coal at the
Very Lowest Price Possible," Minneapolis Daily News, July 28 1913, Gilson Gardner, "People, Not Trusts,
to Exploit Alaska," Cleveland Press, July 26 1913, Gilson Gardner, "Coal Miner, Consumer and Uncle
Sam to Be Partners Who'll Share Equally in the Development of Alaska," Columbus Citizen, July 26 1913.
The Cleveland Press announced the Poindexter plan with the unreassuring headline, "PEOPLE, NOT
TRUSTS, TO EXPLOIT ALASKA."
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pointed to the high costs of naval steaming coal along the west coast-nearly all of it
from West Virginia-as ample evidence that competition from Alaskan coal would lower
fuel costs. The Navy paid $7 per ton for its coal in Pacific ports, alleged Alaskan
boosters, some $5 of which went for transportation from Appalachia and around Cape
Horn. Alfred Brooks, head of the U.S. Geological Survey in Alaska, observed that these
costs might be halved with an Alaskan coal supply. 59 The Chicago Daily Press,
anticipating the Poindexter plan's effects on commerce and "geographical movement,"
opined that opening Alaska "may prove to be but little less great than the building of the
Panama canal." 60
Thus, when the Maryland anchored in Controller Bay in late July, 1913, it was
with much anticipation. A successful test might lead to large-scale mining in the region
and simultaneously guarantee the Navy as a consumer of enormous quantities of the coal.
The tests, however, did not produce a satisfactory result as the supposed qualities of
Bering River coal did not appear. In fact, the results were so unexpectedly dismal and
diverged so widely from expectations that rumors circulated among Alaskan miners that
the Navy had received an intentionally inferior coal sample, the result of a deliberate
intervention by former Interior Secretary Walter Fisher. Miners suspected Fisher
preferred the "Matanuski" coal field to help develop the government railroad from
Fairbanks to the coast.61 Sabotage was unnecessary to explain the test results, however.
59 Gilson Gardner, "The Coal Will Fly When Uncle Sam Opens Alaska," Minneapolis Daily News, August
4 1913.
60 "Good Definition," Chicago Daily Press, August [?] 1913.
61 Anonymous Miner to Navy Department 8/8/1913, in NAI RG 80; Box 1019; File, "25320 (13) to (105)".
The obviously Russian inflection on "Matanuska" is evocative of the forces the proponents of these rumors
might have believed behind such a conspiracy. Matanuska, in fact, does derive from the Russian
"Mednovtsy," or "Copper people," the name Russian traders' bestowed upon the Athabaskan natives of a
region thought to contain many copper deposits. Andrei A. Znamenski, Through Orthodox Eyes: Russian
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The test results reflected only a kind of narrow evidence that ignored the history of the
coal, the story of which underscores the complex relationships between land, technology,
experiments, and geography.
Aboard Ship
It took five days to ferry the coal from Chilkat to the Maryland. It might have taken less,
had low tides not prevented the expedition's four lighters, and the launches that tugged
them, from easily reaching the shore. The coal arrived in sacks. Once aboard, the
Maryland's crew selected every tenth sack for physical examination, emptying its
contents onto the deck of the ship. They measured densities and shook the samples over
mesh screens of decreasing apertures to separate different grades, each of which they
individually weighed. They extracted the visible shales, slates, and earthen residues. 62
Without elaborate examination, they found that the coal was wet. "By picking up
a handful it was possible to squeeze water out of it" reported the testing board.63 They
soon learned that these coals contained an average of more than five percent moisture.
Naval standards limited moisture to three percent, and previous experiments on coal from
the Bering River area suggested they contained less than a single percent. High moisture
content indicated poor steaming coal. A typical battleship carried about 2,000 tons of
coal. With five percent moisture as observed in the Bering River sample, such a ship
would take on one hundred tons of water. Water was not coal, and one hundred tons of
water meant losing a full day of steaming, or nearly three hundred miles.64 To dry some
Missionary Narratives of Travels to the Dena'ina and Ahtna, 1850s-1930s, Rasmuson Library Translation
Series ; 13 (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2003).
62 Coal Board to Commanding Officer U.S.S. Maryland 9/10/1913, in NAI RG 80; Box 1019; File, "25320
(13) to (105)".
63 Ibid.
64 Report on Coal in Alaska for Use in United States Navy: A Letter from the Secretary of the Navy
Transmitting Report ofSurvey and Investigation by Experimental Tests of Coal in Alaska for Use on Board
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of the coal for a rough chemical analysis, the Maryland's crew roasted a sample on a
canvas tarp hoisted above a boiler.65 Although the Navy employed chemistry to measure
the carbon, ash, sulfur, and moisture contents of coal samples, it did not trust these
laboratory analyses to predict the coal's actual performance aboard ship; instead, they
consumed it in a series of steaming trials.6 6
The majority of the coal hauled aboard remained as soggy as it had been in sacks
ashore. This coal was shoveled into the Maryland's number 7 and number 8 boilers as
the ship began its seven day port test, the first of four steaming tests designed to evaluate
the sample's performance in a practical setting.67 Almost immediately, the coal
smoldered, burning slowly and forming clinkers, the fused slag that adhered to engine
grate bars.68 Bloated with moisture, the coal "lay like a blanket" in the engines. Within
twenty-four hours, the test was scrapped. Returning to Navy Standard fuel, the Maryland
steamed to San Francisco. At the city's Mare Island naval station, the five hundred tons
of Bering River coal were unloaded onto four 300 ton lighters lashed to either side of the
Maryland. The coal was spread out to dry on the lighters' decks. Crews later screened
and hand picked the entire sample before again attempting the seven day port test on
August 14th.69
Ships United States Navy [Sic], and Upon Coal and Coal Fields Available for Said Purpose, 63rd
Congress, 2nd Session, House Doc. No. 876 (Washington: GPO, 1914).65 Coal Board to Commanding Officer U.S.S. Maryland 9/10/1913.
66 
"It should be borne in mind, however," observed Robert Griffin, Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Steam
Engineering, that "a chemical analysis by itself proves nothing. The only true test of a coal insofar as the
Navy is concerned is a practical one aboard ship." Griffin continued by noting that certain physical
behaviors, like the unwanted fusing of impurities within coal, called clinkers, could not be predicted by
chemical tests. Robert Griffin to Senator Wesley Jones, 8/11/1919
67 Coal Board to Commanding Officer U.S.S. Maryland 9/10/1913.
68 Clinkers resulted when bits of extraneous rock invariably mixed with the coal melted to the ship's
engines. Like moisture, a little clinker was common, but a lot of clinker was a bad sign. It adhered to the
engine and could suffocate a fire. It also required constant removal.69 Coal Board to Commanding Officer U.S.S. Maryland 9/10/1913.
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After this week of testing in port, the Maryland next simulated an engine room in
an emergency, cruising at full power: what the Navy called a four hour full boiler forced
draught speed trial. Ash formed quickly, as did more clinkers. Stokers shoveled coal
into the furnace, following the rhythm of the boilers and "working until they very nearly
collapsed." A bell signaled the firing of the furnace. The stokers had exactly five
minutes to shovel two or three heaps of coal into one fire, stoke a second fire with a hoe,
and slice a third. Throughout the exercise they scrubbed the grates clean of the persistent
clinker. Shovel, scrub, stoke, scrub, slice, scrub, FIRE, shovel, scrub, stoke, scrub, slice,
scrub, FIRE--"a severe routine" according to the official report. Underscoring the
danger of engine-room labor, the report also noted, approvingly, that "[t]here were no
casualties." 70
Like the preliminary tests, these experiments did not reveal exceptional coal. In
the speed trial test, although the crew tried to reach 20 knots, they managed only a
maximum of a little more than 19. Halfway into the third test-a twenty-four hour,
fifteen-knot run at sea-the ship exhausted its coal supply, forcing the crew to abandon a
final forty-eight hour, ten knot trial. Judging from its performance in the port test, this
Bering River coal was, at best, 82 percent as efficient as West Virginian Pocahontas coal;
at worst, in other tests, it measured just over 48 percent as efficient.71 Translating these
results into the logistics of the Pacific, Bering River coal could not compete with Navy
Standard Pocahontas coal from West Virginia. Outfitted with Pocahontas, the Maryland
would have no trouble steaming the great circle route between San Francisco and
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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
Yokohama with coal left over in its bunkers. With Bering River Coal, the ship's cruising
radius was cut in half, permitting only the shorter voyage to Honolulu.72
Why the enthusiastic reports of extraordinary coal in the Bering River Field did
not match the experimental results aboard the USS Maryland puzzled the Navy. Was it
the result of a poor sample? Overly enthusiastic boosters? Or was the problem in the
geology of the field itself? Problems with the field became the dominant explanation
over the ensuing decade, and the Navy abandoned its interest in the Bering River field."
In conducting practical steaming tests, the Navy assumed that the coal under
examination directly reflected the subterranean environment that produced it. This
notion-that knowledge of coal developed aboard a ship revealed knowledge about coal
in the originating field-explains why the Navy terminated its interest in the Bering
River field so quickly after 1913. The Navy learned that Bering River coal, for example,
was wet, had a relatively low carbon content, and clinkered badly, and it interpreted these
results to hold for the Bering River coal field as a whole. But was this the whole story?
The story of this coal's extraction suggests otherwise, as Bering River coal bore the
traces not only of the field land from which it came, but also of the labor that mined it
and the terrain and weather through which it traveled. This story began a year earlier.
To Know the Land
72 Report on Coal in Alaska for Use in United States Navy: A Letter from the Secretary of the Navy
Transmitting Report ofSurvey and Investigation by Experimental Tests of Coal in Alaska for Use on Board
Ships United States Navy [Sic], and Upon Coal and Coal Fields Available for Said Purpose.
73 This decision had a lasting impact on investment in the Bering River field. In 1919, six years following
the tests, Falcon Joslin, the sole remaining commercial coal operator there, was struggling to keep his
Bering River Coal Company afloat as he searched for markets for his fuel. The once limitless opportunities
ascribed to Bering River coal now appeared very remote. As the Navy focused on Matanuska coal, so too
did other regional coal consumers. Joslin attributed his company's troubles to competition from the
government mine in the Matanuska field and lamented that "it begins to appear very doubtful whether our
mine can be made commercially successful without ... a chance to supply the Navy with at least some of
the coal it requires in the Pacific." Falcon Joslin to Senator Wesley L. Jones 6/17/1919, in NAI RG 80; Box
1020; File, "25320 (171:12)".
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To mine and transport Bering River coal for steam tests aboard the Maryland, the Navy
had appointed a Coal Investigating Expedition, which left Seattle aboard the steamship
Mariposa September 1, 1912.74 Its supervisor, Passed Assistant Surgeon John Otho
Downey, had mustered a company of fifty: miners and foremen, blacksmiths and
carpenters, packers, cooks, and others. In Alaska, they would collect "axemen, rivermen,
teamsters, guides and other pioneer laborers" and for winter work, "Indians, dogs and
sledges.""75 Their arrival off Katalla was inauspicious: disembarking the Mariposa,
sixteen men lost their personal effects in rough water in Icy Bay.76
Once ashore, the mining party pitched their main camp twenty miles north of
Controller Bay at the confluence of the Bering River and Stillwater Creek. Six miles of
lakes, rivers, and creeks fed by nearby melting glaciers cut through Cunningham Ridge
and the Carbon Mountains, separating this camp from the mining site at Trout Creek. In
the field, the expedition found neither wilderness nor industry but the traces of miners
before them, remnants of the Cunningham investment that only three years earlier had
exploded into national political scandal. An abandoned cabin awaited them at Trout
Creek. It became the cook and bunk house. Downey's crew surrounded it by tents.
Nearly two miles of navigable stream on the Stillwater and four miles of a preexisting
trail, "improved to the extent of being practically rebuilt" connected the base camp at
74 "Proposed Amendment to Naval Appropriation Bill Providing for Reimbursement for Loss of Personal
Effects of Men Sent by the Navy Department to Alaska in 1912 with the Alaskan Coal Investigating
Expedition; Attached to Josephus Daniels to Benjamin R. Tillman 6/29/1916," in NAI RG 80; Box 1019;
File, "25320 (13) to (105)" (1916).
75 John Otho Downey, "United States Navy Coal Investigating Expedition in the Bering River Field of
Alaska," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute (1913).
76 "Proposed Amendment to Naval Appropriation Bill Providing for Reimbursement for Loss of Personal
Effects of Men Sent by the Navy Department to Alaska in 1912 with the Alaskan Coal Investigating
Expedition; Attached to Josephus Daniels to Benjamin R. Tillman 6/29/1916.", Josephus Daniels to
Benjamin R. Tillman 6/29/1916, in NAI RG 80; Box 1019; File, "25320 (13) to (105)". It took Congress
some four to reimburse the men the $1,318.43 they lost.
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Stillwater and the mining site at Trout Creek. 77 Where creek and trail met, the crew
found another abandoned and dilapidated cabin built to cache equipment closer to the
mine site. Despite the presence of this preexisting infrastructure, the construction of a
new camp site at Trout Creek lasted into mid-October.78
For the next month and a half, the expedition mined coal, and serious problems
arose as soon as they began. "It was common talk among [the miners] that the coal had
been mined and handled in the most careless manner," observed one local laborer in a
stinging critique of the mining operations, "surface debris being mixed with the coal and
shale, and rock being sacked for coal." In one tunnel, workers were ordered to sack
caved in rock and dirt. In another cave in, workers filled as many as 75 sacks with
debris. Ordinary sacks weighed 200 pounds and could be routinely loaded by individual
laborers, but these sacks were so laden with rock that they required three men to hoist
them upon sleds. On account of the pervasive dirt, rock, and shale mixed in, local
laborers even predicted that steaming tests would result in a large quantity of clinker, as
was later confirmed. Reportedly, the miners maintained "that there was plenty of good
coal in the Cunningham tunnel and that there was no need for sacking rock or dirt," but
the effort required for mining clean coal was not undertaken. In the end, the reporting
miner concluded that "of the estimated total of 751 tons, about 75 tons is clean coal," a
consequence, he claimed, of "willful carelessness." 79
Whatever amount of coal actually comprised the sacked samples, when mining
was completed, the mining crew returned to Seattle and the expedition prepared to haul
77 Downey, "United States Navy Coal Investigating Expedition in the Bering River Field of Alaska," 1659-
60.
78 Ibid.: 1660.
79 Anonymous Miner to Navy Department 8/8/1913.
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all 750 tons from the mine to tidewater.80 This engineering obstacle challenged the Coal
Investigating Expedition. Downey had originally expected to take advantage of winter
terrain and sled the coal from the mine to the opening of the Bering River at Controller
Bay. "A few weeks in the field" he confessed, "and a study of the meteorological records
for the past few years clearly indicated the impracticability of this idea." Winters in
southern Alaska were milder than the expedition had anticipated. Rivers froze only to
thaw unexpectedly. Downey abandoned the sledding plan as well as an alternate route,
"over the great marshes and flats to the southwest of Bering River" which presented too
great a hardship and expense.81
The crew instead settled on a piecemeal approach, sledding the sample--750 tons
worth-the four miles between the mine at Trout Creek to Stillwater Creek before
freighting it the remaining twenty miles on boats through a network of creeks, lakes, and
rivers.82 The trail from Trout Creek they had rebuilt in autumn was too uneven for this
project, and Downey set about to rebuild it yet again. The crew relocated about a third of
it to ensure "better grades and curves." They widened some portions, others they built
anew. They constructed seven bridges. Dynamite cleared the way for seventy yards
along a steep cliff.83 Once built, seven horses dragged sleds, each carrying a ton of Trout
Creek coal. Ten men accompanied the caravan to Stillwater. When necessary,
communication was effected by native pack trains and dog sleds.84 A good day moved
80 Downey, "United States Navy Coal Investigating Expedition in the Bering River Field of Alaska," 1660.
1 Ibid.: 1661-2.
82 By the end of the project, the Expedition had sought all "[l]ight draft river boats with power to operate
over the Delta Division... and all power boats in that section of Alaska were sent for the trial." The final
riverboat armada consisted of thirty-three separate vessels ranging from an 80-ton lighter to two fifty-foot
stem-wheel river boats to a dugout canoe refitted with a power engine that "proved to be invaluable." Ibid.:
1669-71.
83 Ibid.: 1661-2.
84 Ibid.: 1660.
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two round trips, a cargo of about 15 tons. The transportation took more than three
months and was not finished until mid-April. The project would have been impossible
without assistance from local communities. "Practically all the Indians in the region had
been under the employ of the expedition" recalled Downey.8 5 They managed
communication and transportation during the winter coal sledding and served as bear
hunters and guides to the territory. 6
The spring and summer was devoted to moving the coal from Stillwater to
Chilkat. Local opinion "differed widely" on when the Bering River would again be free
of ice and navigable. Downey settled on May 10 as the earliest date, and anticipated the
use of boats drawing 15 inches by June 1. Eight enlisted naval men arrived from Seattle
on May 1. They were sent to operate the riverboats, lighters, and sailing launches
specially built at the Navy Yard in Puget Sound for this work.8 7
Hauling coal downriver required attention to the landscape.88 "The river was
learned perfectly," Downey recalled, "every sand bar and every stretch of water was
named. It was very difficult to speak of or refer to a particular point in the river without
specifically designating it." To this end, the crew partitioned the varied terrain into three
divisions. The Lake Division wound seven and a half miles from Chilkat to Bering Lake.
Six miles further to Cottonwood was the Delta Division. The Glacier Division stretched
85 Ibid.: 1680.
6 Ibid.: 1658.
7 Ibid.: 1663-4.
88 In a similar vein, Richard White has used the evocative phrase "knowing nature through labor." See
Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). For a marvelous elaboration of
this theme, appropriate to Alaska, see Kathryn Taylor Morse, The Nature of Gold: An Environmental
History of the Klondike Gold Rush, Weyerhaeuser Environmental Books (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2003).
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another seven and a half miles to end at the Stillwater coal depot. The mine itself was
another four miles north from Stillwater. 9
Downey and his crew found the Lake Division at tidewater and relatively easy to
traverse. They crossed the Glacier Division easily as well, once the crew cleared its
gravel bottom of rocks and debris. The Delta Division challenged them, however. The
Bering River Delta, "an immense treeless swamp," emptied onto a wide alluvial flat
braided with narrow, shallow channels and patches of tall grass. Quicksand made
navigation at times impossible.90
To make the Delta Division passable "it was necessary to live on the river."
Downey hoped to carve a channel deep enough to pass barges sent from Seattle.
Advancing towards the delta's center from opposite directions, the crew cleared the
channels of rocks and debris. To force several smaller channels together into a single,
deeper one, dynamite provided the first and bluntest tool, but axes and blocks and tackle
proved essential too. Shallow, glacial currents overturned canoes, their crews spending
long hours in the water. To resist mosquitoes, the workers wore head-nets and gloves,
and sometimes even abandoned the shore to sleep on a barge in the river.9' The work of
making this waterway passable went on for two months. By June, the coal, still bound in
sacks at Stillwater, remained twenty miles from tidewater.
The arrival of summer would bring the USS Maryland. Downey redoubled his
efforts to move the coal sample. His crew abandoned their efforts to reengineer the
landscape of the river's delta. Even with the labor and equipment they had available,
89 Downey, "United States Navy Coal Investigating Expedition in the Bering River Field of Alaska," 1664-
5.
90 Ibid.
9 Ibid.: 1667-9.
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including the entire native community of Chilkat, they were unable to accomplish so
massive a project. They turned instead to building fresh, shallow draft barges from
15,000 feet of lumber milled from the nearby Chugach Forest. They built twenty-one
river boats capable of hauling between one and a half and eight tons of coal apiece.92
As for the unexpected wetness of the coal discovered aboard the Maryland, the
coal sacks (what coal there was in them) had been left along the shore at Chilkat, where
they were flooded with salt water. Even the naval officers at the site acknowledged "that
the coal would not have a fair test on this account." 93
The immediate consequence of Bering River mining and shipboard testing was
the Navy's abandoning of interest in the Bering River Field, but not in Alaskan coal
altogether. The following summer, in 1914, the Maryland returned to Alaska and
received another shipment of Alaskan coal, this time from the Matanuska field. It
performed identical steaming tests as it had the year before, and found strikingly different
results-Matanuska coal burned nearly as well as Appalachian coal. Its geographic
orientation shifting once again, the Navy turned to the Matanuska Valley for what would
become nearly a decade of prospecting, surveying, and ultimately, mining Alaskan coal.
The Matanuska Valley
By 1920, the federal government was no stranger to the Matanuska Valley. In 1898 and
1899, U.S. Army and Geological Survey expeditions surveyed the region to support gold
mining. In 1917, the Alaskan Engineering Commission (A.E.C.), an agency of the
92 Ibid.: 1669-71.
93 Anonymous Miner to Navy Department 8/8/1913. Eight years later, a naval officer familiar with Bering
River testing concurred. He acknowledged (contrary to indications in official reports) that selecting the
coal sample "was not made as carefully as should have been done, and not enough of the field prospected."
As a result, the coal "did not have a fair test." R.H. Gifford to Otto Dowling 8/30/1921, in NARA Alaska
RG 80; NACC Records; Box 2; File, "Coal Handling Costs, etc."
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Interior Department charged with assembling the Alaskan Railroad from the Pacific coast
to the resource rich interior, assumed control of a coal mine along Eska Creek, a tributary
to the Matanuska River. The A.E.C. calculated that mining its own coal was more
economical than purchasing it from local mines or importing it from the U.S. or
Canada.94
The Navy, too, had a history in the Matanuska Valley. After mining a coal
sample for shipboard testing in 1914, representatives of the department returned in 1919
for a careful geological exploration. With more resources available now that the war in
Europe had ended, the Navy resumed its intention to develop an Alaskan coal supply.
After his surveys, the commission's senior member, Captain Sumner Kittelle, predicted
more than enough coal to justify mining the field." In the entire Matanuska Valley, he
estimated the availability of 46 million tons of coal, and in the five most promising
leasing units of the Chickaloon district alone he predicted 19 million tons, all adequate
for naval use. He recommended that the Navy assemble a mining expedition, insisting to
Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels that "[t]he whole Matanuska region should be
thoroughly and scientifically investigated by means of diamond drilling, shaft sinking,
tunnel and slope driving" to adequately determine the amount of coal available and the
way to mine it effectively.96
From Secretary Daniels' perspective, the strategic advantages of an Alaskan coal
supply were obvious. He had long been preoccupied with the length of time involved in
shipping coal from the eastern seaboard to the west coast. A typical collier carrying
94 Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to SecNav, 10/22/1918.
95 Kittelle to CNO 2/26/1920, "Navy Coal in Alaska," in NAI RG 80; Box 1019; File, "25320 (131) to
(155:5)". Kittelle to SecNav 6/9/1919, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (171:12)".
96 "Alaskan Coal Situation: Extracts from Reports of Captain Kittelle," in NAI RG 80; Box 1019; File,
"25320 (156) to (156:29)" (1919).
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11,500 tons of coal required about 82 days to "load, carry, and discharge" coal from
Virginia's Hampton Roads, the Navy's principle coal depot, through the Panama Canal,
and to the naval station at Puget Sound, Washington. From Anchorage, the voyage to
Puget Sound required less than half the time, a mere 40 days. From Hampton Roads to
San Francisco, 66 days; from Anchorage, 36. From Hampton Roads to Pearl Harbor,
73.5 days; from Anchorage, 37.5. In the event of a catastrophe at the Panama Canal
(frequently noted as a perceived threat for wartime), the Navy added an additional 37
days to voyages from Hampton Roads now forced to steam the "Magellan route" around
Cape Horn. When peace prevailed, the cost of shipping coal from the east coast to the
Pacific was relatively low and these times were not especially important. During a war,
the entire coal supply at the Navy's Pacific bases was estimated to last a mere three
months, and the speed and ease of replenishing the coal supply exceeded any question of
cost. "The successful development of the Matanuska Coal Field by the Navy is of
inestimable value," asserted one Navy report a year into Chickaloon mining. "The coal
itself has passed Naval tests and fills every requirement. It is the only good steaming
coal the Navy has access to on the Pacific in time of national emergency. Every effort
should be exhausted here to obtain a future supply of coal for the Navy. It is surely wise
policy to push this enterprise as rapidly as machinery and labor permit.""97
But: would proximity of supply compensate for the costs of development?
Shipping eastern coal westward already made coal consumed in the Pacific more
expensive than in the Atlantic.98 It was far from obvious, however, that the Navy's
97 Philip J. Weiss Memo 7/1/1921, "Naval Requirements in the Pacific," in NARA Alaska RG 80; Box 2;
File, "Coal Handling Costs, etc."98 Comparing the costs of steaming coal in Pacific versus the Atlantic ports demonstrates that shipping
eastern coal westward was expensive: during the twelve months between July 1921 and August 1922, the
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development of an independent Alaskan coal supply would actually reduce these costs.
While naval officers could insist that no price was too high for a secure fuel supply,
Daniels ultimately expected to turn Alaskan coal mining over to private industry after the
fields were proved and developed by the government. If the mine could not profit, it
would perish along with the Navy's new coal supply. Nevertheless, as early as 1917
Daniels imagined Matanuska coal eventually competing in world markets and prepared to
commit the Navy to purchasing 150,000 tons per year through the mid-1920s. Although
war in Europe interrupted this plan, by 1920 he had returned with determination to
develop Alaskan coal.99
A Navy Mine
The Navy Alaska Coal Commission (NACC) entered the Matanuska Valley camp
of Chickaloon with a great deal of optimism. Admiral Hugh Rodman, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet noted that about 400,000 tons of coal were known more or
less for certain, but he expected much more. He predicted, in fact, that although the first
year of mine production might be less than what the mine could ultimately support,
Navy purchased 487,000 tons of coal for global use. Stations on the east coast consumed some 294,000
tons. These stations were near Appalachian mines, by rail or by sea, and coal cost about $5.25 per ton at
tidewater, for a total of $1,543,000 for coal on the east coast that year. West coast stations, including Puget
Sound, San Francisco, San Diego, and Honolulu, received about a quarter of this figure, or 118,000 tons
and the Asiatic station stocked another 75,000 tons, giving a total of 193,000 tons of naval coal purchased
for use in the Pacific Ocean. All of this coal was shipped from the east coast through the Panama Canal.
At about $8.00 per ton, even though the Navy consumed much less coal in the Pacific than in the Atlantic
or Caribbean, their Pacific coal expenses that year totaled $1,544,000-nearly identical to costs on the
other coast. See 5-187. This figure might easily have been much higher: as more trade flowed west to east
than the other way around, ships occasionally had to steam westward in ballast-that is, filled with water
rather than commodities. To encourage more westward traffic, shipping companies offered lower rates for
shipping coal to the west coast. See A.B. Canham 4/19/1922, "Memorandum for the Case," in NAI RG 80;
Box 1020; File, "25320 (171:12)".
99 Josephus Daniels to SecInt 3/12/1917, "Summary of the Opinion of the Navy Department in Regard to
the Plan Which Should Be Pursued in So Far as Relates to the Navy's Interest in These Fields," in NAI RG
80; Box 1019; File, "25320 (131) to (155:5)".
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subsequent years would likely see some 100,000 tons a year mined and shipped for naval
use. 100
Nevertheless, early geological reconnaissance indicated that the field's structure
would be difficult to decipher. The Chickaloon formation, an alternating series of shales
and sandstones, was thought to be some 2,000 feet thick, but individual coal seams
embedded within the earthy matrix were not "persistent," appearing irregularly and
terminating abruptly. Igneous masses intruded into the coal beds, forming dikes and sills.
These intrusions were further complicated by deformations in the landscape brought
about by intense underground forces. A report to Secretary Daniels cautioned that
estimating the coal buried in the region was impossible, noting that "[t]he steep dips and
complex folding and faulting of the coal areas calls for careful investigation and
development of the structural conditions of each individual tract before the development
of a mine is attempted."101
The "careful investigation and development" began in the summer of 1920. As it
studied the land at Chickaloon, the NACC faced two distinct but related geological
questions. First, was Matanuska coal adequate for naval use? Steam testing aboard the
Maryland in 1914 had tentatively answered this question affirmatively, and the Navy
anticipated future tests as mining progressed. Second, was there enough coal available in
the field to make mining worthwhile? This question could not be answered in a week of
chemical and engineering experiments. Indeed, how much coal the Matanuska field
might offer, and how easily it could be mined, consumed the bulk of geological work
there for nearly two years.
100 Hugh Rodman to SecNav 6/18/1920, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Policy".
o01 "Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy," in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 2; File,
"Development, Plans for" (8/4/1920).
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Coal Creek flowed into the Matanuska River due south from Chickaloon. The
NACC began prospecting there in early January, and initiated diamond drilling there at
the end of April. Based on the appearance of surface outcrops, NACC geologists
estimated that the Coal Creek region might contain something between "several and
30,000,000 tons" of smokeless, steaming coal. Accounting for inevitable obstacles like
thinning coal beds and igneous intrusions, this estimate meant the field might practically
offer between 15,000,000 tons on the high end to "a small unpromising field" on the low.
Through diamond drilling, the NACC anticipated learning how far east and west of Coal
Creek the coal beds extended. If they extended only half a mile in either direction, they
predicted the field contained upwards of ten million tons of high grade coal; if half was
minable, prospects appeared good. If the field stretched only a little farther east and west,
thirty million tons seemed likely. 102 Within a month, Commander Otto Dowling, the
naval officer in charge of the mining, reported to Washington that the Coal Creek field,
like Chickaloon, was showing "unusual conditions." Although the coal appeared to be
high quality, diamond drilling had revealed a geologic mess. Dowling tempered his
initial enthusiasm with the warning that the Navy should not expect a single large mine
here, but instead settle for several smaller ones. 10 3
As the summer field season of 1921 came to a close, a thick, gravel overburden
impeded diamond drilling at Coal Creek, "almost maddening" according to Dowling.'0 4
Yet as late as the end of November, 1921, Dowling reported fine progress, announcing
102 Philip J. Weiss Memo 7/1/1921, "Naval Requirements in the Pacific." As Dowling solicited bids for
diamond drilling, the department in Washington inquired whether Dowling might be able to disband the
NACC in the field, evidently for fiscal reasons. He replied that the answer depended on the results drilling,
which he expected would show by the end of the fall the quantity of coal available in Coal Creek. Otto
Dowling to unintelligible Captain, 1/25/1921.
103 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 8/1/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only".
'04 Ibid.
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that the "condition of coals in Chickaloon mine is excellent" excepting some areas in the
west of the operation. 10 5
The Commission was beginning to encounter evidence that the picture gleaned
from drilling did not corroborate what had been supposed from geological
reconnaissance. Moreover, drilling was painfully slow, progressing at a paltry twenty
one feet per day. At that rate, the crew would not finish probing the field until the middle
of April. Dowling began to consider forfeiting his drilling contract. 1' 0 6 In Washington,
Admiral Cole considered the news about Coal Creek disappointing but informative.
Responding to Dowling's exasperation, Cole remained philosophical, reassuring him that
"if we had never tried drilling, we would always have wished we had." Above all, Cole
urged him to proceed, whatever the pace. "We must learn the truth about the project in
which we are engaged," Cole wrote, but soon even that assertion was called into
question. 107
As the Commission concluded its survey of outlying fields in the valley, it was
stymied both by what geological reconnaissance revealed and what it kept hidden. At
Coal Creek, for instance, diamond drilling and tunneling revealed a variety of
impediments: coked coal beds in the south; faulted or "dirty and bony" beds in the north.
Fair coal seams gradually shaded into shale and even the high grade coal required
extensive and expensive rail lines to transport it. At Kings River, the complicated
geology of the field made predictions impossible. The Commission found satisfactory
coal, but judged it "totally valueless" nonetheless, "as the beds cannot be correlated and
105 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 11/25/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only".106 By November, the Commission had also found that tunneling around Kings River, another prospect in
the region, had hit Cretaceous sediment, an age of strata that had never before produced coal in Alaska and
further disheartening the Commission. Ibid..107 William C. Cole to Otto Dowling 1/11/1922, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68)".
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traced for sufficient extent to warrant driving upon them." As with Coal Creek, even
these fair beds were difficult to reach, and therefore promised to be expensive to mine. 10 8
As for Chickaloon, Dowling remained cautious but optimistic. Although
underground tunneling revealed faults disrupting otherwise continuous coal seams, a
recent report by the Commission's two geologists disputed the prevailing opinion that a
nearby "intrusive outcropping" infiltrated the high quality coal beds. New field work
suggested that these underground beds were, in fact, untouched. "Up to this time," wrote
Dowling to Washington, "I saw no hope for the successful use of the diamond drill in the
Chickaloon field, believing the same to be too broken up." The new report changed his
mind. "I now believe just the opposite and that our last and best bet for obtaining a
quantity of coal lies right in Chickaloon." Hauling the drill from Coal Creek, the crew
began probing the Chickaloon mine for the first time in April, but "as usual in this
country," the hole repeatedly collapsed, preventing the Commission from forming a clear
picture of what lay below. Yet Dowling insisted that "we should not give up until we
prove their existence or non-existence, or that they lie at too great a depth for mining." 10 9
As the structure of the region was gradually deduced, the Commission reasoned
that if Chickaloon contained substantial coal, coal thick enough and contiguous enough to
permit profitable mining, it would be located at least 1,500 feet below the surface. After
they received word to conclude the operation in March 1922, they hauled the diamond
drill from Coal Creek to Chickaloon to investigate, but the drill hole repeatedly caved in.
108 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 4/11/1922, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only".
109 At this point, Dowling acknowledged that from the perspective of U.S. strategy in the Pacific region, he
"could see the necessity of developing this field no matter what the cost," with the caveat, of course, that
sufficient coal be found there. But the Interior Department's plan to turn the field over to private industry
appeared dubious. Dowling found it increasingly difficult to imagine the profitable extraction of
Chickaloon coal, even if it served the national interest. While Alaska had plenty of barely capitalized
"shoestring outfits," no reliable or established company appeared interested in assuming the risks and costs
of coal mining in the Matanuska Valley. Ibid.
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When the Navy turned the mine over to Interior, they had descended about 1,200 feet; the
A.E.C. dug an additional 150 feet before abandoning the project altogether. "Drilling
being the only quick method of proving this area, drill hole #9 [at Chickaloon] should be
driven thru to completion no matter what the time and cost," concluded the final
geological report. The report insisted that the Navy complete its work in Chickaloon "in
order that it can be proven for once and for all that coal either does or does not exist in
any amount sufficient to be given further consideration as a future source of supply for
Naval fuel."''11
This drilling never happened."' After nearly two years of exploration, the Navy
cut off funding to the mine and the structure of the Chickaloon formation remained a
mystery. If the Commission was correct in assuming the overall shape of the field (a
syncline) and a reasonable average thickness of coal seams to the north of the field, there
might still be as much as twelve or fifteen million tons of coal there. Only diamond
drilling would reveal this for certain, they believed, but without funds, they would never
learn the answer for certain." 12
The Geography of Labor
A second cause of difficulty at Chickaloon involved relations between labor and
management, a conflict that tied this remote mine to a national debate over labor in post-
World War I America. These years were particularly volatile for both labor and the coal
industry as a whole. The Navy was accustomed to order, predictability, and docility in its
work force, but managing coal miners in Alaska introduced dissent, demands for fair
"0o W.P.T. Hill, "Inclosure 'B' of the Final Report of the Navy Alaskan Coal Commission to the Secretary of
the Navy," in NARA Alaska; NACC Records; Box 1; File, "Inclosure 'B"' (1922), 83.
" 1 Ibid., 47-8.
112 Ibid., 44.
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treatment amid a rapidly changing economy, and the threat of strikes. Some voices
within the government disapproved of the Navy's Alaskan coal mining, but appeals to the
security value of the mine for a time palliated these opinions. Nevertheless, a constant
battle with both budgets and labor haunted the project.1 13
Nowhere did this complex tension reveal itself more explosively than in the
controversy over miners' wages at Chickaloon. In an effort to reduce expenses, in
September 1921, Dowling announced a reduction in miners' wages. This cut of nearly
25% lowered the pay scale from $8.60 to $6.50 per day.114 The miners protested,
organizing an impromptu campaign against Secretaries Denby and Fall in Washington,
pressuring them to cancel or postpone the reduction. More was at stake in this conflict
than the fairness of living wages; each party wished to define the relationship between the
United States and the Alaska Territory. Dowling argued that Alaskan wages were
inherently connected to wages in Washington State. Miners, in contrast, argued that their
wages must be set in the larger context of America's mining west. Which relationship
won would shape life and work at the Chickaloon camp. In the contested space of
Alaska, coal mining was as much about the definition of appropriate geographical
relationships as it was about economy or security.
The dispute over wages at Chickaloon occurred amidst nationwide tumult in the
coal industry. During the First World War, heavy coal demand and increased prices
stimulated a nearly 30 percent increase in new mines between 1917 and 1919. The war
brought inflation, too. In response, miners fought for, and received, a series of wage
increases-around 50 percent of the 1914 scale-in return for promises to abstain from
"' William C. Cole to Otto Dowling 2/6/1922, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only".114 Mines Committee to Hon. Dan Sutherland, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020, File, "25320 (156:68) Only"
(9/23/1921).
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striking. With post-war demobilization, the nation slid into an industrial recession; in the
coal industry, utility and industrial coal orders slackened and production plummeted.
Faced with a precipitous decline in demand, mine operators closed mines, cut hours, and
dismissed miners. Anticipating significant wage reductions, miners, led by the United
Mine Worker's skillful and charismatic new President John L. Lewis, threatened to strike
on November 1, 1919.115
Last minute attempts by the federal government to broker an agreement between
labor and operators failed. When the deadline passed, 600,000 bituminous and anthracite
miners set down their picks and abandoned the mines. Through the middle of December,
more than 60 percent of the nation's bituminous mines and its entire anthracite region
remained shut down."' While operators sought to retreat from war-time wage increases,
miners, with support from labor and industrial advocates within the federal government,
pursued further increases to keep pace with the continuing rise in the cost of living.
Accepting arbitration from a government panel, miners and operators in most of the
country eventually accepted wage increases in March 1920 between 20 and 27 percent."17
The November-December strike was by no means the only factor that transformed
a coal shortage into a coal "crisis." In addition, the railroads faced persistent shortages of
coal cars, inefficient marketing prevented the delivery of coal supplies from regions with
115As historian John G. Clark has observed, the 1919 "coal crisis" itself was a product of deep, structural
transformations underway in America's industrial economy. The November-December miners' strike was
preceded in September by a deadly strike in the steel industry, and in 1919 alone, roughly 4 million
workers participated in 3,600 strikes. John Garretson Clark, Energy and the Federal Government : Fossil
Fuel Policies, 1900-1946 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 112-5. James Johnson notes that
these actions were frequently interpreted as "the opening volleys of revolution" whose participants were
maligned as agents of Soviet intrigue. See James P. Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal: The Bituminous
Industry from World War I through the New Deal (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 101-2. On
the war-time wage increases, see Ibid. 81-4.
116 Clark, Energy and the Federal Government : Fossil Fuel Policies, 1900-1946, 113-7.
'
7 Ibid., 117.
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large supplies to regions with large demands, the federal government disassembled the
war-time regulatory apparatus, and consumer stocks remained dangerously low."' These
factors, coupled with the wage increase in the winter of 1920, led to low supplies and
high prices. Consumers shouldered much of the burden as operators passed the wage
increase along in the form of price hikes. Between March and August of 1920, average
coal spot prices skyrocketed over 250 percent.1 19
As administrators in the federal government attempted to understand and address
the coal situation from a national perspective, coal operators and miners reacted to
pressures they experienced at the local level. In Washington State, these local pressures
would spill over into confrontation at the Navy's mine at Chickaloon.
Nationally, most miners and operators accepted a wage increase in March 1920
following the decision of a federal commission, but labor and production conditions
varied so greatly in Washington State that the federal government intentionally left fields
there out of the agreement. Instead, a separate commission was established to investigate
the state. To appoint its five members, miners selected two representatives from their
workers while the government selected two representatives from the region's operators.
The government instructed these four members to select a fifth. After six weeks of
debate they remained unable to do so. Ultimately, President Wilson appointed the fifth
and final member and within a month, the board issued a ruling, mandating in August a
$6.75 daily wage. 120 Neither miners nor operators were satisfied with this result.
"18 Ibid., 116.119 Johnson, The Politics ofSoft Coal, 107-8.
'
20 Sumner S. Smith to Otto Dowling 11/12/1920, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Record; Box 4; File,
"Wages". Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4;
File, "Wages".
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In Alaska, neither the nationally binding wage agreements of March nor the
Washington State agreement of August applied. Instead, a series of informal
relationships between Washington State and Alaska predominated labor, wages, capital,
and markets. Since the Klondike gold rush, Seattle had become what historian Kathryn
Morse has called "the most prominent urban gateway to Alaska," and more than any
other city, asserted its voice into the affairs of Alaska. 12 1 Before and during the war,
Alaskan mining wages largely followed wages in Washington State, moderated by local
conditions. Miners in Alaska were frequently drawn from the ranks of labor in
Washington State, and private operators in the north typically enticed these workers with
higher wages. A ten percent premium over Washington wage rates was a common
figure.122 As a rule, the federal government's agency for constructing the Alaskan
Railroad, the Alaskan Engineering Commission (A.E.C.), followed the wage scales set by
private Alaskan operators, and they too drew their labor from Washington.123 The A.E.C.
even maintained its own employment agency in Seattle through which it recruited
miners. 124
When the Navy moved into Chickaloon in the summer of 1920, however the ten
percent wage gap between Washington and Alaska had nearly equalized for private
operators while the A.E.C. paid below Washington rates. Alaskan wages had not
decreased, of course, but neither were they keeping pace with jolting wartime inflation.
Post-war wage settlements in the states rapidly outpaced wages in Alaska, and miners
121 Morse, The Nature of Gold: An Environmental History of the Klondike Gold Rush, 170.
122 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/22/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only".
123 Of $5.25 per day. Sumner S. Smith to Otto Dowling 11/12/1920. See also Joshua Bernhardt and
Brookings Institution. Institute for Government Research., The Alaskan Engineering Commission : Its
History, Activities, and Organization, Service Monographs of the United States Government; No. 4 (New
York, [N.Y.]: D. Appleton, 1922), 20-1. Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921.
124 Fredrick F. Mears to Otto Dowling 8/4/1920, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 2; File,
"Development, Plans for".
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there fought to keep up with the cost of living. 125 Although not affiliated with the United
Mine Workers, the A.E.C. miners nonetheless acted collectively. The A.E.C. raised
wages at Eska after miners struck in April 1920.126 When the independent commission
settled Washington's wage dispute in favor of labor four months later, A.E.C. miners
threatened a second strike to secure a similar increase. Interior Secretary James Barton
Payne consented, well aware that without coal, the Alaskan Railroad would grind to a
halt. By the end of 1920, A.E.C. miners' wages-including wages at the Navy's mine at
Chickaloon-had risen to $8.60 per day from a mere $5.25 during the summer of
1917.127
No sooner had the A.E.C. and the Navy agreed to this increase than they
deliberated over how to rescind it. In 1921, the cost of living in Alaska actually began to
decrease. With miners receiving regular work and unusually good lodging, food, and
medical care, Navy and Interior officials argued that the government wage was
"manifestly too high and out of all reason."' 28 High wages were "a handicap" and
"seriously embarrassed" private coal operators in Alaska, who remained unable to offer
such rates and remain solvent. 129 The Navy could ill afford to ignore its effect on private
operators, for the exploratory mining at Chickaloon was designed precisely to. entice
capital to invest in the high grade coals of the Matanuska district. Capital would only
125 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/22/1921.
126 Ibid. Sumner S. Smith to Otto Dowling 11/12/1920. This increase brought A.E.C. miners from $6.50 to
$7.10 per day.127 Sumner S. Smith to Otto Dowling 11/12/1920. Otto Dowling to SecNav (ONO) 4/30/1921, in NARA
Alaska RG 80; NACC Record; Box 4; File, "Wages". Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921. The
$1.50 increase in Washington raised miners' wages there to $8.25 per day.
128 Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921. Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/23/1921, in NAI RG
80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only". George S. Rice to RDB 10/27/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020;
File, "25320 (156:68) Only".
129 Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921. Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/23/1921. George S.
Rice to RDB 10/27/1921.
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invest, argued the Navy, if it believed that Alaskan coals could compete in Pacific
markets with coals of the eastern seaboard. The Navy concluded that industry's
perception of excessive labor costs acted as a deterrent against this investment, with high
production costs "tending to discredit" the field.130
However, too hasty a reduction in wages, reasoned the N.A.C.C., would almost
certainly provoke a strike at Chickaloon. The Navy, like the A.E.C., would not permit a
strike to interrupt their exploration, but with mining work there unusually complex, it
shuddered at the prospect of employing untrained scabs.' 31 Operators in Washington had
fewer compunctions about dismissing their miners. They believed that the government
commission's rate was excessive, and they set about to reduce it.
In Alaska, the Navy resolved in the spring of 1921 to postpone a wage reduction
until mines in Washington State acted first, thus providing a justification for reductions at
Chickaloon.132 The N.A.C.C. was unaware at the time of how contentious a decision
linking Alaskan wages so starkly to Washington wages would be. At the time, the
Navy's concern was principally for its budget, not the politics of labor in Alaska. If it
acknowledged in a private letter "that if any man on the globe deserves utmost
consideration, it is the citizen who breathes the coal dust in dark, damp, dusty, close coal
mines," it also believed that the demands of economy must be considered first. 133
In Washington State meanwhile, coal operators, rapidly losing money and
refusing to raise prices any further, announced in March, 1921 a return to prewar wages.
In return, the Washington operators promised to provide food, rent, and supplies to their
130 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/23/1921.
131 Otto Dowling to SecNav (ONO) 4/30/1921.
132 Sumner S. Smith to Otto Dowling 5/16/1921, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File,
"Wages".
133 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/23/1921.
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miners at 1917 prices, and proposed selling coal to the public at 1917 rates as well. They
cautioned that a refusal by the miners to accept the new conditions would result in the
closure of the mines altogether. Nevertheless, the miners balked, and ninety percent of
the state's commercial mines closed down. 134
The operators turned to Washington Governor Louis F. Hart to appoint another
state-wide commission to settle the wage question once and for all. This new
commission, reminiscent of the federal panel of the previous summer, included two
representatives of miners, two representatives of operators, and a fifth, "neutral" member.
This time, the miners and operators deadlocked on the wage question while the neutral
member offered a reduced rate of $6.00 per day. Neither the miners nor the operators
initially welcomed this figure, but in August, a handful of coal operators, mainly around
Puget Sound, decided to resist the union's continuing efforts to preserve wage increases
and they announced a unilateral wage reduction. 135 Ten of Washington's thirty-two
commercial mines reopened, offering wages at the lowered rate of $6.00 per day. They
further signaled their uncompromising position towards labor by endorsing the principles
of the open shop. 136
These events in Washington provided just the impetus that Dowling in
Chickaloon sought to justify the Navy's own wage reduction. Within weeks, he
announced that he was lowering wages for the Navy's miners. Dowling insisted on the
134 Only the railroad mines and a handful of commercial mines remained open, continuing to pay the
previously agreed wage of $8.25 per day. Otto Dowling to SecNav (ONO) 4/30/1921. Philip Weiss to
William C. Cole 9/22/1921, Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921.
135 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/22/1921. Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921.
136 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/22/1921. Otto Dowling to OpNav 9/25/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box
1019; File, "25320 (156) to (156:29)". Sumner S. Smith to H. Foster Bain 9/28/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box
1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only". Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 9/23/1921. The railroad mine at
Roslyn and commercial mines at Bellingham and Tono avoided the wage decrease, agreeing instead to
continue paying the previously agreed to scale not set to expire until April, 1922. Sumner S. Smith to H.
Foster Bain 9/28/1921.
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natural link. between Washington and Alaskan wages and he maintained that his reduction
was based on the recent wage cut declared by the Washington operators. 137 The new
scale, in fact, formalized a relationship that had heretofore been only circumstantial:
instead of a loose connection between Washington and Alaskan wages, Dowling's
reduction added a fixed fifty cents to the rate set by the neutral member of the
Washington commission. 138 As he increasingly insisted that the wage decrease in
Washington warranted a decrease in Alaska, Dowling opened the space for a contestation
not merely of wages, but of geographical relationships.
A.E.C. miners did not protest that wages should be determined in relation to
wages in other mining districts. Instead, they believed these relationships should work
fairly. The more Dowling insisted that circumstances in Washington justified his actions
in Alaska, the more the miners asserted that other geographical relationship should shape
the wage issue.
The Chickaloon miners' committee quickly drafted a petition that they sent
directly to Navy Secretary Denby, accusing Dowling's reduction of being "preemptory
and unsupported by the facts."' 39 While the Navy's connected the Chickaloon wages to
conditions in Washington State, the miners drew a different map. They observed that day
wages in Montana, Wyoming, and Colorado all exceeded $6.50 and were not set to
expire until April 1922. It was unfair, they argued, for the Navy to take action on the
violation of an agreement by only a handful of operators in western Washington but still
held by most in the state. If the Navy insisted that government scales should follow
prevailing regional wages, wage reductions should not be made based on a small number
137 Otto Dowling to OpNav 9/25/1921. Fredrick F. Mears to Albert B. Fall 10/7/1921.
138 Sumner S. Smith to H. Foster Bain 9/28/1921.
139 Mines Committee to Hon. Dan Sutherland.
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of exceptions, and neither should these changes be made based on a unilateral reduction,
before a settlement between miners and operators in the states could be reached.140
The miners' unexpected opposition prompted Secretaries Denby and Fall in
Washington to order a halt to the wage reduction even before it took effect. The
departments agreed to investigate the wage situation themselves and after their analysis,
they decided to postpone any wage reduction until the spring of 1922.141 Although they
justified the delay with concern over timing, their eroding control over how Alaska
related to the rest of the country was evident. "This is not intended as a recognition that
Alaska shall be governed by the miners' agreements in the States" wrote Interior officials
to their counterparts in the Navy, instead feebly arguing that a wage reduction on the cusp
of winter appeared cruel. 142 To Dowling in Chickaloon, Secretary Denby could only wire
instructions to delay the wage reduction and exclaim an ambiguous, "Situation more
complicated than appears to you."' 43
What precisely Denby meant remains unclear. What is certain is that the Navy's
actions were being watched very closely by both labor and coal operators. If Chickaloon
wages remained too high, operators might accuse them of supporting miners at the
expense of economy; too large a reduction might suggest that the government sided with
the coal companies. Ideally, the Navy hoped it could simply wait for a resolution in
Washington State, one accepted by both labor and capital, and then follow that decision
without much objection. "We comply with, we do not initiate," wrote one officer about
140 Ibid. The miners' position was strengthened by the support of Alaska's delegate in Congress, Dan
Sutherland, who observed to the Navy that their miners were not affiliated with organized labor and that
many were themselves recently returned veterans whose "petition merits very serious consideration." Dan
Sutherland to William C. Cole 9/24/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only".
141 E.C. Finney to Frederick Mears 9/27/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only",
Sumner S. Smith to H. Foster Bain 9/28/1921.
142 E.C. Finney to William C. Cole 11/26/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320 (156:68) Only".
143 Edwin Denby to Otto Dowling 9/27/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1019; File, "25320 (156) to (156:29)".
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naval policy, "we do not take sides; we wait until the war between operators and
employees is over and then accept conclusions." But waiting had a price, one that
affected both the availability of the Navy's future fuel supply in the Pacific and the
industrial development of Alaska itself.'44 Dowling continued to push for a reduction.
He also came to recant his earlier suggestion that Chickaloon wages be linked so
firmly to Washington State. By the spring of 1922, Dowling admitted that "[w]ages in
Alaska should be based upon living conditions in Alaska and not upon a territory 1200
miles distant." While the government should have set its own scale for Chickaloon by
loosely following local private operators, the Navy mine was instead following the
distant Washington situation and leading, not following, local Alaskan industry. "We
should set our own wage scale," wrote Dowling, "taking into account private operators
who have to follow the government scale, but having gotten both feet into the
Washington muddle, cannot now do so and must continue to follow."' 45 The "muddle"
was both his own linking of Chickaloon wages to the Washington labor "war" that was
entirely outside of naval control, as well as his providing the opportunity for Chickaloon
miners to argue for a geographical link that worked more in their favor.
As naval officers struggled with wages in Alaska and Washington, they
acknowledged that collectively, the nation had failed to address the persistent inequities
between labor and capital and the wrenching imbalances between production and
consumption. The labor conflict at Chickaloon was merely an element of these problems.
Philip Weiss, Dowling's deputy at Chickaloon, observed that "[s]ociety must continue its
efforts to control supply and demand in the coal problem and work out distribution in
144 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 12/12/1921, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020, File, "25320 (156:68) Only".
145 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 4/11/1922.
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such a way as to provide a good wage for the coal miner and more than 200 days work
per year."146 Failure to do so threatened to lead only to further crises. But national
solutions meant connections between distant places, which had clearly gotten the Navy in
trouble. Even as he emphasized the national scope of the problem, Weiss insisted on a
local solution. The Navy's operation in Alaska was unique, he wrote, and "we cannot
look to the State of Washington alone, or to the States of the Northwest or to the general
situation in the United States for a solution." 147 But he could not have it both ways.
Closing Chickaloon
Suspicion within the Navy that Matanuska coal would never compete economically with
Appalachian coal began sinking in during the summer of 1921. Geological
reconnaissance indicated irregular beds, making high production costs likely, if not
inevitable. Even if coal could be mined for as little as $7.00 per ton, the combined costs
of freight, washing, and handling easily exceeded the cost of eastern coals. "I doubt
whether the coal can ever be laid down for the same price as eastern coal," exclaimed
Dowling, "certainly not for less."' 48 Regional markets were not promising either. In the
summer, only canneries along the coast consumed large quantities of coal, but they
subsisted on cheap lignite. In the winter, even growing towns like Anchorage still
demanded very little-about 1,000 tons per month-and they opted for a lower grades of
bituminous commercial coal mined near Chickaloon. 149
146 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 12/12/1921.
147 Ibid.
148 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 8/1/1921.
149 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 11/25/1921.
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These market constraints remained unknown to the majority of Alaskans, who
grew increasingly discontented over the progress of government mining in the Matanuska
Valley in late 1921. One Alaskan paper editorialized the situation by demanding to know
why the Navy's project in Chickaloon had not resulted in any obvious benefit to the
residents of Alaska. "Where is the Coal?" they asked, "[a]nd why is there not more coal
available for commercial use in Alaska towns?" Other Alaskan papers reprinted the
piece, to which the Navy was eventually forced to respond. Claiming that the current
Navy exploration must not be conflated with previous government mining in the region
(for the Alaskan Railroad), the Navy methodically explained the status of their geological
exploration and progress of their mining. The listed their leasing units and the quantity of
coal blocked out on each. They also noted that problems bringing Alaskan coal to market
were not limited to the government, for even the four private companies operating in the
Matanuska Valley had difficulty selling their coal, and unlike the Navy, their continued
corporate existence depended on it. These companies faced a logistical problem shared
by the Alaskan Coal Commission: transporting their coal from their fields to Alaskan
markets or other locations along the Pacific coast. The Navy concluded their defense by
diffusing expectations that Alaskan coal might ever be able to compete with eastern coals
and their "present ridiculously low freight rates."'15
The Navy as a whole was also under extreme financial duress. By the fall, the
department was exceeding its Congressional appropriations." 5 The Navy faced the
"urgent necessity for reducing Naval expenditures to the lowest figure possible"
150 "The Coal Mining Operations of the Alaskan Engineering Commission 12/16/1921 ," in NARA Alaska
RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Policy".
"'s J.K. Robison, "Engineering in the Navy," in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Navy
Alaska Coal Commission Chickaloon, AK" (1922).
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according to one officer who advocated nixing the $1 million yearly appropriation for
Alaskan mining.152
Furthermore, patience between the Navy and the A.E.C. was wearing thin. As
originally conceived, the A.E.C. managed daily operations like labor and mining, while
the N.A.C.C. supervised policy and budgets. Important decisions were made jointly.
This arrangement inevitably led to the duplication of responsibilities. Furthermore, the
A.E.C. charged the Navy for transporting supplies and workers over the railroad, as well
as for overhead costs for projects the Navy was unassociated with, actions Dowling felt
were deeply unfair. Dowling was especially incensed at these perceived indignations
since he believed that the Navy's investment in the Matanuska Valley would directly
benefit the A.E.C. and its railroad and ultimately "will be their greatest asset." He
thought that only one of the agencies should assume authority, though both hoped the job
would fall upon the other. 153 Nevertheless, "[w]e have followed the theory of not
changing horses in the middle of the stream" wrote Dowling to Washington, "and we
have not removed the monkey wrench that caused the clog in the machinery." 154 The
"monkey wrench," in Dowling's opinion, was Sumner Smith, formerly federal mine
inspector for Alaska and now the chief mining engineer for the mine at Chickaloon.
Smith "has not cooperated with the Commission to his fullest ability by any manner of
means," Dowling asserted. Smith's weakness, according to Dowling, was that "his ideas
of expenditures tend very closely to extravagance." After regularly reducing Smith's
152 5-185
153 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 11/25/1921, Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 4/11/1922.
154 Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 4/11/1922.
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budget estimates, Dowling found it increasingly difficult "to maintain friendly
relations." 155
The suggestion of abandoning coal mining in Alaska was not universally
embraced by officers within the Navy Department. The Chiefs of the Bureau of
Engineering and the Bureau of Yards and Docks protested to Denby that the closure of
the Chickaloon mine must be accompanied by further development of an emergency coal
supply there. If the Navy turned its investment in the Matanuska field over to the
Department of Interior, they cautioned that the mine should be further developed by the
government or through leases, that the available coal supply there remain substantial, that
the washery be completed and kept ready for operation, and that government royalties
from selling Matanuska coal be spent on port development in Anchorage of Seward. 156
Failure to ensure these precautions, they warned, "would involve a large measure of
waste of Government funds already spent."' 57
And what of naval strategy in the Pacific? Only weeks before had Admiral Cole
reassured the N.A.C.C. about the strategic necessity of proving and developing
Matanuska coal. Cole conceded that speaking strictly economically, Alaskan coal did
"not offer captivating allurements." But the Navy-and the perceived imperatives of
national defense-did not operate strictly economically. Cole rehearsed the familiar
strategic arguments for an Alaskan coal supply: threats to the Panama Canal locks, the
impossibility of shipping massive quantities of coal cross-country by rail, the limited coal
storage capacity in Pacific ports. All these strategic weakness in the Pacific pointed to an
155 Ibid.
156 Chiefs BuEng & Y&D to SecNav [Names?] 3/10/1922, in NAI RG 80; Box 1020; File, "25320
(171:12)".
157 Ibid.
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apparent inevitability to the Navy's development of Alaskan coal. "You may consider as
final that if you prove the field the coal will be mined" assured Cole. The Navy might
not become the sole consumer of Alaskan coal, he added, "but if our present plans
materialize, the coal will market itself."158
But present plans did not materialize and Alaskan coal did not market itself. Less
than three weeks after Admiral's Cole's confirmation of Navy policy, Dowling received a
terse telegram from Washington: "Due to lack of funds all expenditures in Matanuska
Field will cease April one period Advise all concerned period Letter follows."'159 After
nearly two years of digging, drilling, strikes, and strategizing, the leadership in the Navy
decided to terminate their direct involvement in mining Alaskan coal.
Later observers would justify the closure of Chickaloon on the grounds that
geological exploration determined an insufficient quantity of coal available at
unaffordable costs. It is certainly true that supporters of the Chickaloon project
overstated the ease of mining and underestimated the cost. But even after the mine's
closure was announced, Navy representatives in Alaska still maintained that their work
was valuable and that the investment would eventually be validated. It was easier to
justify the expenses of the program on learning for certain that coal mining in the
Matanuska Valley was impossible than to acknowledge that nearly two years and two
million dollars into the project, geological spaces were still unknown. According to
Dowling's assistant, "[t]he next 10 years will show actual mining in the field, sale of the
15s William C. Cole to Otto Dowling 2/6/1922.
159 Opnav to Otto Dowling 2/25/1922, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Telegrams".
A subsequent order delayed the closure until May 1st, permitting time to shut down the mine and negotiated
a deal to turn Chickaloon over to the Interior Department. See Edwin Denby to Otto Dowling 3/8/1922, in
NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Telegrams". OpNav to Otto Dowling 3/18/1922, in
NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Telegrams".
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coal in Alaska and on the Pacific at a price which will compete with Eastern coal and a
feeling of financial satisfaction on the part of the Government for having opened up the
field."160 But no such actual mining occurred.
Over the following two months, the Navy Alaskan Coal Commission gradually
concluded its operations. Miners disassembled the camp at Kings River first. 16 1
Diamond drilling was rapidly brought to a close, leaving the geologists an incomplete
impression of the underground structure of the region. Exploration at Coal Creek ceased
in early April as miners began working three shifts at Chickaloon to extract enough coal
for washing and shipboard testing. Digging one hundred tons daily, they still only
finished a day before the scheduled shut down. 162
Although boosters, planners, and naval officers imagined an Alaskan energy boom at the
beginning of the 20 th century, that boom failed to appear. The difficulties of management
and labor frustrated the Navy, as did natural obstacles for which the department's
expeditions were unprepared. Above all, the Navy encountered too much difficulty in
uncovering the tricky geology of distant Alaska.
The Navy's gradual shift to burning oil fuel that began in the 1910s also
prevented the Navy from planning to mine Alaskan coal in the future. As the fleet
increasingly burned oil, the demand for coal lessened and by World War II, had ended
entirely. Yet oil did not eliminate the importance of geography or resources. Only a year
160 Philip Weiss to William C. Cole 3/6/1922, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 2; File,
"Reports Monthly - SecNav".
161 Otto Dowling to SecNav (ONO) 3/6/1922, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 2; File,
"Reports Monthly - SecNav", Sumner Smith to Otto Dowling 3/2/1922, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC
Records; Box 4; File, "Operations-Matanuska Field-Genr'l".
162 Otto Dowling to SecNav 4/5/1922, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Telegrams",
Otto Dowling to SecNav 5/22/1922, in NARA Alaska RG 80; NACC Records; Box 4; File, "Telegrams",
Otto Dowling to William C. Cole 4/11/1922.
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after the Navy closed its mine at Chickaloon, President Calvin Coolidge established the
Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 4 on Alaska's North Slope. It joined three other Naval
Petroleum Reserves in California and Wyoming, including the one at Teapot Dome, that
had been established during the Taft and Wilson Administrations. This interest in
reserving a fuel supply for naval use grew directly from the near century of effort to fuel
the Navy with coal. As petroleum use grew throughout the 20 h" century, including its
vital use to the American military, the relevance of the geography of energy resources
became clearer as well.'63
163 On the Naval Petroleum Reserves, see J. Leonard Bates, The Origins of Teapot Dome: Progressives,
Parties and Petroleum, 1909-1921 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), Burl Noggle, Teapot
Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920's (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), David H.
Stratton, Tempest over Teapot Dome : The Story ofAlbert B. Fall, The Oklahoma Western Biographies ; V.
16 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).
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Conclusion
On January 27 th, 1911, large crowds took to the streets in Guayaquil, Ecuador. The
government called in troops to disperse them-trying, but failing, to keep them away
from the President's house. Gathering at its gates, the protestors assailed the President,
the liberal reformer Eloy Alfaro, for planning to lease the Galapagos Islands as a naval
coaling station to the United States. The crowds proceeded to "hoot" the government,
according to one press report, attacking as well the President of the Guayaquil and Quito
Railway Company who was blamed for instigating the plan. Though dispersed by troops,
the crowd returned the following night, this time stoning the residence of the President-
Elect and the office of the government's newspaper organ, El Tiempo. This time, the
police kept the crowds from reaching Alfaro's house, but only with the help of a charging
cavalry.
A wire story, reprinted in many of the U.S.'s largest papers, reported that the
Galapagos issue had "resulted in the most serious demonstrations of ill-feeling against
everything American seen here in many years." On the third day of protests, some
10,000 Ecuadorians marched at noon to the President's house. Troops kept the
demonstrators from approaching too closely, but their leader, the politician Ignacio
Robles, gained an audience with President Alfaro. Robles explained what was by then
obvious: that Ecuadorians were opposed to negotiating with the U.S. over the Galapagos.
By the end of the long meeting, Alfaro conceded, explaining that his government would
"Hoot Galapagos Lease," New York Times, January 28 1911, "Mob Resents Lease to U.S.," The
Washington Post, January 28 1911, "More Riots over Galapagos," New York Times, January 29 1911,
Alfredo Luna Tobar, Historia Politica Internacional De La Islas Galdpagos, Biblioteca Del Pensamiento
Internacionalista Del Ecuador 2 (Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 1997), 195-9.
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cease its negotiations. The President-Elect took the cue as well, and quickly issued a
statement that his administration, too, when it took office, would prohibit such a deal.2
This episode is revealing, because in 1911, neither the State nor Navy
Departments had actually desired the Galapagos Islands for use as a coaling station. The
United States began negotiations only when approached by the government of Ecuador
and pursued them only out of the suspicion that the country might sell or lease them
instead to Britain, Germany, or France. But to the massive crowds hooting the
government in Ecuador and to Americans learning of the events in their newspapers or
through Congressional investigations, U.S. diplomacy for islands had become
inextricably identified as expansion for coaling stations, and suggestions of the
importance of coaling stations was no longer limited to policy elites. Major national
newspapers like the New York Times, Washington Post, and Boston Globe, as well as
popular journals like Scientific American published literally hundreds of articles around
the turn of the twentieth century that suggested the need for these stations.
In 1854, the federal government, including the President and Secretary of the
Navy, had balked when Matthew Perry suggested acquiring territory to support the Navy
with coal in the Pacific. After 1898, this same notion had become commonplace and had,
in fact, resulted in substantial acquisitions of land around the world. The pursuit of coal
and coaling stations had normalized the idea of projecting American power abroad
through the geographic control of strategic ports, islands, and bases.
Scenes of protest as occurred in Guayaquil would become increasingly common
in the 2 0 h century, as the United States gradually acquired land for coaling stations,
2 "Show Hatred of America," The Washington Post, January 30 1911, "Ecuadorians Angry at U.S.,"
Chicago Daily Tribune, January 30 1911, "To Drop Galapagos Lease," New York Times, January 30 1911.
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oiling plants, and an increasing range of military facilities. We must situate this change
within a long history of adapting American foreign policy to the changes in industrial
power.
Nevertheless, we must also avoid slipping into an easy technological determinism,
that steam power simply required coaling stations. We must reject the idea that coal
alone demanded the American empire that emerged after 1898. Coal did not make an
empire necessary, but the persistent efforts to acquire coaling stations in the 19t century
helped create the idea of needing coaling stations, and helped Americans naturalize the
acquisition of foreign bases. The idea of the need for an energy network shaped public
opinion and policy, even when energy was itself not at stake. The idea of coaling stations
helped Americans imagine themselves as a benevolently imperial power-they were not
after territory, after all, but merely acquiring the bare minimum land they believed to be
required by modem technology. As Rear-Admiral Royal Bradford put it in 1899, "[i]f
the layman were asked if he believed in the acquisition of foreign island territory, or in
what at the present time is termed 'expansion,' the chances are about one to three that he
would reply in the negative." Over sixteen more pages in the popular journal Forum
Bradford argued that acquiring this foreign island territory was simply a modem
necessity for national defense-it couldn't be argued with.3
But the idea of the coaling station slid rather easily into more muddled territory.
It became harder and harder to separate strategic bases for coaling from bases for other
strategic purposes, and those strategic purposes grew over the course of the 20 h century.
Yet the notion that allowed Americans to imagine possessing strategic territory overseas
3 Royal B. Bradford, "Coaling-Stations for the Navy," Forum XXVI, no. 6 (1899): 733.
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was formed much earlier in the 19 th century, and at the core of this notion lay steam
engines powered by coal.
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Appendix
Map 1: Sketch of the "Coast of Borneo Proper" and the city of Brunei. From Captain
Rodney Mundy and James Brooke, Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, Down to
the Occupation of Labuan: From the Journals of James Brooke, Esq., Rajah of Sarawak,
and Governor of Labuan. Together with a Narrative of the Operations of H.M.S. Iris.
2nd ed. Vol. 2. London: John Murray, 1848, p. 396A.
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Map 2: "Plan of the Island of Labuan." From Captain Rodney Mundy and James Brooke,
Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, Down to the Occupation of Labuan: From
the Journals of James Brooke, Esq., Rajah of Sarawak, and Governor of Labuan.
Together with a Narrative of the Operations of HM.S. Iris. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. London:
John Murray, 1848, p. 396C.
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Picture 1: "Coal Seam at Labuan." From Captain Rodney Mundy and James Brooke,
Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, Down to the Occupation of Labuan:' From
the Journals of James Brooke, Esq., Rajah of Sarawak, and Governor of Labuan.
Together with a Narrative of the Operations of HM.S. Iris. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. London:
John Murray, 1848, p. 348A.
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Picture 2: "Explorers.-Lew Chew.-Night Camp." Wood cut by Japan Expedition artist
Wilhelm Heine. From Matthew Perry and Francis L. Hawks, Narrative of the expedition
of an American squadron to the China seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852,
1853, and 1854, under the command of Commodore M.C. Perry. Vol. 1. H. Ex. Doc. 97,
3yd Cong., 2nd sess., 1856, p. 166.
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Map 3: "Map Intended to Show the Positions of the COAL MINES Eastward of Kelung,
Island of Formosa." From "Reports Made to Commodore Perry on A Visit to the Coal
Regions of the Island of Formosa," inMatthew Perry and Francis L. Hawks, Narrative of
the expedition of an American squadron to the China seas and Japan, performed in the
years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the command of Commodore M.C. Perry. Vol. 2. H
Ex. Doc. 97, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1856, p. 155.
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Map 4: "Map of the Province of Chiriqui, Republic of New Granada," Ambrose W.
Thompson's land shaded in brown. From Ambrose W. Thompson Papers, Box 43:
Chiriqui Improvement Co., 1865-1866, Library of Congress.
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Map 5: "Map Showing Relation of Alaska Coal Fields to Transportation Routes." From
Mineral Resources of Alaska, 1910, U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 442, Plate 1.
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Map 6: "Map of Central Alaska Showing Position of the Coal Fields." From Geology
and Mineral Resources of Kenai Peninsula, Alaska: U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 587,
1915, Plate 1.
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Map 7: "Topographic Map of Upper Matanuska Valley, Alaska." From Geology of the
l!pper Matanuska Valley, Alaska, U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin, 791, 1928, Plate 1.
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Picture 3: Photograph of the Chickaloon coal camp, circa 1920. From "Dee 1920
Report," Box No.1, PC 31 Entry 17, "Reports from the Navy Alaskan Coal Commission,
Dec 1920 and May 1, 1922, RG 80 General Records of the Department of the Navy
1798-1947, National Archives I.
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